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PREFACE 
By the time of publication, there will always be much more recent 
information available so a statement on timing is helpful. In this 
monograph, "now" means March-May 1962 and the data used gene-
rally stops about the end of March. Another general rule of topical 
studies is that drastic changes always occur just as the writing is finished. 
In June 1962, a new Banking Companies Ordinance was released which 
placed further controls, actual and potential, on the operations of 
foreign banks. The principal changes are that these banks are now 
required to maintain capital in Pakistan to the extent of five per cent 
of deposits and that they must publish balance sheets of their Pakistan 
operations separately (see Section II of this monograph). 
1 am indebted to John H. Power and M. Umer Chapra for reading 
and commenting on this manuscript. I would not have been able even 
to begin this study without the cooperation I have received from private 
bankers and State Bank officials. Since many are reluctant to be 
associated with my arguments and conclusions, I refrain from naming 
them. But my obligation is no less great for this omission, and I thank 
each. 
Richard C. Porter 
Research Adviser, 
July 1962. Monetary and Fiscal Section, 
KARACHI. Institute of Development Economics. 
S Y M B O L S A N D A B B R E V I A T I O N S 
RC+F refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Research Depart-
ment, Report on Currency and Finance, issued 
annually {e.g., RC+F 60-61 refers to the issue 
for 1960/61). 
BS refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Statistics Depart-
ment, Banking Statistics, issued annually (e.g., 
BS 59-60 refers to the issue of 1959/60). 
SBP.B refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin, issued 
monthly. 
SBP.GFO refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Research Depart-
ment, The State Bank of Pakistan: Its Growth, 
Functions, and Organization, Karachi. 1961. 
SBP.AR 
SBP.SSP 
Weekly Statement 
refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report 
{e.g., SBP.AR 56-57 refers to the issue of 
1956/57). 
refers to State Bank of Pakistan, Statistics Depart-
ment, Statistics on Scheduled Banks in Pakistan, 
issued quarterly (begun in December 1961). 
refers to the data collected by the State Bank 
from each Scheduled Bank on Friday of every 
week and published, for the aggregate of all 
Scheduled Banks, within a few days. It is avail-
able in SBP. B, RC+F, and BS. 
Quarterly Statement refers to the data collected by the State Bank 
from each Scheduled Bank on the last day of 
every quarter and published, for all Scheduled 
Banks and for two or three subgroupings of 
them, after a few months. It is available in 
greatest detail in BS. The items on this and the 
Weekly Statement are generally defined diffe-
rently; hence, the entries in the two Statements 
are rarely comparable. 
I.D.E. refers to the Institute of Development Economics. 
— in a table means that the value is zero, 
n.a. in a table means that the value is not available. 
One crore is ten million. 
One lakh is one hundred thousand (100 lakhs = 1 crore). 
These two words are not italicized in the text. 
Rs. refers to Pakistan rupees. 
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S E C T I O N I 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the determinants of the volume of bank credit 
in Pakistan. It is undertaken with three purposes. The first, and 
most important, is the need for this knowledge in order to formulate 
monetary policy. The second is to provide a description and analysis 
of the Pakistan banking system with respect to the volume of credit it 
creates. The third is to suggest an alternative method of analysis of 
bank credit and monetary policy to that usually employed, especially 
in underdeveloped countries, in which almost no emphasis is given to 
the positions and policies of the commercial banks. 
These three purposes are interrelated. Because of the present 
tendency to consider only the central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan, 
when monetary policy is being discussed, there exists almost no des-
cription of the operations of commercial banks in Pakistan. And 
because there is no real understanding of the commercial banks, there 
is no sound basis for the State Bank's credit policies. The last two 
sections of this monograph, Sections XIV and XV, are concerned with 
the resulting failures of State Bank credit control policies and suggest 
steps toward the possibility of control of bank credit in Pakistan. 
Since the volume of credit is largely determined by the institutional 
structure of the banking system, the different policies of individual 
commercial banks, and the interrelations between these banks, it is to 
this that most of this monograph is directed. The next twelve sections 
are primarily aimed at improving our understanding of the operations 
of the commercial banks, and only to lesser extent the policies of the 
State Bank. 
By commercial bank, or just bank, we shall mean Scheduled Bank 
throughout this monograph. In Pakistan, a commercial bank becomes 
a Scheduled Bank (i.e., is placed upon the "schedule") whenever its 
capital assets exceed five lakhs of rupees1 . There are in Pakistan nearly 
1. Other quite unimportant conditions must also be fulfilled. 
twice as many non-Scheduled Banks as Scheduled Banks2, but less 
than one-tenth of the bank branches are of non-Scheduled Banks; the 
Total deposit liabilities of the non-Scheduled. Banks are only about 
0.7 per cent of those of the Scheduled Banks3. Of the so-called "indi-
genous bankers", who are not even listed as non-Scheduled Banks 
(though they may be quite large), we know even less. But it is generally 
believed that, in Pakistan, such "banks" are much less prevalent than 
in some Asian countries. Thus, while this study is concerned only 
with the Scheduled Banks in Pakistan, it really comes very close to con-
sidering the entire banking system. 
In Sections II and III, some institutional and legal background to 
the Pakistan banking system is given. In Sections IV and V, the process 
by which the banks acquire and hold their principal assets, securities 
and advances, is described. The next three Sections, VI, VII, and VIII, 
are concerned with the sources from which individual banks can acquire 
lendable funds. A description of the process of advance expansion is 
presented in Section IX. Sections X through XIII contain analyses 
of the determinants of inter-bank transfers of reserves, cash ratios, 
liquidity ratios, and indebtedness of banks to the State Bank. The 
problems of monetary policy are treated in the final two sections. 
There are five appendices which contain subsidiary matter too long 
or too technical for the general reader's interest. These may be omitted, 
but if they are read, they should be considered along with the section 
to which they pertain. 
SECTION II 
T H E PAKISTAN B A N K I N G SYSTEM 
The banking system of Pakistan is in many important ways no 
older than the nation itself. Before the partition of British India, the 
2. On June 1961, there were 50 non-Scheduled Banks and 28 Scheduled 
Banks (BS 60-61, p. vii). 
3. In 1960, the latest figures available for the non-Scheduled Banks, not all 
of which even bother to report to the State Bank. The deposit liabilities of the 
non-Scheduled Banks were Rs. 1.96 crores (average of weekly figures over 1960) 
which might be increased to Rs. 2.20 crores to allow for underreporting (BS 60-61, 
p. 14). The average of the deposit liabilities of Scheduled Banks for December 
1959 and December 1960 is Rs. 319.69 crores (Weekly Statements). 
2 
regions which later became Pakistan were not industrial, even by sub-
continental standards, and the banks which serviced them did 110 more 
than finance the seasonal flow of food and raw materials to large cities 
and ports. For this task, there was a quite extensive network of bank 
branches, especially in East Bengal where the jute crop originated, but 
it was almost entirely in the hands of Europeans and non-Muslims. 
The partition of India and Pakistan almost completely destroyed 
this banking network. Over 400 bank branches, about 70 percent of 
the total number in what became East and West Pakistan, (according 
to the State Bank) were closed during the difficulties that accompanied 
Partition. Even after the restoration of order, the exodus did not stop 
though many Hindu bankers re-opened their Pakistani branches for 
a while. During the period f rom 1949 through 1951, sixteen Scheduled 
Banks withdrew from Pakistan. Not until 1961 did the number of 
bank branches in Pakistan again reach its pre-Partition size1. 
Nearly a year after Pakistan's official inception, almost 90 per cent 
of the bank branches were still operated by the Indian and British 
banks, despite the rapid departure of many Indian banks. Of banks 
operated by its own nationals, Pakistan had only two at. the time of 
Partition, the Habib Bank and the Australasia Bank2. Two new 
Pakistani banks were sooii founded, the Muslim Commercial Bank 
and the Bank of Bahawalpur, but the system remained overwhelmingly 
foreign-dominated until the devaluation. crisis of 1949 forced the in-
auguration of the National Bank of Pakistan, a bank whose operations 
reflect government policy, though it is not entirely owned by the gov-
ernment3 . By 1952, half the bank branches in Pakistan were of Pakis-
tani banks, but the total number of branches had increased little over 
1. All figures in this paragraph are from State Bank of Pakistan, Twelve 
Years of Banking in Pakistan, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1960). 
2. Something of the origin and history of these and other Pakistani banks 
may be found in J.S.G. Wilson, "Money and Banking in Pakistan" in R. S. Sayers 
(Ed.), Banking in the British Commonwealth, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1952), pp. 260-302; more recent are the several banking articles in Trade & Industry, 
Karachi, November 1961. 
3. For discussions of Pakistan's early financial trials, see M. Baqai, "The 
National Bank of Pakistan: Its Origin and Development", in Selected Papers 
on the Pakistan Economy, Vol. 2, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1955), pp. 87-
106; and Z. Husain, "Central Banking in Pakistan", Federal Economic Review, 
October 1954, pp. 1-44. 
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the preceding few years as the Indian banks continued to withdraw4. 
The system has grown rapidly since 1952, the National Bank of 
Pakistan leading in the government-backed efforts to inculcate the 
"banking habi t" throughout the nation. By June 1961, there were 
580 bank branches in Pakistan, a three-fold rise f rom the number in 
June 1948. Just as important as this tremendous growth in the bank-
ing system, however, is the significant change in its structure: 507 of 
the 580 branches are of Pakistani Scheduled Banks; the Indian banks 
have steadily dwindled to a position of very minor importance; and 
the British banks have just held their own in the face of increasing 
difficulties in obtaining deposits. 
Most of the banks in Pakistan, regardless of the nationality of their 
owners and managers, are basically in the British tradition. In this 
sense, it is misleading to suggest that the Pakistan banking system is 
no older than the nation itself. Such hallowed words as "short-term", 
"self-liquidation", "credit-worthy borrowers" echo along the tall, fan-
covered ceilings of McLeod Road with perhaps greater resonance and 
regularity than ever they did from Threadneedie Street. If the various 
Scheduled Banks in Pakistan were uniform in their acceptance, and 
subsequent violation, of these British traditions, there would be less 
need to consider the banking system in its constituent elements. Be-
cause the 33 different Scheduled Banks that now comprise the Pakistan 
banking system do operate by somewhat differing principles and in 
vastly differing circumstances, it is necessary that we examine the various 
segments. 
The principal groups are the Pakistani, the British, the American, 
and the Indian banks. But once we begin to subdivide the Scheduled 
Banks, State Bank publications become almost useless as sources of 
information. Even to estimate the relative deposit-size of the various 
groups is no easy mat ter ; in the estimates below, we rely upon the only 
two public sources of information: 
1) Quarterly Statements of the Scheduled Banks are segregated 
by Pakistani and foreign banks, so that these aid comparisons if the 
subgroups are no more finely formed. Through September 1961, 
4. All figures in this paragraph are from BS 60-61, p. 110. 
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the Indian banks were reported separately from the "other foreign" 
banks; while this discontinuation is to be praised in the interests of 
less prejudicial Indo-Pakistan relations, the loss of information is to 
be pitied by the analyst—perhaps we can hope for a new and more 
useful breakdown of the foreign banks category, e.g., by the British, 
American, and other foreign banks. 
2) The annual balance sheets required of the Pakistani banks by 
companies law: The foreign banks need not, and do not, release 
balance sheets of their Pakistan operations, although the State Bank's 
Banking Statistics duly (and uselessly) publishes balance sheets of each 
foreign bank's total worldwide operations. It is surprising that the 
State Bank and the government in their determination to Pakis tan- /^ 
the banking system, have forced the Pakistani banks to operate under 
the handicap of giving information to the foreign banks without re-
ciprocation. It would surely not be inequitable, and it would be very 
useful for analysis, if each foreign bank were required to release a 
balance sheet of its Pakistan operations5 . 
However, with these two pieces of public information and various 
semi-public knowledge, we can estimate the relative size, with respect 
to deposits, of these four segments of the banking system (as of Decem-
ber 1961) (see Table II. 1) N o really sound effort can be made to 
break down quantitatively the relative importance of particular banks 
within any of these categories except the Pakistani. No more than 
a qualitative estimate will be attempted for the British and American 
banks. Some discussion of each of these groups is relevant. 
1) Pakistani banks: There are now twelve Pakistani-operated 
Scheduled Banks, four of which are principally government-owned 
(the National Bank of Pakistan, the Agricultural Development Bank 
of Pakistan, the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, and the 
Eastern Mercantile Bank). Of these twelve, however, only a few are 
of significant size as is shown in Table II.2. The two largest are very 
different in attitudes and, as a result, in portfolios. The National 
Bank, though it is partly private-owned and makes good profits, 
5. Since this was written, such a requirement has been introduced. 
Table IV .4 
Type of bank Fraction of total deposits 
Indian 
Other 
Pakistani 
British 
American 
.67" 
.196 
.07c 
.06" 
.01e 
Source and Procedure: Total deposits of all banks were Rs. 353.90 crores (Quar-
terly Statement, "total demand and time deposits"). Each figure is a frac-
tion of this. 
a. The Quarterly Statement separates "total demand and time deposits" of 
Pakistani banks (Rs. 237.82 crores). 
b. Residual. 
c. The American banks depend for deposits primarily upon the U.S.A. 
government funds; these are believed to have been about Rs. 20 crores 
in December 1961. Thus, the total deposit estimate is about Rs. 25 
crores. 
d. The Indian banks' "total demand and time deposits" (Quarterly State-
ment) were Rs. 20.39 crores in September 1961 (not available in Decem-
ber 1961). This figure was estimated to have increased proportionately 
to the total deposits of the whole system between September and December 
1961 (the latter rose from Rs. 340.69 crores, i.e., by 4 per cent). Thus, 
their December 1961 deposits are about Rs. 21 crores. 
e. The four"other foreign Scheduled Banks, the Bank of Tokyo, the Nether-
lands Trading Society, the Bank of China, and the Deutsche Asiatische 
Bank are known to be small in Pakistan and the 1-per-cent figure is a token 
gesture. 
Source: For total Pakistani banks deposits, December 1961 Quarterly Statement 
(Rs. 237.82 crores); for deposits of particular banks, their annual 
balance sheets. The deposits of the Muslim Commercial Bank, given 
for September 1961, are increased by 6 per cent to allow for their growth 
up to December 1961; those of the United Bank, given for June 1961, 
are increased by 5 per cent. These per-cent rises are those of the total 
Pakistani bank deposits over these periods, 
Table IL2 
Bank 
Deposits as a fraction of 
total Pakistani bank 
deposits 
National Bank 
Habib Bank 
Muslim Commercial Bank 
United Bank 
Rest 
.44 
.34 
.11 
.05 
.06 
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is not run on strictly commercial bank principles. As we shall see, it 
buys assets and lends money where the public interest, as it sees it, 
requires. The Habib Bank, on the other hand, maintains an ex-
tremely conservative policy concerning its assets. The other Pakistani 
banks neither facilitate generalization nor warrant individual space; 
but they range from somewhat to very conservative, in their portfolio 
policies at least. Because of the low capital-deposit ratios6, the stock-
holders do not suffer absolutely f rom either the conservatism of the 
Habib Bank or the occasionally unprofitable policies of the National 
Bank. The ratio of profit to paid-up capital and reserves over the 
last three years is shown in Table 11.3 below: 
Table II . 3 
Bank 
1959 1960 1961 
(1) (2) (3) 
National Bank .13 .21 .24 
Habib Bank .27 .15 .19 
Muslim Commercial Bank .25 .33 .40 
Sources and Notes: Balance sheets of the banks. For National Bank, the sum of 
"transfer to reserves", "dividend . . . . " , and "balancecarried to balance 
sheet" divided by the sum of "called-up" capital, "reserve", and "profit 
and loss: balance " ; for Habib Bank, "balance (net profit)" 
divided by the sum of "issued, subscribed, and paid-up capital", "reserve 
funds", and "profit and loss account"; for Muslim Commercail Bank, 
"balance net profit" divided by the sum of "called- and paid-up capital", 
"reserve fund", and "profit and loss account". The denominator is 
that of the preceding year. 
Such profit rates do not require very high net earning rates on assets 
with capital-deposit ratios of only about 5 per cent7. A final and most 
6. .065 for Habib Bank, .045 for Muslim Commercial Bank, and .041 for 
National Bank in 1960. Source: their balance sheets; "paid-up capital" and 
"reserves" divided by "deposits". 
7. It can be easily shown that 
aP 
1 + a 
where (e) is the average net earning rate on all assets, (p) is the profit rate on 
capital, and (a) is the capital-deposit ratio, assuming that liabilities other than 
deposits are zero. Thus, if a = .05, p = .20 implies that (e) be, not implausibly, 
about .01. 
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important characteristic which all Pakistani banks share is then growth 
relative to other groups of banks. Aided by lav/ (Section III) and led 
by National Bank policy, the Pakistani banks have moved f rom a small 
to a dominant force in their nation's banking system over the past 
fourteen years. 
2) British banks: Although the Pakistan government policy has 
meant the loss of deposits—always, relatively, and often, absolutely— 
the British banks have remained a strong segment of the system. Their 
importance today exceeds their deposit strength because their borrowers 
have not deserted them so rapidly as their depositors and because they 
have been able to compensate for their deposit losses through borrow-
ing from other banks. Thus, their balance sheets are not conserva-
tive in appearance, with advances sometimes exceeding deposits. They 
neither lend to, nor borrow from, their parent branches except in small 
amounts, so their foreign connections are irrelevant to their Pakistan 
operations. The largest of the four British banks is the National and 
Grindlays Bank, the result of two amalgamations over the past five 
years8. 
3) American banks: Only three in number, and only one until 
the summer of 1961, the American banks have become important in 
the banking system by virtue of their large holdings of the United 
States government deposits. These have more than doubled over the 
last year, increasing f rom around Rs. 10 crores in June 1961 to around 
Rs. 25 crores by the spring of 1962. At least partly because of their 
newness in Pakistan, their opportunities for making loans are much 
less than the funds at their disposal, with the result that these banks 
are able to lend to other banks not so easily placed. 
4) Indian banks: Anachronisms and anomalies, considering the 
present political relations of India and Pakistan, the Indian banks will 
never revive though their rapid decline seems now stemmed. There 
have been ten such banks, with about 37 branches, since 1958. Like 
the British banks, they do chiefly foreign-trade lending, but unlike the 
British, seem to have placed no roots in the new industrial soil. 
In a system consisting of hundreds, or thousands, of banks, many 
of these differences could be expected to dampen by the sheer weight 
8. The National Bank of India, and Orindlays Bank combined in 1958; 
Lloyds Bank was absorbed into it in 1961. 
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of numbers. In an analysis of the bank credit in Pakistan, however, 
we shall be forced to make frequent distinction between the National 
Bank of Pakistan, the Habib Bank, the other Pakistani banks, the 
British banks, and the American banks. Even finer breakdowns might 
be rewarding but must be omitted for the lack of data and in the in-
terests of brevity. 
Before any detailed analysis of the various assets and liabilities of 
the Scheduled Banks, it may be useful to give a perspective by means 
of their consolidated balance sheet. This is given below, in Table II.4, 
both in value terms and as fractions of total non-bank deposits in 
the system, for March 30, 1962: 
Table II.4 
Amount As fraction of 
Item (rupees in non-bank 
crores) deposits 
(1) (2) 
Assets: 
Cash 7.60 .02 
State Bank balances 19.41 .06 
Inter-bank assets 40.29 .11 
Securities 128.32 .37 
Advances and bills 296.78 .84 
Liabilities: 
Demand deposits 215.93 .61 
Time deposits 136.10 .39 
Inter-bank liabilities 40.29 .11 
State Bank debt 72.39 .21 
Rest (net) 27.69 .08 
Source: Weekly Statement, March 30, 1962. The totals are not given; they 
would'mean little since many items are netted out in the "rest (net)". 
The data are presented as in the Weekly Statement, except that the inter-
bank liabilities figure is repeated as the asset figure (see Section VIII). 
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There is little in this aggregate statement to cause notice, relative 
to that of other banking systems, unless it is the extent of inter-bank 
indebtedness and of indebtedness to the central bank. These two 
items will prove especially important in our analysis. 
SECTION m 
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON B A N K S 
Banking is probably the most regulated industry in the world: 
even a veteran banker would find difficulty in listing any significant 
fraction of the legal restraints under which he operates. Fortunately, 
most of the laws pertinent to banking in Pakistan are not pertinent to 
the problem of the volume of credit so that we may dash quickly through 
the legal forest1. The principal documents are but two, the Slate 
Bank of Pakistan Act and the Banking Companies (Control) Act1. 
From the viewpoint of the volume of bank credit, constraints upon 
banks concerning their assets are always important. This is of course 
true of limits to the absolute amounts of certain assets, but these are 
rare anywhere and are not usually imposed in Pakistan. More relevant 
are constraints about the amounts that must be held (or not held) in 
certain assets relative to certain liabilities. In Pakistan, the banks must 
conform to two such constraints, a cash-reserve ratio and a liquidity 
ratio. 
The State Bank Act requires each Scheduled Bank to maintain with 
the State Bank a deposit balance of at least five per cent of its demand 
liabilities and two per cent of its time liabilities3. The "Central Gov-
ernment" is empowered to vary these percentages " f rom time to time, 
by notification in the official Gazette"4 . N o ceiling is placed upon 
1. A new unified Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 has been promulgated 
since this paper was completed. 
2. These, plus two lesser laws, the Banking Companies (Restriction of 
Branches) Act and the Banking Companies (Inspection) Ordinance, comprise all 
the relevant legislation. 
3. State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956, (as amended up to May 31, 1959), 
chap. IV, 36-(l), p. 19. 
4. Ibid., 36-(2), p. 19. 
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these ratios, and the Act specifically permits them to be completely 
"dispensed with"5. There is a progressive sale of penal interest rates 
on any deficits to these reserve requirements4. 
The maintenance of a minimum liquidity ratio is also required7. 
Liquidity is defined to include cash, balances with the State Bank, gold, 
and "unencumbered approved securities". This last category requires 
some comment. "Approved" securities are those wliich the State 
Bank is willing to accept as collateral for its advances, i.e., "stocks, 
funds and securities, other than immoveable property, in which a trustee 
is authorized to invest trust money . . . . "8 . These include all govern-
ment securities and presumably almost all, if not all, non-government 
investments of the Scheduled Banks. To qualify for inclusion in the 
bank's liquidity, these securities must also be "unencumbered" which 
means not being used as collateral for State Bank borrowing. The 
sum of all these liquid assets is required to be at least 20 per cent of the 
bank's time and demand liabilities. 
Both of these requirements, the reserve ratio and the liquidity ratio, 
are applied to the bank's "liabilities". This word is used in a very 
special sense. Excluded from "liabilites" for these purposes are paid-
up capital and reserves, credit balances in the profit and loss account, 
and State Bank indebtedness9. Thus, the bank must maintain these 
two ratios against its deposits, time and demand, and its borrowings 
from other than the State Bank. Sensibly, no distinction is made bet-
ween the deposits and the borrowings of the Scheduled Banks for these 
purposes. 
The State Bank must grant permission before new branches may 
be opened, a power which has been used primarily to restrict the ex-
pansion of the foreign banks: 
It is felt that foreign banks should properly be engaged mainly 
in financing foreign trade and the fostering of foreign investment. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 36-(4) through 36-(8), pp. 19-20. 
7. Banking Companies (Control) Act, 1948, Section 8. 
8. State Bunk of Pakistan Act, op. cit., !7-(4) (a), p. 11, 
9. Ibid., 36-(2), p. 19, 
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It has accordingly been laid down that the application of foreign 
banks for opening new offices should be entertained only in port 
towns or in large cities from where substantial trade is carried on 
with foreign.countries10. 
This decision has been effectively implemented, with great impact upon 
the banking system". 
The foreign bauks are also technically restricted by the requirement 
that 80 per cent of a bank's liabilities must be maintained within Pakis-
tan12. In fact, a bank's foreign-exchange balances and credits are 
controlled much more completely than this law suggests, and there is 
very little transfer of bank assets in and out of Pakistan. Even with-
out any restrictions, the British banks (the most important segment of 
the foreign banks) would probably still maintain nearly completely 
separate Pakistan accounts; the Bank Rate in England is usually too 
high to encourage lending to the Pakistan branch13, and there are no 
surplus funds here to be lent to English parent offices. For all practi-
cal purposes, we can neglect the foreign connections of the foreign 
banks, except as these influence their methods of operation within 
Pakistan. 
It is important that we recognize, throughout this paper, the tremen-
dous potential for control which the State Bank has. For example, 
the State Bank may inspect any Scheduled Bank at any time, and may 
require the bank to summon a meeting of its directors to consider 
matters arising out Of the inspection and to carry out, within 
such time as may be specified, such changes in its management as 
the State Bank may consider necessary . . . . I 4 . 
The State Bank can also recommend to the Central Government that 
10. SBP:GFO, p. 46. 
11. The largest number of cities in which a single foreign bank has offices 
is nine, by the National and Grindlays Bank (Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, 
Rawalpindi, Chittagong, Dacca, Khulna, and Narayanganj) (BS 60-61, pp. 111-
12. Banking Companies (Control) Act, op. cit., Section 9. 
13. And there is the ever-present possibility of devaluation. 
14. SBP.GFO, p. 48. 
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a bank be forbidden to accept new deposits. The effect of such powers 
is to force the banks to remain on good terms with the State Bank: 
a mere "suggestion" by the State Bank may suffice to induce the banks 
to do something completely against their interests. Thus , the State 
Bank can write proudly that it receives "such unstinted cooperation" 
from the Scheduled Banks that it has not been necessary to take " too 
frequent recourse to statutory powers of credit control"15 . This great 
power has, as we shall see, had the unfortunate effect of permitting the 
State Bank to neglect the traditional, and ultimately more effective, 
techniques of credit control by inducement. 
S E C T I O N I V 
T H E SECURITIES M A R K E T 
The central and provincial government securities, and "other 
securities" comprise about one-fourth of the Scheduled Banks' assets'. 
More relevant, because of the liquidity ratio requirement, is that these 
investments are presently about one-third of total deposit liabilities2. 
Less than half of these securities are required to be held by the Scheduled 
Banks in order to maintain the 20-per-cent. liquidity ratio3. The ma-
jority of the investments in securities are held, technically at least, at 
the option of the banks and presumably compete with call money, 
advances, and bills for a place in each bank's asset portfolio. 
While, for the Scheduled Banks taken as a whole, some 60 per cent 
of the total securities are in excess of what is required for the liquidity 
requirement, this is certainly not equally true of each individual bank. 
The ratio of investments to deposits for the four leading Pakistani banks 
in 1961 varied noticeably as is indicated by Table IV . l . 
15. Ibid., p. 63. 
1. Rs. 128.32 crores out of Rs. 488.23 crores of "total assets" according to 
the Weekly Statement of the Scheduled Banks' position as of March 30,1962. The 
"total assets" of this statement does not include certain minor asset items, so the 
true fraction in investments is somewhat less. 
2. Such liabilities were Rs. 392.32 crores on March 30, 1962 (Weekly State-
ment). Included in deposit liabilities are inter-bank borrowings but not State 
Bank borrowings, as is done in the definition of the base for the liquidity ratio. 
3. Since the Scheduled Banks held cash and State Bank deposits of Rs. 27.01 
crores (on March 30,1962; Weekly Statement), only Rs. 51.45 crores of "approved 
unencumbered" securities ( = .20'of 392,32 less 27.01) were needed to fulfill the 
legal requirements. 
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Table IV .4 
Bank Date 
Ratio of 
investments to 
total deposits 
Habib Bank Dec. 31 0.47 
National Bank Dec. 31 0.39 
Muslim Commercial Bank Sep. 30 0.21 
United Bank June 30 0.24 
Source: Published balance sheets of each bank. The definitions, 
especially of deposits, may differ slightly between banks. 
A close analysis of liquidity ratios may await Section XIII; it is suffi-
cient now to note that, for a great many banks though not necessarily 
for all, at least some securities are held freely, in the sense that no law 
requires their place in the bank's portfolio. Where an asset is not 
required to be held, an analysis of the amount the banking system 
chooses to hold—and hence the amount it chooses not to hold in alter-
native assets—becomes more difficult. The examination of motives 
and traditions internal to the banks will be postponed to Section XIII. 
Here, we will look only at the mechanism by which banks and others 
acquire and dispose of securities. 
The amount of noil-government securities and shares outstanding 
may be quite large, but its relevance to the banking system is not. The 
Scheduled Banks hold insignificant amounts of such investments4. 
The rest of the Scheduled Banks' investments, Rs. 125.05 crores, are 
in the form of central and provincial government securities. And, of 
these latter, over 85 per cent are central government securities. 
While the Scheduled Banks are relatively unimportant participants 
in the markets of private corporation debt, it is quite the reverse with 
the debt of the Pakistan governments. In order to make a statement 
about the extent to which the banking system, as a whole, is a monop-
4. Rs. 3.27 crores (Weekly Statement ; March 30, 1962), less than 3 per cent 
of the total of Scheduled Banks' security investments. 
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sonist of government security issues, it is essential that the relevant 
concept of "public debt" be defined. This, and the calculation of the 
fractions owned by various parts of the banking system, require us t o 
make not a brief digression. 
We are interested in the public debt for its attribute as an earning 
asset to the banking system. This is a rather unusual interest, and 
hence a caveat should be strongly pronounced. What we shall call 
the "public debt" in this section excludes many items that a more 
normal definition would include—the figures presented should not be 
mistaken for an estimate of the public debt by a more familiar defini-
tion. 
It simplifies our task that the concept of public debt we require is 
so unusual. For it is difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider to 
know the exact debt position of the governments of Pakistan5. What 
makes our job easier is that we do not need information about five 
aspects of the public debt, as it is usually conceived: 
1) Coinage and notes of the government6: While the banking 
system usually owns some quantities of this kind of government debt, 
it certainly does not view such issues with the same eye as it does the 
interest-bearing securities. 
2) Bank deposits of governments: These are liabilities of the State 
Bank and hence are considered by them as essentially different from 
earning assets. To count such deposits as merely negative holdings 
of securities would, from the viewpoint of the State Bank, be mistaken. 
3) Interest-bearing government debt which is neither held nor con-
sidered for ownership by banks: Within this class falls a number of 
items, such as Prize Bonds, National Development Savings Certificates, 
and Postal Savings Deposits. 
4) The debt and bank balances of the semi-autonomous government 
organizations: Their deposits can be neglected, for the same reason 
5. See, for example, N. Sarfraz, Problems of Budgetary Reform in Pakistan, 
(Karachi: Institute of Development Economics, 1961), pp. 24-29. 
6. As contrasted to that of the State Bank (which issues all notes of Rs. 5 
and above). 
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as can governments'—that such balances are not treated by the banks 
as mere negative holdings of securities. Their securities-issues are 
excluded because they are held in very small quantities, if at all, by the 
Scheduled Banks7. 
5) Advances by Scheduled Banks to governments: These advances 
are considered quite different from securities and should not be com-
pared to them8. 
The public debt with these omissions amounts simply to the total 
of central and provincial governments' issues of interest-bearing 
securities. These consist of three kinds: 
1) the "permanent debt" 
2) "three-month treasury bills"' 
3) "ad hoc treasury bills" 
There is serious doubt whether our concept of public debt should in-
clude this latter group of securities, the "ad hoc treasury bills", for they 
are held only by the State Bank and hence are not available to the 
Scheduled Banks' securities portfolios. But this problem is not 
critical. 
Data for the first two kinds of securities are available monthly in 
State Bank publications, but the amount of "ad hoc treasury bills", 
presumably subject to frequent change, is released by the State Bank 
only once a year, for June 30. Thus, the most recent available figures 
for the total public debt (by our definition) are those of June 30, 1961. 
These are given in Table IV,2. 
7. Recall that the Scheduled Banks* investments in other than the central 
and provincial government securities are less than 3 per cent of their total invest-
ments. 
8. See the discussion of "counter-finance" in Section VII. 
9. Never large and practically nil (less than half a lakh of rupees) for the 
last two years (RC+F60-61, p. 152). 
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Table IV.2 
Amount 
Type of issue (Rs. in 
crores) 
Central Government : Permanent Debt 242 
Central Government : Ad Hoc Treasury Bills 174 
Provincial Government: Permanent Debt (East Pak stan) 36 
Provincial Government: Permanent Debt (West Pakistan) 5 
Total 457 
Source: SBP.AR 60-61, pp. 34-36. 
The ownership of this government debt is distributed as shown 
below in Table IV.3 for the same date, June 30, 1961: 
Table IV.3 
Amount 
(Rs. in crores) 
State Bank, Issue Department 218* 
State Bank, Banking Department 89b 
Scheduled Banks 128c 
Insurance companies 17d 
All other 5" 
Total 457 
Sources: a. RC+F60-61, p. 127. 
b. Ibid., p. 133 '». 
c. Weekly Statement, June 30, 1961. 
d. Pakistan Insurance Yearbook, 1961, pp.115, 121 (December 1960 
figure of Rs. 15.80 crores is given there; Rs. 1 crore has been added 
to get an approximate figure for June 30, 1961). 
e. Residual. 
10. It is assumed that all of the Banking Department's "investments" are 
in Pakistan governments securities. This is probably true, or at least nearly so, 
but the State Bank remains annoyingly vague: "this item consists of investments 
made by the [State] Bank in Pakistan and in foreign treasury bills and securities" 
(Ziauddin Ahmad, "Item-wise Analysis and Correlation of State Bank and 
Scheduled Banks' Weekly Returns", SBP.B, November 1952, p. 6). 
The calculation of a few percentages is revealing: 95 per cent of the 
public debt, by our definition (which may greatly understate the debt 
by more usual definitions), is held by the banking system"; 92 per 
cent of the marketable public debt (i.e., excluding "ad hoc treasury 
bills") is held by the banking system; and, 85 per cent of the non-State-
Bank-owned public debt is held by the Scheduled Banks. 
The essential conclusion of the preceding pages is simple: in the 
kind of public debt in which it deals, the banking system (including 
the State Bank) is very nearly the only dealer. A corollary of this is 
that whatever securities the State Bank decides to sell must be almost 
entirely purchased by the Scheduled Banks if the State Bank is to effect 
its decision. And a final corollary, the converse of the previous one, 
is that whatever securities the Scheduled Banks, taken together, decide 
to sell must be almost entirely purchased by the State Bank, if the 
Scheduled Banks are to effect their decision. In these simple theorems 
lies the essence of the securities market in Pakistan and the key to the 
Scheduled Banks' attitude toward securities. 
If the State Bank were to withdraw itself f rom any dealings in gov-
ernment securities, these would become, to the Scheduled Banks as a 
whole, almost perfectly illiquid, and, to individual banks, liquid only 
to the extent that securities can be sold to other banks. To a banker, 
there is perhaps no greater horror than the prospect of an illiquid asset. 
No modest yield would suffice to induce the Scheduled Banks to pur-
chase government securities if a serious possibility of illiquidity existed. 
Since the governments in Pakistan have shown no inclination to pay 
more than minimal yields on their debt issues, since there is no suffi-
ciently large alternative buyer to the banking system, and since the 
State Bank does not wish to purchase the entire debt, the State Bank 
must support, and support strongly, the liquidity of government securi-
ties. 
This the State Bank has done ever since its inception. Various 
pious statements and side-issues have been voiced over this period in 
defence of complete State Bank willingness to "monetize" the debt. 
Principal among these have been: 1) that national prestige requires that 
I t . The amount held by the non-Scheduled Banks is negligible. Out of 50 
such banks in Pakistan, 43 reported to the State Bank during 1960; they held 
Rs, 0.15 crores of the government securities. 
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the Government of Pakistan securities be liquid and without fear of 
loss12; 2) that the development of a securities market is essential 
for economic development; and, 3) that the safety of the banking 
system requires this State Bank support13 . Through all, however, 
has remained one incontrovertible fact, that if securities are to be sold 
to the Scheduled Banks, there must be State Bank support to the 
market. 
The State Bank has two ways of giving this support, and it has used 
both, to varying degrees, over the years. One is always to stand ready 
to buy (and, less important, sell) securities at stable, though not neces-
sarily unchanging, prices. The second is always to stand ready to 
lend to the Scheduled Banks on the collateral of their government 
securities at a reasonable, and reasonably stable, rate of interest. Al-
though it is difficult to discover which of these two policies has pre-
dominated at what times, I have the impression that the State Bank 
preferred, in its early years, to support the market and discourage 
Scheduled Bank borrowing on securities collateralM, and in its recent 
life has reversed this preference. In any case, the State Bank does 
not now enter the securities market except on rare occasions. 
Because they are assured of the liquidity of government securities, 
the Scheduled Banks are interested in them. They neither desire nor 
are able to place all their funds, beyond those required by the liquidity 
ratio, in advances and bills. Each, according to his attitude and ad-
vance opportunities, demands government securities for his asset port-
folio. Alongside this demand for securities by the Scheduled Banks 
is the supply which the State Bank has decided the Scheduled Banks 
should hold (roughly equal to the total public debt less the maximum 
amount the State Bank believes it can itself hold consistently with 
monetary stability). These demand (D) and supply (S) functions are 
shown in Figure TV.l. 
12. "In July 1948 . . . . many foreign banks were unwilling to make advances 
against the Government of Pakistan securities . . . now these securities are known 
to be marketable at firm and stable prices." SBP.AR 48-49, p. 7. 
13. See, for example, pp. 36 tl". of Azizali F. Mohammad, "Bank Liquidity 
with Reference to Pakistan'', in Selected Papers on the Pakistan Economy, Vol. 1 
(Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1953), pp. 27-57. 
14. 1 he State Bank actually enforced a progressive interest rate schedule on 
such borrowing in 1950. P. 266 n. of J.S.G. Wilson, op. cif, 
YIELD 
FIGURE 321-1 
The entire supply, Qe, that the State Bank wishes to sell can be 
placed with the Scheduled Banks at a yield of Ye. In fact, however, 
the yields on government securities are seldom sufficiently high to 
induce the banks to buy freely what the State Bank feels they must 
buy. In Figure IV.1, the yields are usually of the order of Yo with 
the result that the banks wish to purchase only Qo of the offer. 
Unless it wishes to hold more securities than it originally planned., 
the State Bank has only two options in this situation. One, it can 
permit the nominal issued-yield to rise to, or toward, Ye by selling the 
securities below par. This lias, to some extent, occurred in recent 
years—in the past two years, almost all new issues have been put out 
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at a slight discount. Often the issued-yield is raised by 0.1 percentage 
point or so in this manner '5 . 
But the gap between Ye and Yo is not so easily bridged. The 0.1 
per cent concessions do little to move the banks' effective demand 
up to Qe. So, the State Bank falls back on its second option, to force 
the Scheduled Banks to hold more securities than they wish (at a yield 
of Yo or Yo + 0.1 per cent). The procedure by which this is achieved 
was undoubtedly an emergency measure at first, but it has now become 
routine whenever a government issue is about to be offered. State 
Bank officials visit each bank and suggest a quota for the bank; bar-
gaining ensues, but the final figure is apparently seldom much lower 
than the initially suggested quota. With the Scheduled Banks increas-
ingly in debt to the State Bank16, they are increasingly aware of the 
necessity to remain "popular"1 7 with it. 
There are of course limits to the extent of this coercion. Even the 
State Bank, with its great potential for control of the Scheduled Banks, 
cannot place all the securities it wishes if the Qo Qe gap is too large. 
The State Bank is sufficiently well informed about the position of the 
Scheduled Banks that it is usually able to make a good estimate of what 
quantities of the government securities can be marketed at any parti-
cular time. Never has it misjudged its power and the Scheduled Banks' 
situation so badly as to be embarassing. But, it does resort to a mild 
subterfuge when the Qo Qe gap is unexpectedly, or expectedly but 
unavoidably, large: the National Bank absorbs a greater portion of 
those securities to be placed with the Scheduled Banks, and the other 
banks are correspondingly relieved. 
Some evidence of this residual nature to the National Bank's security 
holdings may be seen in Table IV.4, where the percentage chan-
ges in the total investments of the National Bank and of the other 
Scheduled Banks are given18, between Decembers over 1955-1961. 
15. For example, during 1961, the Pakistan, 1966, 3-3/4 per cent was issued 
at Rs. 99.75, the Pakistan, 1972, 4 per cent at Rs. 99.50, and the West Pakistan, 
1968, 4 per cent also at Rs. 99.50. These three comprised the entire new issue 
market in that year. 
16. See Section VII. 
17. This word was used during an interview and excellently summarizes the 
bankers' attitude toward these negotiations. 
18. All these investment figures also include non-government securities, 
but these, as we have seen earlier, are insignificant. 
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Table IV .4 
Year 
Percentage 
changes in 
Nat. Bank 
(1) 
Investments 
of other 
Sch. Banks 
(2) 
Col. (1) less 
Col. (2) 
(3) 
1955 22.07 7.68 14,39 
1956 23.01 —1.24 24.25 
1957 11.17 13.79 —2.62 
1958 6,35 14.51 —8.16 
1959 23,08 20.96 2.12 
1960 37.18 —3.57 40.75 
1961 8.45 —12,00 20.45 
Source: Col. (1), Annual Report, December 31, 1961, the National Bank of Pakis-
tan. 
Col. (2), Weekly Statements (for all Scheduled Banks less investments 
of the National Bank), last Friday, December. 
Of these seven years, four (1955, 1956, 1960 and 1961) were years known 
for the tightness of the banks' position, and three (1957 through 1959) 
for its easiness. In 1955, 1956, 1960, and 1961, the Karachi inter-
bank call money rate was at or above the Bank Rate (at the end of 
December) while, in the other three years, it was lower19. And in 
those years of tightness, when the Scheduled Banks were particularly 
reluctant to accept unwanted securities, the National Bank accepted 
somewhat greater quantities than usual. Column (3) of the preceding 
table, which measures the percentage change in the ratio of National 
Bank to other Scheduled Banks securities holdings, averages 24.96 
per cent over 1955, 1956, 1960, and 1961, but only —2.89 per cent over 
1957-59. 
There is some slighter evidence that the State Bank itself holds a 
larger share of the securities when the Scheduled Banks show reluct-
ance. As in the preceding table, Table IV.5 below shows the percentage 
changes in State Bank holdings, all Scheduled Bank holdings, and the 
difference between the two percentages, 
19. See Section VIH, 
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Table IV .4 
Year 
Percentage change in investment of 
State Bank Sch. Banks 
(1) (2) 
Col. (1) less 
Col. (2) 
(3) ' 
1955 —5.69 10.20 —15.89 
1956 39.68 3.48 36.20 
1957 40.36 13.18 27.18 
1958 4.00 12.66 —8.66 
1959 —5.24 21.41 —26.65 
1960 7.33 5.28 2.05 
1961 2.56 —6.21 8.77 
Source: Col. (1), RC+F 60-61, p. 123 and p. 129. 
Col. (2), Weekly Statement, last Friday, December. 
The average of Column (3) is 7.78 per cent for 1955, 1956, 1960, and 
1961, and —2.89 per cent for 1957-59. This suggests, much less em-
phatically, that the State Bank also accepts a larger share when the 
Scheduled Banks prove reluctant. 
For a central bank that is unwilling to watch passively while an 
ever-increasing portion of the public debt moves into the government 
hands, these short-run measures are inadequate. Ultimately, the 
yields must be raised, and the state bank, in its capacity as financial 
adviser to governments, will strongly urge such increases. In Pakis-
tan's history, the State Bank has almost continually been pressing this 
very advice upon the governments and having that advice at least parti-
ally accepted. Table IV.6 of issued-yields of the central government 
securities shows that in only a few years in the fifties did at least some 
issued-yields fail to rise. 
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Table IV .4 
Yield (%) on securities of maturity" of 
Year 
five years six through More than 
or less ten years ten years 
(1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
1949 
1950 2.50 3.00 
1951 
1952 2.75 
1953 3.00 3.00 
1954 3.00 3.00 
1955 3.00 3.00 
1956 3.00 3.25 
1957 3.00 
1958 3.00 3.50 
1959 3.50 4.00 
1960 3.75 4.00 
1961 3.75 
Source: SBP. AR 48-49 through SBP. AR 60-61; and Sheriar F. Irani, Market 
Weekly, issues of July 1961 through May 1962. 
a. Where two issues of the same maturity group were made in the same year, 
the higher rate is given. There were no new debt issues in the first five months of 
1962. The government securities are usually issued and redeemed during the 
summer months. 
There is, therefore, a two-fold tendency for yields to be below their 
equilibrium level. One, they are issued below it; and two, the equili-
brium yield is clearly undergoing a secular, if not continual, rise. The 
job of the securities-trading market is clear: to bid down the prices 
of previously issued securities so as to raise their actual yields-to-re-
demption toward not only the issued-yields of more recent securities 
but also the even higher market equilibrium yield. Offsetting this 
tendency is. however the maturity effect which lowers the equilibrium 
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yield of a security as it nears redemption (the effect is clearly present 
in the last table). The usual argument as to why this effect exists is 
that shorter-dated securities are more liquid. The State Bank, how-
ever, now insures that all securities are quite liquid. This maturity 
effect must result, then, f rom 1) bankers' traditional aversion to long-
term assets (even when they don't represent long-term commitments), 
2) a general market expectation of secularly rising rates which makes 
earlier maturity of present holdings desirable, and/or 3) a fear that the 
State Bank may not continue its present policies over the entire life of 
the longer-term securities. But this maturity effect is not very strong 
and very definitely does not seriously offset the two upward tendencies 
of the secular yield rise and the below-equilibrium issued-yield. 
Curiously, however, the market reflects very little of the pressure 
that must be exerted by the existence of subequilibrium securities 
yields. Weeks, sometimes months, pass with few transactions; even 
those sales that are accomplished are frequently made at no reduction 
in price. The insurance companies, with their more or less regular 
accretion of funds, are the only potential buyers. But even they dis-
appear from the market when new issues are expected. For example, 
in the spring of 1961, the "lack of demand in existing scrips is to a great 
extent due to institutional investors reserving their funds for participa-
tion on (anticipated) more favourable terms in the official borrowing 
programme expected in the next few months"2 0 . 
The insurance companies' funds are of course very limited relative 
to the Scheduled Banks'21. And most bankers have long since stopped 
20. Sheriar F. Irani, Market Weekly, May 5,1961. (parentheses in original). 
21. Insurance companies increase their holdings of the government securi-
ties by about Rs. 2 crores each year: 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Gov. Sec. with Ins. Co. 9.28 11.30 13.65 15.80 
Change in Gov. Sec. with Ins. Co. (a) 2.02 2.35 2.15 
Source: Pakistan Insurance Yearbooks, for 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961. 
(a) not calculated. 
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even trying to sell securities in anything but the most minute amounts21. 
Moreover, those bankers who do go to the market try to sell off their 
3-per-cent's and 3-1/2-per-cent's, while the insurance companies are 
quite naturally trying to purchase the 4-per-cents: 
Enquiries have now started trickling into the hitherto practi-
cally inactive gilt-edged market. These enquiries centred around 
distant-dated maturities affording a high redemption yield but 
business was restricted due to absence of sellers at quoted 
rates23. 
It is usual at this point to note that this is a " th in" or "underdeve-
loped" securities market. But that explains nothing. The absence 
of buyers does not necessarily lead to an inactive market ; it does neces-
sarily imply a price that is too high. Some banks must be more un-
happy holding securities (at the margin) than are the other banks. Why 
do they not offer attractive price discounts in order to sell? Even if 
all banks were equally anxious to sell, it would explain only the sparcity 
of sales, not the almost unbelievable slowness with which the prices of 
those few sales declined. 
There is usually a tendency in the direction of lower prices, and 
hence liigher yields24. What requires explanation is not any absence 
of a tendency, but the sluggishness with which that tendency appears 
in securities prices and the continued existence of sales at prices which 
are obviously too high. 
Two explanations are required, one where the State Bank pegs the 
market by buying and selling at fixed rates (as it formerly did) and one 
where the State Bank does not enter the market (as at present). State 
Bank "pegging" was never an unlimited affair; banks were not free to 
22. To the question: "Do you ever sell securities on the Stock Exchange 
market?" a memorable, but also typical, answer by one banker was, "We used to 
try, but we never succeeded." 
23. S. F. Irani, Market Weekly, September 29, 1961, p. I. 
24. Often the prices of the highest issued-yield securities tend to rise slightly. 
This probably results from insurance companies' efforts to fill their portfolios in 
the face of bank reluctance to part with their securities of high yield. A small 
premium usually overcomes this reluctance; for example, Irani reports "large 
blocks of 4-per-cent-1974 changing hands at Rs. 100.50 against last week's official 
quotation of Rs. 100". (Market Weekly, October 6, 1961, p. 1). This paradox 
of scarcity in the midst of superfluity will shortly become clear. 
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unload all their unwanted securities at above-equilibrium prices25. Since 
the banks were only permitted to sell in moderation, the State Bank 
could avoid becoming a too-big buyer while maintaining the fiction of 
a meaningfully pegged buy-sell rate26. When this so-called "market 
price" became too far above the equilibrium price and the State Bank 
began to experience difficulty in avoiding extensive purchases, the 
pegged price would be permitted to move slightly. The yields moved 
slowly—but move they did—as periodically the pressure became great 
enough. 
It is not well known exactly when or why the State Bank stopped 
providing this "reasonable support" to the market. But recently it 
has remained fully aloof. One's first expectation is that the State 
Bank's withdrawal would free the market to make more rapid adjust-
ments toward equilibrium prices. In fact, just the reverse has occurred. 
Very few transactions now take place, the banks seem to have ceased 
trying to sell securities, and the insurance companies often must offer 
a higher price to get securities at all. The reasons for this are neither 
certain nor obvious, but the following seem relevant: 
1) The banks fear, probably quite correctly, that the State Bank 
would not approve if they permitted securities prices to drop signifi-
cantly in an effort to get rid of sizeable quantities. 
2) Each bank knows that banks can only sell to each other, beyond 
small amounts; and hence each recognizes the possibility tliat heavy 
selling efforts would sell few securities and even those at the cost of 
large capital losses in some bank portfolios. 
3) Even if the bank were successful in selling securities (by accept-
ing lower prices and hence capital losses), it might be forced to take a 
larger quota when the next new securities were issued. These quotas 
are probably based on some concept of a bank's "normal" comple-
ment of securities. 
25. Officially, the State Bank never provided more than "reasonable support 
to the market when needed." Ziauddin Ahmad (Deputy Director, Research 
Department, State Bank of Pakistan), "Central Banking in Pakistan", in S. G. 
Davies(Ed.), Central Banking in South and East Asia. (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), p. 151. 
26. There always was a small spread, about two annas (Rs. 0.12) per hundred 
rupees, between the buying and selling prices; but it was so small as to be negligible 
here, 
2'? 
As a result, the market is not used, the banks preferring to take 
their redundant securities to the State Bank as loan collateral27. Once 
the market becomes inactive, there are further reasons for not attempt-
ing to use it : 
1) It might take much time and bother to find a buyer even if a 
large and reasonable price discount is offered. 
2) Should the bank later want the securities back, as is not unlikely 
in the less busy summer season, it may be impossible to find a seller 
quickly and at a reasonable price. 
Thus, in recent years, a securities market which is " th in" at best 
has become nearly non-existent. 
One cannot quarrel with the State Bank belief that borrowing is 
the best way for the Scheduled Banks to meet their seasonal needs for 
extraordinary reserves. There is no purpose to the State Bank buying 
and selling back large amounts of securities annually. But the present 
State Bank policy is much more than this. It permits government 
securities to be issued at cheap yields. This, in turn, requires the State 
Bank to "bludgeon"2 8 the Scheduled Banks when it wishes to effect 
changes in the credit situation, because securities yields are too low to 
permit their use as an inducement. Also, artificially low securities 
yields help to enforce an artificially low interest structure and cry hypo-
crisy at the State Bank's efforts to get the Scheduled Banks to raise 
their deposit rates. 
Thus, some one-fourth of the Scheduled Banks' assets are held for 
reasons which can be only partly explained by economic analysis. 
Some of these securities they are required to hold by law (for the liqui-
dity ratio requirements), the rest are held for a mixture of largely non-
economic reasons, mostly because of State Bank pressure. To Section 
XII must be left the task of uncovering the economic reasons why the 
27. Since the State Bank no longer buys, it is more than ever obligated to 
lend on securities collateral. 
28. One banker's choice of words. The State Bank puts it more euphemisti-
cally: " the State Bank has endeavoured to achieve the objectives of its credit 
policy largely through moral suasion and consultations with the commercial 
banks . . . : " (SBP-.GFO, p. 62). 
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Scheduled Banks hold unencumbered as many of these low-yield securi-
ties they do29. 
S E C T I O N V 
BANK LENDING 
After the Scheduled Banks have fulfilled their legal requirements 
concerning State Bank balances and government security holdings 
(needed for the liquidity ratio), after they liave purchased whatever 
other securities they desire or are unable to resist accepting, and after 
they have set aside funds for such minor items as vault cash, the banks 
may hold the rest of their assets in advances and bills. There are only 
three constraints; they must find borrowers; they must be willing to 
lend to them; and they must have the funds to do i t ' . Analysis of 
the banks' willingness and wherewithal will come later; for the present, 
we will be concerned with to whom, how, and at what terms the banks 
lend. 
Bank lending in Pakistan is in two principal forms, bills discounted 
and advances. The discounting of bills of exchange, mostly foreign, 
makes up about 10 per cent of the total bank lending2. The rest is 
in the form of cash credits, overdrafts, and demand loans. With a 
cash credit, the customer pays interest upon a certain amount whether 
he actually uses the funds or not, and pays further interest only on 
further drawings3. With an overdraft, the borrower is permitted to 
overdraw his account up to a limit, and pays interest only on his over-
drawings. Interest is paid on the full amount of a demand loan-whe-
ther it is fully used or not ; the loan is callable on demand. 
Loans not at least technically callable on demand are rare, even 
when the purpose of the loan may clearly require a long-term commit-
ment by the bank. The rationale of this procedure seems to be that, 
according to one banker, "we won't lend to anyone who can't get the 
29. See Appendix A for further analysis of the matter of this section. 
1. I.e., the banks must have sufficient excess reserves to be able to meet the 
withdrawal that will probably follow any advance. 
2. The fraction has been declining in recent years. 
3. Up to a fixed limit, Often the credit is granted only in instalments, 
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same loan f rom another bank if we need the money". More likely is 
the desirability of maintaining the fiction that bank assets are short. 
In any case, loans, demand or otherwise, are the least frequent form 
of lending. Pakistani banks have not yet convinced their customers 
of the necessity or desirability of paying interest on borrowed, funds 
that are never used4. 
There is a vast literature, ever-growing in Pakistan as in other under-
developed economies, concerning who does and doesn't have access to 
bank credit. This is not the place to consider the problem in detail5. 
It is enough that we recognize that only a few of the potential bank 
borrowers of a developed country can consider the bank as a feasible 
source of funds in an underdeveloped country. Farmers, consumers, 
and small businessmen rarely achieve the exalted status of bank borro-
wers. Advances are made to a seeming handful—to big businessmen, 
with an excellent and long credit history, in a commercial or industrial 
field, with a sound and readily marketable security, and for a short 
period of time. In tills respect, the bankers "follow the principles if 
not the practice of the advanced countries f rom which they imported 
their banking institutions"6. 
One point cannot be made too strongly. The fact that there were 
almost unlimited potential demands for credit in a country like Pakistan 
would not mean an almost unlimited demand for bank advances. 
Given the banks' apparently unchanging standards of credit-worthi-
ness and appropriate kinds of loans, there is a very narrow market for 
bank advances. It often happens that the banks "cannot" make all 
the advances they would like to—while there are literally millions of 
unsatisfied seekers after credit. 
4. There is one possible exception to this—advances made to owners of fixed 
deposits. 
5. Two recent books of general interest are: E. Nevin, Capital Funds in 
Underdeveloped Countries, (New York: St. Martins' Press, 1961), and W. Diamond, 
Development Banks, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). For a description of 
Pakistan's particular situation, see Credit Enquiry Commission Report, (Karachi; 
Manager, Government Publications, 1959). Much more has been written about 
bank credit allocation in India, where the situation seems to be very similar to 
Pakistan. See G. Rosen, Some Aspects of Industrial Finance in India, (Bombay: 
Asia Publishing House, 1962); See also various issues of the Reserve Bank of India 
Bulletin, where many good articles on this subject have appeared. The particular 
credit problems of the farmer, the small-businessman, and the seeker of long-term 
funds have filled many pages. 
6. W. Diamond, Development Banks, op. cit., p, 13, 
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in all underdeveloped countries this unsatisfied "fringe" of millions 
must either do without credit, get funds from friends and family, or 
approach the "indigenous" or "un-organized" financial institutions. 
Of the latter, Pakistan has its share- -money-lenders giving credit at 
very high, though apparently declining, interest rates. But there are 
in Pakistan surprisingly few connections between the organized and 
un-organized credit sectors. It is unlike India, where in many big 
cities, shroffs lend to businessmen who do not meet bank standards 
and then rediscount the resulting bills (called hundis) with the banks7 ; 
it is unlike Iran, where urban money-lenders take the less creditworthy 
customers on funds which they have borrowed from banks, and both 
banks and money-lenders deal in the same short-term discounted bill, 
the softeli8. In Pakistan, the bank-credit market is truly separate from 
the indigenous-credit market. Economically, this gap is unfortunate, 
but analytically it permits us to neglect a large majority of potential 
borrowers. Borrowers who do not qualify for bank credit need not 
concern us, for their demands cannot affect the demand for bank ad-
vances9. 
In a somewhat ambivalent chapter10, the Credit Enquiry Commis-
sion Report recognizes the insecurity of small business loans without 
some sort of insurance such as the shroffs used to provide or a govern-
ment guarantee might now provide. But it nevertheless "must em-
phasize the need for a greater effort by the commercial banks to directly 
lend to such enterprises"". In the subsequent three years, typically, 
no gurantee programme has been inaugurated, but the State Bank has 
exhorted the Scheduled Banks to increase these risky and unprofitable 
loans, despite the fact that the banks presently have more sound loan 
7. See H.T. Parekh, The Bombay Money Market, (Bombay: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1953), pp. 44-49. In 1953, these hundis carried interest rates of only 8-9 
percent, extremely low for non-bank, unsecured credit. By 1959, however, the 
rate was "a minimum of 9-12 per cent," (G. Rosen, Some Aspects of Industrial 
Finance in India, op. cit., p. 37). 
8. See R.E. Benedick, "The Money Market in Iran", Pakistan Development 
Review, Autumn 1962. He notes that the "main distinction between bazaar and 
modern Persian commercial banks is the impressive buildings housing the latter." 
9. And are unlikely to affect much the supply of funds with which banks 
make these advances. 
10. Chapter XII, Credit Enquiry Commission Report, op. cit. 
U . Ibid., p. 110. 
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possibilities than they can readily handle. The National Bank has 
set an example for the Small Traders' Scheme; the President of its 
Board of Directors proudly announced that " . . . . borrowers accomo-
dated by the Bank up to Rs. 25,000.00 constituted 97 per cent of the 
total number of borrowers " ,12. But the height of the folly was 
achieved elsewhere: one other bank took the Report and the State 
Bank sufficiently to heart to begin to make these highly risky advances 
(of less than Rs. 10,000) at a concessional rate of 4 per cent, about two-
thirds the rate for thoroughly sound borrowers ,3. 
Fortunately, the amounts involved in these deviations f rom rationa-
lity are sufficiently small as to be neglected. Until such time as a sensi-
ble link is created between banks and the less sophisticated credit 
agencies, we may safely forget the latter. It must not be thought that 
the banks' attitude as to who constitutes an acceptable borrower is 
completely unchanging in all respects. Immediately after Partition, 
Pakistan had few industries and the banks did not have much to do 
with their finance; bank credit went almost entirely into foreign, whole-
sale, and retail trade14. As Pakistan's industry grew and its foreign 
trade declined (relatively) the banks have increasingly made advances 
to industry. But this has represented no fundamental change in credit 
policy—their industrial borrowers are also big. sound, short-term, and 
well-secured. 
This relative shift f rom commercial credit, which in Pakistan is 
generally highly seasonal, to industrial credit, with much smaller seaso-
nal variations, has been responsible for some smoothing of the banks' 
operations, though not nearly so much as is commonly believed or 
might be expected. The April-August period is commonly called 
the "slack season" in Pakistan; little jute or cotton is travelling then. 
Traditionally, this is the time when the banks pay off their State Bank 
borrowings, buy the new issues of government debt, and accumulate 
excess reserves for the forthcoming "busy" season. 
12. Speech of H.N.E. Dinshaw, President of the Central Board of Directors, 
National Bank of Pakistan; reported in Dawn, April 21, 1962 (Supplement), p. I. 
13. See Speech Delivered by Mr. S.A. Hasnie, Governor, State Bank of Pakis-
tan, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1961). September 8, 1961, p. 12. 
14. See Azizali F. Mohammad, "Bank Liquidity with Reference to Pakis-
tan", op. cit., p, 34f. 
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The fact that the Scheduled Banks were unable to discharge their 
State Bank borrowings in the summer of 1961, for the first time in his-
tory l5, has led many to think that the relative "slackness" of the 
summer has declined. Actually, the seasonal patterns of both ad-
vances and bills have changed remarkably little over the last eight years 
as Figures V-l and V-2 show 16: 
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There is no strong evidence of any seasonal flattening in either of these 
series. 
Where some decline in the seasonal fluctuations of bank credit has 
occurred it has been in a secular shift f rom bills to advances. The 
fraction in bills of total advances and bills for each of the three 
15. Seldom did the borrowings actually reach zero, but their summer low 
had never been above Rs. 4.77 crores (September 6, 1957) until 1961 when they 
were Rs. 30.26 crores (May 26). 
16. The seasonal indices are calculated by the link-relative technique from 
the "advances to others" (than banks) and "bills purchased and discounted" of 
the Quarterly Statements. Arithmetic averages of three relatives are used except 
for March of 1953-55(when two relatives are used) since no relative is possible for 
March 1953. The trend is removed by the usual means. Monthly seasonal indices 
for the sum of bank advances, bills, and investments in "other" securities (from 
Weekly Statements) are calculated, by moving averages, in M.U. Chapra, "Effec-
tiveness of Bank Rate Instrument in Pakistan", Pakistan Development Review, 
Spring 1962, p. 88. 
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periods is given below in Table V,1:17 
Table V.X 
Year in Decembers in Marchs 
1953-55 .20 .16 
1956-58 .14 .12 
1959-61 .12 .11 
Source: Quarterly Statements (advances to banks excluded). 
Since bills have a more violent seasonal pattern, their fall in importance 
lias had some slight tendency to stabilize the overall index. The rapid -
increase of manufacturing, with its greater reliance on advances than 
bills, makes this decline in the use of bills reasonable, if not inevitable. 
The summer of 1961 indebtedness to the State Bank of the Scheduled 
Banks, which has misled many into seeing a changed seasonal pattern, 
does not imply that at all. A look at the winter indebtedness of 1960/61 
and 1961/62 will suffice. One must not confuse tighter money condi-
tions all year around with a change in the relative tightness of the various 
seasons. The Pakistan banking system still operates in a credit environ-
ment of strong seasonality. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to examine closely the way in 
which banks choose their borrowers, the types and purposes of ad-
vances they permit, and the kinds of security they require. But, it is 
important for us to see if there are any differences between the different 
banks in Pakistan in these respects. The principal groups of banks 
are, it will be recalled, the Pakistani, the British, the American, and 
the Indian banks in that order. We cannot, with existing material, 
check for differences between banks within each of these groups, but 
it is very likely that most of the variation, with respect to lending be-
17. These are ratios of averages of bills over the relevant three years to aver-
ages of total bills and advances over the same period. 
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haviour, will be between groups. The State Bank subdivides several 
quarterly series concerning banks' advances by Pakistani, Indian, and 
"other foreign" banks IB. This latter category is poorly chosen for 
our purposes since there are undoubtedly significant differences bet-
ween the British and the American banks' advances policies. Presently, 
however, the American banks, for all their wealth of deposits, do not 
make a large volume of advances; thus, the "other foreign banks" 
category may reasonably be considered representative of the British 
banks 
The difference between the advances policies of the Pakistani and 
the British banks are neither so slight as to be unimportant nor so 
great as is often stated, or hoped. One must never forget that both 
kinds of banks are historically grounded in British banking principles. 
This fact explains much of the similarity but also induces an expecta-
tion that the Pakistani banks might gradually be breaking away from 
British traditions. Curiously, however, the advances policies of the 
two are less dissimilar now than ten years ago (see Table V. 2). This 
can be seen from three-year averages, over 1953-55, 1956-58, and 
1959-61, for the Pakistani and the British (i.e., "other foreign") banks 
of: 1) advances to other-than-trade sectors as a fraction of total advan-
ces; 2) bills discounted as a fraction of total bills and advances; and 
3) advances secured by illiquid assets as a fraction of total advances20. 
In each case, the figures for the two types of banks are more similar in 
1959-61 than in 1953-55. The reason is not hard to find. At the time of 
Partition, there was little industry in what became Pakistan, and the 
established British banks traditionally financed the raw materials exports 
of the two wings2 1 . The new Pakistani banks were unable imme-
diately to compete in this field, and the British banks were slow to 
enter the new and rapidly growing manufacturing sector. By 1959-61, 
however, each had sufficiently encroached upon the other 's domain 
as to cause the disappearance of many previously distinguishing fea-
tures. 
18. Beginning in December 1961, the Indian banks are no longer segregated. 
19. This is of course only true as concerns bills and advances not to banks. 
The American banks have large amounts of advances to banks. See Section 
VIII. 
20. For each of these three fractions the total advances (of the denominator) 
excludes advances to banks. 
21. Indeed, they were often called the "exchange banks". 
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Table IV.2 
F r a c t i o n Banks 1953-55 1956-58 1959-61 
1) O t h e r - t h a n - t r a d e sec tors Pakis tan i .26 .41 .37 
Brit ish1 .17 .32 .40 
2) Bills Pak is tan i .27 .11 .10 
British" .10 .16 .13 
3) Secu red by i l l iquid assets Pakis tan i .07 .08 .06 
British" .14 .10 .04 
Sources and methods: 
1) BS 48-57 through BS 60-61. Only June data is used, other quarters not 
being available for the early years. The "other-than-trade" sectors are 
assumed to be "mining and quarrying,""manufacturing," and "construc-
tion". 
2) BS 48-57 through BS 60-61 and SBP:SSP, December 1961, pp. 3-4. 
December data is used, it being the seasonal peak for bills. 
3) BS 48-57 through BS 60-61. June data, other quarters not being avail-
able for the early years. The "illiquid assets" are assumed to be "machi-
nery and fixed assets" and "real estate". 
a. Technically, this category includes all non-Indian foreign banks. The 
bills-to-bills-and-advances fraction for 1961 includes Indian banks as well. 
Note: The figures given are arithmetic averages of the fractions for each of 
the relevant three years. 
T h e r e r e m a i n s o n e grea t d i f ference in their l ending pol ic ies : t he 
Bri t ish b a n k s a re wil l ing t o m a k e large a d v a n c e s to i nd iv idua l b o r r o w e r s , 
whi le t he Pak i s t an i b a n k s a r e surpr is ingly ret icent . T a b l e V. 3 s h o w s 
the a v e r a g e a d v a n c e per b o r r o w e r a c c o u n t , by e c o n o m i c sec to r , 
f o r t h e t w o ca tegor ies of b a n k s . In a l m o s t every ca tegory , t h e 
fore ign b a n k s ' a v e r a g e a d v a n c e is m u c h g rea te r t h a n the Pak i s t an i 
b a n k s ' n . T h i s is f u r t h e r p r o o f t h a t t he P a k i s t a n i b a n k s o u t - H e r o d 
H e r o d in the i r a p p l i c a t i o n of t r ad i t i ona l Br i t i sh p r inc ip les l o n g a f t e r 
t h e Br i t i sh b a n k s h a v e themselves ceased to p rac t i ce t h e m 23. 
If t h e r e is r i sk in l a rge advances , t he re is a l so p ro f i t . T h e fo re ign 
b a n k s cha rge , o n the ave rage , one-ha l f a pe r cen t age m o r e o n the i r a '1-
22. The exception, services, arises from the inexplicably large number of small 
"government services" advances that foreign banks make." Such accounts, with 
average borrowing of under Rs. 2,000, comprise nearly one-fifth of the total num-
ber of their advance accounts (SBP.SSP , December 1961, p. 33). 
23. Large advances to particular borrowers are believed to risk a "lock-up" 
of capital as it is then more difficult to withdraw the advance on short notice. See 
for example, on these "traditions", T. Balogh, Studies in Financial Organiza-
tion, (London; Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp. 74-86. 
Table V. 3 (Rs. in lakhs) 
Pakistani Foreign 
Sector banks banks" 
(1) (2) 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing .006 4.197 
Mining and quarrying .451 43.577 
Manufacturing .942 11.936 
Construction .047 .678 
Electricity, gas, water, and sanitary 
services .632 2.259 
Commerce .313 1.347 
Transport, storage, and communication 1.050 2.509 
Services .115 .061 
Source: SBP:SSP, December 1961, pp. 30-33. The 
information is not available for earlier periods. 
a. This can be considered representative of the British banks. 
vatices than the Pakistani banks. Although the distribution of ad-
vances by interest rates charged is available separately for the two 
categories of banks only for December 1961, the differences are too 
great to be coincidental. The following Table V.4 summarizes these 
distributions. 
Table V. 4 
Pakistani Foreign 
banks banks 
0) (2) 
1) Average rate charged 5.13% 5.60% 
2) Average rate charged, excluding zero-
interest advances 5.20% 5.73% 
3) Per cent of advances made at rates 
below 4 % 22.73% 3.04% 
Source: SBP.SSP, December 1961, pp. 35-36. 
Some part of this difference may be explained by the larger advances 
made by the foreign banks, if there really is a significant risk involved. 
But experience in other countries suggests that large advances, up to 
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a point at least, should command lower rates. A more plausible ex-
planation of this difference in rates will be offered shortly. 
Finally, it is important that we examine the course of advance rates 
over the past few'years24. During this discussion two historical facts 
must be kept in mind: 1) the Bank Rate was raised early in 1959; 
and 2) the Scheduled Banks began to face unprecedented tightness 
in lendable funds during the busy season of 1960, a difficulty that has 
not since eased25. The impact of the first upon advance rates is easily 
discovered; the effect of the latter is more complex. 
The State Bank has published, since June 1958, semi-annual dis-
tributions of the volume of advances of the Scheduled Banks by interest 
rate charged. Table V.5 gives several interesting statistics of these 
distributions: 
Table V.5 
Interest rates (in %) Advances made 
(as % of total) 
Date Variabi- At no Below 
Average lity Skew interest Bank Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1958, June 4.19 1.40 — .98 1.42 16.28 
December 4.21 1.29 — .96 2.06 13.81 
1959, June 4.96 1.35 —1.35 2.53 21.84 
December 5.14 1.28 —1.49 2.01 13.74 
1960, June 5.15 1.37 —1.33 2.05 16.75 
December 5.28 1.27 - 1 . 3 5 1.77 12.94 
1961, June 5.14 1.40 —1.32 1.95 22.59 
December 5.26 1.36 —1.33 1.67 17.29 
Source: SBP:B, March 1962, p. 32 (typographical 
errors in the last column were corrected). 
Methods: Col. (1): the first moment around zero. 
Col. (2): the square root of the second moment around the mean. 
Col. (3): the cube root of the third moment around the mean. 
Col. (5): the cumulative relative frequency up to, but not including, 
3 per cent for June and December 1958,4 per cent thereafter. 
24. This we can do only for all Scheduled Banks together as the breakdown 
between different categories does not exist before December 1961. 
25. Some might date this era from the spring of 1960, but the busy season 
of 1959/60 was late and most banks were not unusually pressed until the advent of 
the following busy season. 
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As a result of the Bank Rate rise, only the average and the skew-
ness of advance rates was noticeably affected. Within a year of the 
change, the average interest rate 011 advances had also risen by about 
one percentage point, as Figure V-3 makes visually clear. This 
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adjustment of advance rates, though hardly instantaneous, seems 
amazingly rapid when we remember the sluggish pace at which gov-
ernment security rates rose in this period. The increase in the leftward 
skewness of advance rates following the Bank Rate rise resulted f rom 
the failure of the rates on advances made at extremely low rates of in-
terest to rise 26. 
Much more difficult to comprehend is the failure of average advance 
rates to increase significantly over 1960 and 1961. The explanation 
of this phenomenon is necessarily conjectural since bankers are parti-
cularly reluctant to discuss in detail the methods by which their advance 
rates are determined. But two factors seem particularly relevant: 
one rather universal in banking; and the other specific to Pakistan 
conditions. 
The iimnediate reaction to shortages of lendable funds (relative 
26. One would expect this to increase the standard deviation as well. But, 
there was also a decline in the relative volume of advances made at very high 
rates of interest. 
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to the demand for them) of bankers almost everywhere is to reject 
marginal borrowers. Only gradually is the price of borrowing in-
creased. While explanations of this process are not always thoroughly 
convincing, it is sufficient here to note that it seems to be present in 
Pakistan also. 
The other factor involves the differences between the Pakistani and 
the British banks. The British banks have lost their depositors to the 
Pakistani banks relatively more rapidly, over the past decade, than 
they have lost their borrowers 27. As a result, the British banks have 
felt the impact of the tighter money far more than the Pakistani banks 
(and, even more so, than the American banks). Thus, while we could 
expect the British banks to lead the way to higher interest rates inasmuch 
as they are being forced to refuse the greatest number of advances, we 
must recognize their fear that they will only hasten their decline by 
doing so. It is bad enough to lose your depositors—it is disaster to 
lose your borrowers. The British banks do charge somewhat more 2 8 
for their advances, but they are very reluctant to increase this spread. 
The lead in any rise in advance rates must, therefore, come from other 
places: f rom the State Bank by means of a presently unlikely rise in 
the Bank Rate or an insistence that the Scheduled Banks pay higher 
interest rates on their deposits2 9 ; from the National Bank which, 
however, as a ' 'public service" is apparently doing precisely the oppo-
site; or from the private Pakistani banks, whose liquidity position 
and banking philosophy do not suggest any such action 30. 
This failure of advance rates to rise is unfortunate from the view-
point of credit allocation 31. But there are implications also for the 
27. Number of domestic branches is a less important criterion to bank borro-
wers than to depositors. Thus, theBritish banks' inability to expand their branches 
has cost them much more in deposits than in potential advances. 
28. About one-half a percentage point, as we have seen. 
29. The State Bank is doing the latter to a slight extent; see Section VI. 
30. Their reluctance may also derive from religious injunctions, though it 
is not clear why. One can easily read the Holy Koran as forbidding all interest or 
exhorbitant interest ("devour not usury, doubling and quadrupling", M.M. Pick-
thall (Trans.), The Glorious Koran, (Mentor Edition, 1956) p. 72; it is hard to see 
how either of these interpretations forbids a rise of advance rates from, say, 5 per 
cent to 7 per cent. It is sheer rationalization to define usury as an overlarge gap 
between the bank's advance rates and the rates it pays for funds; but this view is 
held by some and helps to explain the rise in advance rates that followed the Bank 
Rate increase. 
31. As I have discussed elsewhere. See Part III of my article, "Monetary 
Policy in the Economic Development of Pakistan", Trade and Industry, (Karachi) 
January 1962. 
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volume of credit. Today, despite the high standards which the banks 
in Pakistan require of their borrowers, there are often more acceptable 
borrowers than banks wish to or can satisfy. Whereas banks used to 
consider the demand for advances by creditworthy customers as one 
of the constraints to their lending operations, the shortage of lendable 
funds may now be more important. 
S E C T I O N V I 
SOURCES OF F U N D S : DEPOSITS 
In this and the subsequent two sections, the "sources" of lendable 
funds are discussed. This word "sources" is not used in its usual 
sense nor is it used consistently throughout. In the descriptive ma-
terial, it means no more than the liabilities which offset, in a balance, 
sheet sense, the banks' assets. In the analysis, it is used in its more 
traditional sense as sources of reserves, which a fractional reserve bank-
ing system can then use to expand advances and deposits (deposits 
are then a result, not a source). The context is clear, so the convenience 
of the double meaning is persuasive. The principal liabilities of the 
banking system are deposits, State Bank debt, and inter-bank call 
money. These three also are the potential sources of reserves for a 
bank and for the banking system whenever expansion is desired and 
reserves are inadequate. For a particular bank, all three are sources, 
but for the banking system as a whole, only State Bank borrowing and 
new deposits which represent a shift from currency serve as sources of 
reserves. If the reader will keep all of this in mind, the subsequent 
use of the word "sources" and the failure always to distinguish bet-
ween a bank and all banks will save much space and not confuse. 
The principal liability of all banking systems and of almost all 
individual banks is deposits. In Pakistan, 76 per cent of the total 
liabilities of the Scheduled Banks are non-bank deposits'. 
In Pakistan, there are basically three kinds of deposits: demand, 
savings, and fixed2. While the words are universal, the meanings are 
1. Weekly Statement, March 30, 1962. More precisely, demand and time 
deposits of "others" (i.e., other than banks) are 76 per cent of total demand and 
time deposits, inter-bank borrowing, and borrowings from the State Bank. 
2. Throughout this section, inter-bank deposits are omitted from considera-
tion; see Section VIII. 
41 
Hot, so definition of each is in order. Demand deposits are, as al-
ways, those accounts of which a bank is liable to payment without 
notice. Generally, no interest is paid on such accounts. Only about 
one per cent of the demand deposits in Pakistan now receive interest, 
at rates varying f rom 0.25 per cent to 8.00 per cent3, al though several 
banks used to pay some small interest on such accounts4 . Fixed 
deposits are those accounts which must remain in the bank for a 
stated length of time in order to earn interest. The fraction of total fixed 
deposits committed for different time periods and the median interest 
rate earned on each are given below in Table IV. 1: 
Table VI. 1 
Time period 
Fraction of 
fixed deposits 
0 ) 
Median rate of 
interest (in %) 
(2) 
Up to 3 months 0.25 2.50 
3-6 months 0.08 2.75 
6 months to 1 year 0.59 3.00 
1-2 years 0.05 3.25 
2-3 years 0.02 3.50 
Over 3 years 0.01 4.00 
Source: SBP:SSP, December 1961, pp. 14-15 (figures are for 
December 1961, the only date for which they are available). 
Almost all such deposits are now fixed for a year or less, and this has 
probably always been true. Savings deposits have attributes of both 
fixed and demand deposits. Some portion of a savings deposit may, 
at any time, be withdrawn without notice5; what stays in the account 
earns interest periodically, though of course at a lower rate than any 
fixed deposits 6. For purposes of the Weekly and Quarterly State-
ments, where deposits are recorded as being either demand or time, all 
3. SBP-.SSP, December 1961, p. 14. 
4. Ziauddin Ahmad, "Item-wise Analysis and Correlation of State Bank 
and Scheduled Banks' Weekly Returns", op. cit., p.7. 
5. Usually, the number of withdrawals per week is fixed, but some banks 
limit the amount that can be withdrawn without a week's notice. 
6. Only about two per cent of all savings deposits earn more than two per 
cent interest (as of December 31, 1961; SBP SSP, December 1961, p. 14). 
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fixed deposits are considered time, and savings deposits are divided, 
according to a formula, between demand and time7. 
In Pakistan, as in most underdeveloped economies, currency is 
much more widely used than bank deposits. But just as we expect 
that development will lead to an increasing amount of money transac-
tions8, so also do we expect that development will usually encourage 
a shift from currency to bank deposits. In the fourteen years of Pakis-
tan's existence, there is little evidence, however, of such a secular trend. 
Table VI. 2 gives the ratios of currency in circulation, demand deposits, 
and time deposits to the sum of all three: 
Table VI.2 
Ratios of 
Date Demand Time 
Currency deposits deposits 
(1) (2) (3) 
1948 .61 .33 .06 
1949 .60 .32 .07 
1950 .63 .30 .07 
1951 .62 .31 .07 
1952 .62 .30 .08 
1953 .61 .30 .09 
1954 .60 .29 .11 
1955 .61 .28 .11 
1956 .63 .27 .10 
1957 .61 .28 .11 
1958 .60 .28 .11 
1959 .57 .29 .14 
1960 .58 .27 .15 
1961 .54 .29 .17 
Source: Cols. (1) and (2), SBP.B, March 1962, p. 35 ("other 
deposits with SBP" are included in demand deposits). 
Col. (3), ibid, p. 24. 
Note: Figures are for end of Decembers; ratios do not always add to one be-
cause of rounding. 
7. That part of the savings deposit which can be withdrawn without notice 
is considered on demand. Where banks limit the number, not the amount, of 
withdrawals, the formula emerges by negotiation with the State Bank. 
8. See M. Haq, Deficit Financing in Pakistan, 1951-60, (Karachi: Institute 
of Development Economics, 1961), pp. 25-27. 
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Up to 1958, there is no evidence of any shift from currency to deposits, 
though there appears to have been a move from demand to time de-
posits in the early 1950s. Over the last three years, however, there 
has been a definite decline in the currency ratio and a corresponding 
rise in the time deposit ratio. Thus, the relative increase in time de-
posits has taken place in two spurts, in effect once at the expence of 
demand deposits and once of currency. 
To what extent time deposits have reacted to deposit rates is twice 
a difficult question, once because of the empirical problem and also 
because of the interpretative problem. We can construct a rough 
measure of the level of deposit rates over 1948-61 (with base 1948 = 
100)9 as is shown balow in Table IV.3: 
Table VI. 3 
Date Index of 
deposit rates Date 
Index of 
deposit rates 
1948 100 1955 128 
1949 105 1956 134 
1950 120 1957 155 
1951 112 1958 170 
1952 119 1959 181 
1953 119 1960 180 
1954 118 1961 177 
9. The index is rough; it is constructed as follows. The upper limit of the 
deposit rates for four kinds of time deposits are averaged, with the following 
weights: savings, 0.3; three-months, 0.2; six-months, 0.2; and, one-year, 0.3. 
This is done for June and December of each year and the two figures averaged 
(except for 1948 and 1949, for which no June figures are available). Since upper 
limits are used, the resulting figures have little absolute meaning; so index numbers 
are formed, with 1948 = 100. Sources: RC+F 57-58 through RC+F 60-61, and 
SBP.B, March 1962, p. 67. 
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The large increases occurred over 1948-50 and 1956-59, while the large 
increases in the relative quantity of time deposits occurred over 1948-54 
and 1958-61. The correspondences are such that it is difficult to accept 
or reject correlation between the two series. At best, deposit rates 
might affect time deposits with a lag of a year or two. 
Even if one sees causation, as well as correlation, he is left with the 
interpretative problem: why did the time deposits come from demand 
deposits in one case and f rom currency in the other ? From the view-
point of the individual, the question is immaterial, as it in either case 
represents a shift f rom an interestless to an earning asset. But to the 
banks, taken together, one is an expensive process of gaining no new 
deposits while the other does uucover new deposits. And to the State 
Bank, one implies no great change in the credit environment while 
the other does l0. 
The Scheduled Banks strongly believe that a rise in deposit rates 
does not attract new deposits to them, taken as a whole, though they 
recognize that it might reallocate existing deposits. As a result, the 
banks have done two things: 1) they have agreed not to use interest 
rates to bid depositors away from each other '1 ; and 2) they stand 
together and strongly against efforts to get them to raise deposit rates. 
The State Bank officially considers deposits as a whole interest-elastic, 
though this probably derives less f rom any scientific examination than 
from a reluctance to watch an ever-increasing portion of bank reserves 
be borrowed from the State Bank. As a result almost entirely of State 
Bank pressure, the Scheduled Banks finally agreed to raise the rates 
on savings but not on fixed deposits '2. They apparently consider sav-
ings deposits the least likely to be completely interest-inelastic (or least 
likely of the time deposits merely to incur conversion from demand 
deposits) '3. 
10. In the sense of creating excess reserves (or liquidity) which permit an 
expansion of banks' earning assets. 
11. There seems to be some cheating on this agreement, but not enough to 
break it down. 
12. On May 14, 1962 (reported in Dawn, May 15, 1962, p. 14). 
13. Of course, the bankers may be correct in their belief and still the State 
Bank be correct in its efforts to get deposit rates raised. Why should the Scheduled 
Banks be permitted to act as a monopsonist in their purchase of lendable funds 
from the public? Furthermore, artificially low deposit rates seem to breed artifi-
cially low advance rates. But these are side-issues here. 
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Several special circumstances are often cited to explain the recent 
rise in the importance of time deposits, none of which have anything 
to do with deposit rates: 
1) The effectiveness of the Martial Law regulations and income tax 
amnesty at unearthing currency hoards. Much of this may have gone 
into deposits once its ownership became legal. 
2) The recent import and investment regulations may have induced 
businessmen to hold fixed deposits while waiting for their licences or 
deliveries. 
3) The process of lending foreign exchange to businessmen often 
involves their putting up as collateral a fixed deposit in local currency 
(this helps to explain the large amount of advances by Pakistani banks 
at 3 per cent and 3.25 per cent interest M). 
Since there is no way to test these hypotheses, it is perhaps best to 
conclude ambiguously: it is possible that the banks, as a whole, 
cannot increase their deposits by means of higher deposit rates; if this 
is so, and perhaps even if it is not, it is in the interests of each bank 
that the banks act together to keep deposit rates f rom rising. 
There is one other way for a particular bank to increase its share 
of the system's deposits and also for all banks together to raise the 
ratio of deposits to currency: by an expansion of branches. A greater 
number of branches in the smaller cities attracts not only deposits in 
these cities but also increases the attractiveness of bank deposits else-
where. Over the last decade, branch expansion has undoubtedly been 
a very successful means of getting more rapid deposit growth. And, 
as Figure VI-1 suggests, there may even be increasing returns; if we 
start f rom the Habib Bank as the median, the implied curve sweeps 
upward ever more steeply to the right and downward ever more steeply 
to the left. 
14. SBP.SSP, December 1961, p. 35. 
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Note: The symbols are as follows: 
• , Bank of Bahawalpur, 
X, National Bank of Pakistan, 
Muslim Commercial Bank, 
O, Habib Bank, 
B , non-Indian foreign banks, 
Australasia Bank, 
Indian banks. 
Source: Balance sheets of individual banks for 1954,1960 and 1961; Quarterly 
Statements of Junes, 1954 and 1961, for deposits of Indian and other 
foreign banks; State Bank, Banking Facilities in Pakistan, (Karachi: 
State Bank of Pakistan, 1954),pp. 5-9 for branches of Indian and other 
foreign banks in 1954; BS 60-61, p. vii, for these branches in 1961. 
Method: The figures are the annual rates of growth which, applied to the 1954 
value, give the 1961 valued. 
15. 1960, not 1961, is the terminal date for calculations concerning the Bank 
of Bahawalpur and the Australasia Bank. 
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While the deposit-branch relation is certain in the long run, it can 
be very uncertain in the short ruu. In Figure VI-2, the percentage 
change in deposits of each of the three largest Pakistani banks, as devia-
tions from the percentage change in deposits of all Scheduled Banks, 
is plotted for each year over 1952-61 against the percentage change of 
their branches as deviations from the percentage change of all Scheduled 
Banks' branches. 
CHANGE IN • 
DE POSITS '54) 6 0 
+ 4 0 
+ 20 
• o 
" 2 0 „ 
• 0 0 
o - 2 0 
FIGURE 2 
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Symbols: Same as in Figure VI-1. 
Sources: Balance sheets of individual banks; for branches of all Scheduled 
Banks (June figures), BS 60-61, p. 110; for deposits of all Scheduled 
Banks (including inter-bank deposits), Weekly Statements for end of 
Junes. 
An upward function is discernible, but not impressive. More-
over, of the three banks taken individually, only the dots of 
Muslim Commercial Bank clearly form an upward pattern. This 
strongly suggests that, no matter how powerful a deposit attraction 
new branches may be, the results are surely not instantaneous. New 
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branches attract new deposits only when a reasonably long period is 
considered l6. 
While it is true that individual banks can increase their relative 
share of the deposits, in the long run at least, by means of branch ex-
pansion, there is great doubt whether the system as a whole can induce 
much shift front currency to deposits in this way. Just before Parti-
tion, there were 364 bank offices in what was to become Pakistan, just 
after Partition, only 6217. By June 1948, the number had reached 
195; not until June 1959 did the number re-attain pre-Partition levels. 
Yet, through all, the ratio of currency to currency-plus-deposits re-
mained stable between 0.60 and 0.63 until 1959. Nevertheless, it is 
an article of faith of the State Bank (and the National Bauk) that 
branches attract deposits. The " p r o o f " is usually given by pointing 
out first the great increase in branch offices since 1948 and then the 
great increase in bank deposits (in absolute terms) since 1948 l8. To 
my knowledge, it has never even been suggested that much of the past 
decadc's expansion of branches has been an expensive form of non-
price competition between the banks for deposits; nor that the Na-
tional Bank's dedication to the spread of the "banking habit" has 
achieved little more than subsidy of small-city banking services l9. 
It may be that the deposit ratio would have declined over the 1950s in 
the absence of this branch-expansion programme. But I think it more 
likely that it would merely have meant that the deposits now in lesser 
cities would have been kept in the larger cities. 
This hypothesis can be tested, but to do it well requires information 
held confidentially by the State Bank and the National Bank—data on 
the origin and type of deposits that are placed in the new branches. 
But some casual testing can be done with published material. The 
16. The graphs of percentage change in deposits in the next year and over the 
subsequent two years against percentage change in branches in a particular year, 
also as deviations, are only slightly different from Figure VI-2. 
17. J.S.G. Wilson, "Money and Banking in Pakistan", op. tit., p. 273. But 
see Twelve Years of Banking, op. cit., where it is said that there were 631 offices 
before Partition. For the present discussion, the difference is not critical. 
18. For example, see Speech Delivered by Mr. A. Qadir, Governor, State 
Bank, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1958), pp. 12-13. 
19. Since branches are one of the services a bank can provide, their expansion 
has succeeded in accelerating the Pakistan-ization of bank deposits, for the foreign 
banks cannot compete. 
49 
average population per Scheduled and non-Scheduled Bank office, by 
city size, is given in Table VI. 4: 
Table VI.4 
Size of city Population per office 
5 10 lakhs 13,020 
2 5 lakhs 13,302 
1—2 lakhs 12,272 
75—100 thousand 13,693 
50—75 thousand 13,544 
25—50 thousand 11,098 
Source: BS 60-61, p. 50. 
But these figures are derived from June 1961 branches and 1951 (sic) 
population statistics. The relatively more rapid growth of the larger 
cities in the past decade means that the large-city figures are more under-
estimated than the small. It is not impossible that there are more 
people per bank branch in the largest cities than in all other sizes of cit-
ies; in any case, there are certainly not many fewer per branch in the 
larger cities. This, together with two facts, indicates how uneconomic 
this expansion may have been: 1) most bank deposits are business, 
not personal, and the large cities have relatively more businesses of a 
depositing nature than the small cities; and 2) the income, output, 
and transactions per capita are much greater in the bigger cities. 
In summary, new deposits are a source of funds for a particular 
bank if it can find ways to take deposits away from other banks. The 
banks prefer branch-expansion to deposit-rate rises as the means of 
achieving this. But there is great doubt whether either of these methods 
can increase the propensity of the public to use bank deposits. For 
the banking system as a whole, the stability of the currency-deposit 
ratio makes it unlikely that new reserves can be uncovered in this way. 
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S E C T I O N V I I 
SOURCES OF F U N D S : STATE BANK BORROWING 
The State Bank is empowered to lend to the Scheduled Banks 
against any "form of security as the [State] Bank may consider suffi-
cient''1. Despite periodic protestations against excessive use by banks of 
this borrowing privilege, the State Bank has always been liberal in its 
provision of funds to the banks in this way. From a primarily seasonal 
phenomenon, borrowing from the State Bank has recently become a 
large, continual source of reserves for the Scheduled Banks; their 
State Bank debt currently amounts to over 20 per cent of their deposits5. 
It is difficult to ascertain the exact indebtedness of the Scheduled 
Banks to the State Bank, though the various figures are all close to the 
true value. The State Bank itself publishes its Banking Department's 
"other loans and advances", which consist mostly of advances to the 
Scheduled Banks, but also of advances to cooperative banks and others3. 
Data for State Bank borrowing is also calculated on the basis of the 
Scheduled Banks' Weekly and Quarterly Statements, but the two 
figures rarely agree, and once both gave figures higher than the State 
Bank's4. Over the 32 quarters of 1954-61, the Weekly Statement's figures 
exceeded the Quarterly Statement's only seven times, three of those 
times by more than two crores of rupees; the Quarterly Statement v/as 
larger in 23 cases (two being identical), eight times by more than one 
crorc of rupees. The Weekly Statement has not been the larger since 
June 1959. The biggest excess of the Quarterly over the Weekly State-
ment occurred in December 1961, a difference of Rs. 6.65 crores. 
There is no reason why the banks should "window-dress" either 
return, so the difference probably results f rom the timing of the two 
Statements. The Quarterly Statement is submitted long after the date 
1. State Bank of Pakistan Act, up. cit., chapter IV, !8-(1) (b), p. 14. 
2. On March 30, 1962, Weekly Statement. Slate Bank debt was Rs. 72.39 
crores; deposits (excluding those of banks) were Rs. 352.03 crores. 
3. See Ziauddin Ahmad, "Item-wise Analysis , " op. cit., p. 6. 
4. Implying negative advances lo cooperative banks. On March 31, 1961, 
the State Bank's "other loans and advances" were Rs. 34.57 crores(/JC-t F60-61. 
p. 129); the Weekly and Quarterly Statements were Rs. 35.41 crores and Rs. 35.42 
erores respectively (RC \ F 60-61, p. 136, and BS 60-61, p. 22). 
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while the Weekly is submitted almost immediately. Though the Quarter-
ly figures are probably the most accurate, we shall find it convenient to 
use the Weekly, with the reservation that these are probably underesti-
mates. 
The State Bank lends to the Scheduled Banks 011 several kinds of 
security: 1) on government, or other "approved" securities; 2) on pri-
vate bills that are suitably endorsed; 3) on bills and advances to 
governments (called "counter-finance"); and 4) on no tangible security 
(called "c lean"; technically, on government guarantee). The data, and 
estimates, of the amount of borrowing done in each of these categories 
since 1954 is presented in Appendix B. Each of these types of colla-
teral requires some further discussion. 
1) Government securities: Although the State Bank is not legally 
obligated to lend unlimited amounts to banks on government securities 
collateral, then present philosophy as manager of the public debt 
nearly forces them to stand ready to do so (as we have seen in Section 
IV). The only effective limit to this lending now is the Scheduled Banks' 
demand for such loans. 
2) Private bills: The Bill Discounting Scheme, was introduced in 
1952 in order to "evolve an instrument for providing seasonal credit 
on a self-liquidating basis"5. Not all bills are eligible as collateral 
under this scheme, only those 
bearing two or more good signatures one of which shall be 
that of a Scheduled Bank, or any corporation approved by the 
Central Government . . . .having maturities not exceeding five 
years — 6 . 
Moreover, the State Bank is only obligated to lend on such collateral 
5. SBP:GFO, p. 50. 
6. State Bank of Pakistan Act, op. cit., chapter IV, 17-(2) (d), pp. 10-11. 
Technically, the State Bank is empowered to rediscount bills (i.e., purchase bills 
that have been discounted by the banks) or to lend to the banks on the collateral 
of their discounted bills. Any bill which qualifies for one action automatically 
qualifies for the other. In fact, lending on bill collateral is far more common; to 
use the term, rediscounting in Pakistan is, therefore, very misleading and is here 
avoided. 
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up to "the limit fixed each year by the [State] Bank"7. Never-
theless, it would appear that almost all bills are eligible and that, 
at least in recent years, the limits placed by the State Bank on such 
borrowing have not been very strict. Table VII. I shows the 
fraction of total bills that have been used as collateral over the past 
four years8: 
Tablc V11 1 (Rs. in crores) 
Bills used Total Ratio 
Date as collateral bills [ ( 1 ) ~ ( 2 ) ] 
(D (2) (3) 
1958—December 1.22 20.52 0.06 
1959—March 1.46 17.09 0.09 
December 2.57 20.11 0.13 
1960-March 3.22 18.38 0.18 
December 15.51 23.00 0.67 
1961—March 4.92 21.25 0.23 
December 15.05 26.56 0.57 
Sources: Col. (1), Appendix B. 
Col. (2), Weekly Statements. 
When we consider that many bills must be in the hands of banks that 
do not borrow from the State Bank and hence do not wish to use them 
as borrowing collateral, it appears that probably nearly all the bills of 
7. Ibid., chapter IV, 17-(2) (d) and 17-(4) (d), p. 11. 
8. The quarters before December 1958 are omitted since no figure for bills 
collateral alone is available ( see Appendix B). Only the two quarters of peak 
borrowing are included. 
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banks wishing to borrow were used as eligible collateral in the last 
two years. In theory, the State Bank can always refuse to accept any 
bills as collateral. Thus, the limits to the State Bank's willingness 
to accept this collateral seem to be complete, f rom zero to one hundred 
per cent. The amount that the Scheduled Banks can get from this 
source is far from unlimited, however even if they could manage to 
borrow upon all of their bills, this type of credit is but a small and de-
clining part of their total bills and advances9. The immediate effect of 
the Bill Discounting Scheme was to encourage the use of bills, the ratio 
of bills to bills and advances rising from 0.06 and 0.09 in 1950 and 1951 
respectively to 0.15 in each of 1952 and 1953 and a peak of 0.21 in 1954; 
but this ratio has fallen again, to 0.11 by 1960 and 0.10 in 1961l0. Even 
the usefulness of bills as State Bank borrowing collateral has not over-
come the Pakistan economy's growing preference for other forms of 
credit, 
3) Counter-finance: By 1953, a system had developed whereby 
various Scheduled Banks make loans to the Central and Provincial 
Governments to facilitate the food procurement schemes of these 
governments. In turn, these advances may be, and are, readily used 
as collateral for State Bank borrowing at one percentage point below 
the Bank Rate, The amounts of the borrowing in this manner, called 
counter-finance, are given, since December 1955, in Appendix B; 
in every December and March since December 1957, counter-finance 
has represented over one-third of the total State Bank borrowing, and 
during the past year (1961) it has always been more than one-half. 
Why governments prefer to borrow from commercial banks instead 
of issuing ad hoc bills to the State Bank is a mystery we need not solve, 
for the monetary effect is very nearly the same. Almost all of such 
loans are freely counter-financed if the bank feels any need at all. This 
statement cannot be proven because of the scarcity of data on Scheduled 
Banks' loans to governments; information is published by the State 
Bank only annually, for June 30, and only since 1956. Such loans clearly 
represent, as is shown by Table VII.2, a significant part of the Sche-
duled Banks' advance portfolio. 
9. See Section V. 
10. Weekly Statement, end of Decembers, is used here since the Quarterly 
Statement does not go back to 1952. 
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Table V1I.2 (Rs. in crores) 
Year 
Scheduled Banks' 
loans to 
governments 
(1) 
Col. (1) as fraction 
of Sched. Banks' 
total advances 
(2) 
1956 7.75 0.10 
1957 5.44 0.05 
1958 11.82 0.11 
1959 20.10 0.18 
1960 15.91 0.11 
1961 33.06 0.16 
Source: Col. (1): RC+F56-57 through RC+F60-61, in section on "Money 
and Banking". 
Col. (2): Total advances from Weekly Statements, end of Junes. 
We have no way of knowing whether these amounts are higher or 
lower at other times of the year than June". Thus, it is impossible 
to show what fraction of these loans are counter-financed during the 
busy season. Nevertheless, it is most likely that almost all of it is, at 
least, in recent years. 
Not all banks participate in these advances to governments. Pro-
bably over 80 per cent of them are made by the National Bank, and 
most of the rest by the Habib Bank, and recently, the Eastern Mercantile 
11. Since this was written, I have found figures for Scheduled Banks' ad-
vances to governments for Decembers, in Government of Pakistan, Economic 
Survey, 1961-62, (Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1962), p. 120. The guess 
of the text can be verified; the fraction of such advances counter-financed in 
Decembers was 0.99 in 1957, 0.99 in 1958, 0.27 in 1959, 0.92 in 1960, and 0.85 
in 1961. 
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Bank. It is said that only the Habib Bank does not counter-finauce 
almost immediately and continually. The banks do not consider 
counter-finance as State Bank indebtedness. That the very conserva-
tive Habib Bank enters into it indicates how differently it is viewed. 
In fact, it is seldom stated, if indeed recognized, that counter-finance 
is a form of borrowing from the State Bank, For example, note the 
wording of the President of the Board of Directors of the National 
Bank: 
This phenomenal rise in our advances . . . .has been contributed 
to substantially both by our increased assistance to the Govern-
ment in the implementation of their foodgrains procurement schemes 
and our enlarged credit facilities to the private sector. [ may men-
tion here that the finance to the Government exercised no pressure 
on our resources as they were counter-financed by the State Bank 
of Pakistan11. 
Just as the banks have no reservations about counter-financing all 
their government advances whenever their needs require, so also has 
the State Bank no qualms. Whether, indeed, the State Bank has the 
power to refuse such a collateral offer is unlikely, but the State Bank 
has so far shown 110 unwillingness to counter-finance without limit. 
Although the State Bank rarely mentions counter-finance in public, 
its Governor's speech of 1960 gives a clue to the favourableness of its 
position: 
It is a major aim of national economic policy to accelerate the 
rate of development in East Pakistan. In pursuance of this objec-
tive, the State Bank has provided liberal counter-finance to the 
National Bank of Pakistan to make possible large-scale financing 
of the jute trade I3. 
4) "Clean" advances'. It is difficult to get information about the 
extent to which the State Bank lends to Scheduled Banks without any 
further security than the bank's note. It is certain that only the govern-
ment-controlled banks are presently so favoured, but other banks 
12. Speech of H.N.E. Dinshaw, op. cit. 
13. Speech delivered by Mr. S. A. Hasnie, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan 
on September 10, 1960, (Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan, 1960), p. 9. 
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could conceivably qualify. In fact, however, it is never really necessary 
rhat the State Bank lend "clean" since it can alternatively accept as 
collateral the bank's advances or its buildings (or, in short, any 
asset). 
From the preceding description of the forms of State Bank lending 
to the Scheduled Banks we can draw several valuable conclusions. 
First, and the most important, the existence of "clean" lending, even if 
no more than one rupee's worth, indicates that the State Bank could 
lend to the Scheduled Banks just as much as it wishes. The appro-
priateness of the collateral can never be a constraint. This we have 
always known was legally correct14, but the lack of a legal constraint 
does not imply the absence of constraint. So far the State Bank has, 
we are almost certain, never lent "clean" to other than the government 
banks, principally, the National Bank. If the State Bank continues 
this policy, as it almost must (since other banks cannot offer a govern-
ment guarantee), it means that its "clean" advances are determined by 
the demand for them by the National Bank, assuming the State Bank 
accepts the National Bank's views as to how much borrowing it re-
quires. 
Thus, the volume of Scheduled Bank borrowing f rom the State 
Bank is a function of three variables: 1) the Scheduled Banks' de-
mands for such borrowing; 2) the amount of eligible collateral in 
the hands of those banks which wish to borrow; and 3) the State 
Bank's willingness to supply. Full analysis of these factors must await 
later sections, but we may here note that the third factor, the State 
Bank's willingness to supply such borrowing, is not very flexible. Un-
less the State Bank wishes to alter radically the conditions in which the 
Pakistan governments issue securities and borrow from the Scheduled 
Banks, it must continue to accept all government debt obligations as 
collateral. Moreover, it is unlikely that the State Bank would dare to 
refuse these even if it wished. What the State Bank now lends "clean" 
is also not very optional. Such lending is presumably done when an-
other government bank, the National Bank, believes that some advance 
(that it could not make with existing funds) is in the public interest; 
the State Bank presumably must usually accept the National Bank's 
views in this respect. 
14. Recall that the State Bank may accept whatever security it "mav consider 
sufficient". 
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If securities and government advances must be accepted and "clean" 
advances made to the government banks when the latter require, there 
is left very little room for State Bank policy concerning its lending to 
banks. Only with respect to the extent that it accepts bills as collateral 
can the State Bank display its willingness or unwillingness. Thus, the 
important determinants of State Bank borrowing are presently only 
two, the Scheduled Banks' wishes and the availability of suitable colla-
teral. The effects of each on indebtedness will be analysed in Section 
XII. 
S E C T I O N V I I I 
SOURCES OF F U N D S : C A L L M O N E Y 
Call money, or more generally, inter-bank deposits and borrow-
ings, is unique among bank funds in that what is a source of funds to 
the borrowing bank is a use of funds to the lending bank. Thus, the 
amount of inter-bank reallocation of funds must be considered with 
respect, simultaneously, to bank assets and bank liabilities. While 
not very important in a strict balance-sheet sense, call money never 
amounting to more than ten per cent of Scheduled Bank assets or liabili-
ties', the market for this inter-bank lending is critical to an under-
standing of the operations of the Pakistan banking system. 
We must begin by defining carefully the method of operation of 
this market and the product which is handled. Basically, Scheduled 
Banks lend to each other, and occasionally to non-Scheduled Banks, 
through what is known as the "Karachi inter-bank call money market". 
It is indeed a Karachi market only, but this is small hindrance since 
the chief offices of almost all banks are in that city and the surpluses 
and shortages of other branches can easily be channelled through 
Karachi. The market is strictly inter-bank by agreement between the 
banks themselves. It is at least technically a call money market, al-
though we shall soon see that it is not that simple. And finally, it is 
a "market" only in a figurative sense. Brokers no longer try to operate, 
and prices are nowhere posted; buyers and sellers meet over the tele-
phone, and price changes are rippled out by rumour. 
1. "Money at call and short notice"' was Rs. 30.45 crores, from the asset 
side, and "inter-bank deposits and borrowings" were Rs. 40.29 crores, from the 
liabilities side, on March 30, 1962 (Weekly Statement). These figures, unusually 
high, are only 6.6 per cent and 8.7 per cent of the Scheduled Banks' total liabilities 
of Rs. 464.71 crores (Weekly Statement, also March 30, 1962). 
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All the funds lent on the call money market are, by definition, at 
call. But much of this carries a "gentleman's agreement" that it will 
be renewed for some time and will be recalled at short notice only if a 
real emergency arises. Thus, much of what is nominally call, or de-
mand, borrowing is in its essence time borrowing; any distinction that 
is made between the two assumes serious risk of being almost entirely 
arbitrary. 
Similarly, the distinction between inter-bank borrowing and inter-
bank deposits is a dubious one. The State Bank maintains that inter-
bank deposits are those funds "received by a bank in the usual course 
of business, primarily for the benefit of the depositing bank" 2 while 
any funds that are "solicited" are considered borrowings. The differ-
ence may be useful for theoretical purposes, but it is impossible to make 
in practice for two reasons. One, while there is a meaningful difference 
between inter-bank deposits and borrowings on the demand accounts, 
because of the need for clearing balances, the distinction fades when 
one considers time accounts. And two, because deposits look better, 
so bankers think, than borrowings on a bank's balance sheet, there 
are frequently successful collusions to label loans as deposits rather 
than borrowings. Thus, to notice only what is called "money at call 
or short notice" or inter-bank time and demand borrowings is to neglect 
some inter-bank borrowings that are not so labelled. 
On the other hand, to total all inter-bank transfers, both demand 
and time and both borrowings and deposits, will overcount the amount 
of borrowing (by the extent of the genuine unsolicited inter-bank clear-
ing accounts). But even the total of borrowing is probably an over-
estimation of borrowing, though by how much we cannot know. Be-
cause much of the borrowing is only technically at call, and is really 
time borrowing, the borrowing bank which finds itself temporarily 
sated will often re-lend its call money at call. It does this partially 
because the "gentleman's agreement" works both ways what is 
implicitly lent for time is also implicitly borrowed for time but 
chiefly because it cannot be certain that it will be able to borrow these 
funds again once they are returned. The existence of the "gentleman's 
agreement" means that the market is extremely inflexible in the very 
short run. Thus, it is possible that some banks are both borrowers 
2. Ziauddin Ahmad, "Item-wise Analysis — " , op. cit., p. 7. 
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and lenders in the call money market a paradox only if one insists 
on taking the word, "call", too literally. 
Ideally, one would like to net out such positions; since we cannot, 
we must not expect to find an exact answer to a question about the net 
inter-bank reallocations of funds. The word, "net" , must be inter-
preted properly. The net inter-bank lending, in one sense, is of course 
zero for all banks. What is meant throughout when "net inter-bank 
reallocation of funds" is used is the result of the following procedure: 
1) net out each bank's position in this reallocation; 2) segregate all 
banks into two groups, net lenders and net borrowers; and 3) add 
up the lendings of the net lenders (which will of course equal the sum 
of the borrowings of the net borrowers). The first step cannot be done 
either for inter-bank borrowings alone or for all inter-bank transfers 
so we must resign ourselves to some error; the second and third steps 
also give some trouble. 
It is somewhat frustrating to be able to choose among several esti-
mates of a figure when you know that none of them is quite what is 
desired. We may add up the data for inter-bank reallocations from 
either the assets or the liabilities side of either the Weekly or the 
Quarterly Statements of the Scheduled Banks. No two are quite 
identical nor are the differences always explicable. The four possible 
measures are: 
1) Quarterly Statement, Assets side: the sum of "balances with 
other banks" and "advances to banks". 
2) Quarterly Statement, Liabilities side: the sum of "demand de-
posits f rom banks", "time deposits f rom banks", and "borrowings 
from other banks". 
3) Weekly Statement, Assets side: the sum of "balances with other 
banks (current account)" and "call money". This neglects time de-
posits and explicitly time lendings to other banks. 
4) Weekly Statement, Liabilities side: the sum of "inter-bank 
demand deposits", "inter-bank demand borrowings", "inter-bank 
time deposits", and "inter-bank time borrowings". 
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The figures for each of these are given below in Table VIII. 1 
over the past two years: 
Table VIII. 1 
(Rs. in crores) 
Definition of inter-bank reallocation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1960--March 18.50 24.35 15.10 22.58 
June 22.74 27.05 15.72 21.75 
September 33.22 35.17 29.25 35.07 
December 31.86 35.06 25.65 34.44 
1961— -March 27.60 23.72 17.01 23.61 
June 29.59 25.44 20.58 25.78 
September 25.59 29.25 25.35 30.06 
December 33.98 30.79 26.35 30.45 
1962--March n.a. n.a. 36.12 40.29 
Source: As given in text above. 
The omissions of definition (3), based on the assets of the Weekly 
Statement, make it continually and distinctly lower than the other 
three. Between definitions (1), (2), and (4), there is little to choose and 
even less defence to a choice. Definition (4) is perhaps preferable for no 
better reason than that there may be some failure to net out inter-
brancli lending in the Quarterly Statements (the figures from (1) and 
(2) tend to be slightly higher than from (4))3. 
3. Definition (4) has the added advantage of being the longest series. It 
goes back to June 1952. 
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But by none of these definitions do we get a figure for call money 
or, more generally, for inter-bank borrowings or, even more generally, 
for inter-bank transfers4. Not only do we not get anything really 
meaningful, we fail to get it even in the less useful gross sense. For the 
present, we need notice from all this just a few things :1) the Weekly 
Statement asset figure for "call money" is no more than a minimum 
value of the true amount of such inter-bank borrowing, by any defini-
tion ; 2) the " t rue" amount of inter-bank borrowing is almost as elusive 
in concept as it is in fact; and 3) while we may now talk about the 
"call market," we shall later (Section X) find it convenient (if not neces-
sary) to forget the term and deal in inter-bank borrowings, deposits, 
and total transfers. 
The volume of inter-bank accounts follows a seasonal pattern 
very similar to bank advances and bills. The summer quarters see re-
latively little lending, the winter months relatively much. This fact is 
worthnoting only in that there has been, in the past, a misconception 
that "at times, both in the busy and slack seasons, the call market be-
comes nominal, the volume of actual transactions being extremely 
small"5. Only once (1953/54) over the past decade has the December-
or-March peak not been at least ten per cent above the preceding June 
figure. 
Two other things should be noted about the volume of inter-bank 
borrowings and deposits (definition 4). One is a slight but noticeable 
decline in the seasonality of the volume of funds over the last few 
years. The call market is becoming more year-around. And the second 
is a tremendous growth in recent years; in December 1956, Rs. 20 
crores were lent for the first time, not until September 1960 was Rs. 30 
crores lent, but Rs. 40 crores were lent only a year and a half later, 
in March 1962. 
A listing of which banks are lenders and which borrowers in this 
market is not a chance affair, dictated by temporary and unexpected 
surpluses and shortages. At all times of the year and over the years, 
^ 4. We shall worry more about what we do get from definition (4) in 
Section X. 
5. Ziauddin Ahmad, "Money Market in Pakistan," Federal Economic Re-
view, October 1955, p. 231. The statement may well have been correct before 
1952. 
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certain banks lend to certain other banks. A very few, if any, banks in 
Pakistan have ever borrowed at some times and lent at others. Precise 
data are impossible and even rough estimates very tenuous, but it is 
easy to segregate the banks into borrowers, lenders, and neutrals. 
Very few of the Pakistani banks ever borrow, much or often, in the 
call market, though the National Bank sometimes does and is the prin-
cipal recipient of funds freely deposited with it for clearing purposes. 
All of the other leading Pakistani banks, Habib Bank, Muslim Commer-
cial Bank, and United Bank, generally lend on the call market or are 
neutral. According to their 1961 balance sheets, the amounts each listed 
as cash assets at call and balances with other banks are given below 
in Table VIII.2: 
Table V I I I . 2 
(Rs. in crores) 
Bank Date At call With banks3 
National Bank Dec, 31 1.63b 1.17c 
Habib Bank Dec. 31 d 14.14e 
Muslim Commercial Bank Sept. 30 d 4.57° 
United Bank June. 30 2.43b 1.84e 
Source: Balance sheets of particular banks. 
a. This probably includes State Bank deposits in some cases. 
b. Money at call and short notice. 
c. Balances with other banks on current account. 
d. No listing. 
e. "Cash with bankers". 
Generally, banks prefer to hide their borrowings from other banks, so 
we can only guess to what extent these figures represent net transfers of 
funds between banks6. But it is a good guess that the Pakistani banks, 
except for Habib Bank, are either neutral or small lenders. The Habib 
6. Of these four banks, only the United Bank and the National Bank give 
any explicit information on their inter-bank borrowings; the United Bank gives 
Rs. 0.5 crores as "borrowings from banks" (including the State Bank) and the 
National Bank gives Rs. 4,198. (sic) as borrowings from banks other than the 
State Bank. 
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Bank probably does about half of the total lending in the inter-bank 
reallocations. 
The extent to which the Pakistani banks, principally the Habib 
Bank, are creditors among banks may be seen from the Quarterly 
Statement as presented below in Table VIII.3 (where the Pakistani 
banks' data are given separately): 
Table VIII.3 
(Rs. in crores) 
Item Pakistani banks 
(1) 
All banks 
(2) 
Ratio: 
Col. (1) to Col. (2) 
(3) 
Assets: 
Balances with other banks 11.39 12.61 0.90 
Advances to banks 9.12 21.37 0.43 
Total (definition 1) 20.51 33.98 0.60 
Liabilities 
Demand deposits from 
banks 4.95 11.13 0.44 
Time deposits from banks 3.90 11.95 0.33 
Borrowings from other 
banks 1.45 7.71 0.19 
Total (definition 2) 10.30 30.79 0.33 
Source: SBP: SSP, December 1961, pp. 2-3. 
Thus, the Pakistani banks do something like CO per cent of the lending 
and only 33 per cent of the borrowing. And if, as is likely, the Pakistani 
banks carry among themselves larger than average clearing balances, 
allowance for these might bring these fractions down to around 43 per 
cent and 19 per cent, respectively (the fractions on "advances" and 
"borrowings"). 
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The rest of the leading is done by the American banks. There 
is no published material upon which to base this statement, but it is 
common knowledge. The total assets of the three American banks are 
around Rs. 30 crores, of which almost half must be in inter-bank loans 
(of one type or another). This accounts roughly for the other half of the 
total inter-bank reallocations of funds of about Rs. 30 crores in Decem-
ber 1962. 
The borrowing is done by the British and the Indian banks, pri-
marily by the former. This can be seen below in Table VIII.4 which 
gives their inter-bank positions, by definitions (1) and (2), for Sept-
ember 19617: 
Table VIII.4 
(Rs. in crores) 
Ratio: Ratio: 
Indian Oth ^ r All Col. (1) Col. (2) 
Item banks foreign banks to to 
banks Col. (3) Col. (3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Assets: 
Balances with other 
banks 0.38 0.31 11.32 0.03 0.03 
Advances to banks 0.23 11.79 14.27 0.02 
Less American esti-
mate ' 11.79 
Total (definition 1) 0.61 0.31 25.59 0.02 0.01 
Liabilities: 
Demand deposits / 
from banks 1.30 10.34 15.96 0.08 0.65 
Time deposits from 
banks — 5.58 8.71 — 0.64 
Borrowings from 
other banks 0.24 2.74 4.58 0.05 0.60 
Total (definition 2) 1.54 18.66 29.25 0.05 0.64 
Source: Unpublished release of State Bank. 
a . On the assumption that all the "advances to banks" of this category were 
made by the American banks. 
7. The Indian banks are no longer segregated in December 1961, so 
September is used. 
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"With the one deduction for the American banks, the "other foreign 
banks" column may be considered close to that of the British banks. 
They do almost none of the lending and nearly two-thirds of the 
borrowing. The Indian banks do much more borrowing than, lending 
but are sufficiently small in each to be neglected. 
These figures, it must be remembered, refer to the total of inter-
bank reallocations of funds. The call money market is something 
less than this by the amount, roughly, of inter-bank deposits (in the 
strict sense of unsolicited funds). If allowance is made for the greater 
amounts of these latter in the Pakistani banks, it is clear that the British 
banks do over 80 per cent of the true call money market borrowing. 
The Pakistani and. the American banks probably each do about 50 per 
cent of the lending in the call market. 
This configuration of lenders and borrowers is but another mani-
festation of the differential deposit-getting and advance-making abili-
ties of the banks in Pakistan. Call money has become the British 
banks' answer to their relative decline in deposits. In fact, at least 
one of the British banks now borrows more money on call than it has 
in its deposits. Call money lending suits the conservative temperament 
of the Habib Bank; and the American banks are too new, and perhaps 
also too conservative, to have yet found another outlet for their huge 
United States government deposits. 
Thus, the continual process of transfer of funds which the call money 
market effects makes the price of these transactions a particularly sensi-
tive indicator of the tightness or easiness of the banking system. When 
the demand for advances is relatively light, the British banks are able 
to get their call money at lower prices; when they demand larger 
amounts of call money, the Habib Bank and the American banks are 
able to get higher prices for these funds. As we shall see in later sec-
tions, the call rate together with the Bank Rate explains much of the 
balance sheets of the Scheduled Banks and the reaction of these balance 
sheets to changes in the demand for advances. 
The range of possible interest rates on call money is large. Many 
years ago, it was not unusual for the rate to drop to 1/4 per cent during 
the slack season (even the British banks experienced slack then); more 
recently, it has been unusual for the rate to go below 1 per cent for more 
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than an occasional summer month or two. In February 1956, the 
rate rose above the Bank Rate for the first time, but it has been above 
it at the end of six different months since then8. A call money rate 
above the Bank Rate is not a temporary aberration, as might at first be 
thought; it merely means that the British banks are out of eligible 
collateral for State Bank borrowing (or reluctant to engage in it further 
for other reasons) and the lenders are taking advantage of it. 
There is call money and there is call money. Because it represents 
many kinds of loans between banks, it is not unexpected that there is 
frequently no single rate quoted. Usually a spread of 1/4 per cent 
covers the lowest and highest rates. For example, currently (March 
1962) the rate is 3-3/4—4 per cent; National and Grindlay's Bank, the 
biggest single borrower of call money and always ready to borrow more 
or repay its debt on a moment's notice, gets the lower rate while the 
other banks mostly must pay the higher. 
This preferential rate to certain borrowers gives us a clue to the 
process of precise change in the call market. If there were upward 
pressure, the number of borrowers who received the lower quotation 
would gradually diminish, and simultaneously a few least-favoured 
borrowers would find themselves paying a higher rate. It must always 
be remembsrcd. that this market is an example of bilateral oligopoly 
with all its indeterminacy. Since it would be tiresome to re-negotiate 
the rates anew each day and would subject everyone to unnecessary 
and undesirable uncertainty, the participants implicitly agree to alter 
the rates and move the funds only when it is clear to everyone that such 
a step is called for. 
Thus, it is not abiding fully by the rules for a lender to take advant-
age of a momentary desperation or for a borrower to seek greater funds 
with offers of big rate increases. It is not that the call rate never moves, 
nothing could be farther from the t ruth; it is just that it moves slowly 
and meaningfully. Also, the rate does not reach the extremes it might 
in a more competitive, less restiained market. Lenders stop trying 
to put out their funds when the rate gets low; they do not bid the rate 
down further in an effort to clear their surpluses. Similarly, borrowers 
stop trying to get funds when the rate gets high; they do not bid the 
8. December 1956, April 1960, October 1960, December 1960, January 1961, 
and February 1961. RC:F 60-61, p. 149. 
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rate up further in an effort to find more funds. All participants see 
the market as a whole, with all its frustrating inelasticities, and are 
capable of seeing the futility of competitive bidding where supplies or 
demands are nearly fixed. The call rate is meaningful as an indicator 
of the tightness of the system. But its level is neither the result of a 
competitive process nor that which completely eliminates excess supplies 
and demands. 
SECTION IX 
PROCESS OF EXPANSION 
In Pakistan, most banks can be readily classified as tight or easy 
banks on the basis of their reactions to increased demand for advances. 
There are banks that can easily adjust their balance sheets in order to 
make the new loan if they decide in favour of it; there are others that 
must worry and work especially hard to meet the liquidity strain that 
new advances impose. The process of expansion quite naturally 
differs greatly for these two so dissimilar types of banks. 
The easy bank is far f rom "loaned up" by any definition of that 
nebulous phrase. By necessity or by policy, the bank makes fewer 
advances than it can readily handle. Such a bank often has excess 
cash assets, usually in the form of unnecessary deposits in the State 
Bank. It frequently maintains relatively large clearing balances with 
other ba.nks. If the bank decides to make a new advance, these can 
be used fust . The second step in the process of expansion is the with-
drawal of call lending from the market or the counter-finance of govern-
ment advances'. Which of these is chosen may depend upon many 
things, not least being the relative rates of interest in the call market 
and on State Bank borrowing. 
Once a bank has cut to the minimum its cash and reserve ratios, 
has ceased to be a call money lender, and has fully counter-financed 
any government advances, that bank has passed over f rom an easy to a 
tight position. Further expansion of advances requires difficult and 
expensive adjustments of the balance sheet—adjustments which also 
do not improve the appearance of the balance sheet. Such a bank 
1. The possibility of sale of government securities is neglected throughout, 
although occasionally it may be possible (see Section IV). 
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really has three sources of lendable funds open to i t : it may borrow 
1) call money; 2) f rom the State Bank on the collateral of its "approv-
ed" securities; and 3) from the State Bauk on the collateral of its 
"eligible" bills. 
When the bank has a choice of acquiring new lendable funds by all 
three of these methods, its choice on grounds of least cost alone is quite 
complicated2. It is sufficient to recognize that the relative levels of 
the call money rate and the Bank Rate are important to its decision. 
If the bank chooses to use State Bank borrowing, it will eventually 
exhaust its stock of eligible collateral. The liquidity requirement 
makes the holding of some quantity of unencumbered securities essen-
tial, and hence, the amount of securities which can be encumbered is 
much less than the bank's total holding of them. Not all the bank's 
bills are always acceptable, and even if they were, such assets comprise 
a small part of the portfolios of most banks. There is a very definite 
limit to the amount of borrowing f rom the State Bank a particular 
bank can do3. 
There is no such technological constraint upon call market borrow-
ing. In theory, a bank can always attract to itself a larger amount of 
call money if only it offers a sufficiently high price. In fact, the call 
market does not react quickly to offers of higher rates (see Section 
VIII), and even its long-run reaction is generally inelastic, at least in 
the range of the higher rates. Thus, while it may technically be true 
that some increased call money can be borrowed Jby means of a quite 
large rate rise, the inelasticity of the market may place a profitability 
constraint upon further expansion4. 
As an example, consider a bank which is currently borrowing Rs. 5 
crores on call at 3.75 per cent. It is considering increasing its borrow-
ing to Rs. 6 crores but it expects that this additional demand on its 
part will push the call rate up to4per cent. If it does the extra borrowing, 
its annual call money expenses will rise f rom Rs. 18.75 lakhs to Rs. 
24.00 lakhs; its marginal rate of interest on the las tcroreof borrowing 
2. See Appendix C. 
3. Unless it receives "clean" advances from the State Bank; then there is no 
limit. 
4. Even if the dubious appearance of the bank's balance sheet does not stop 
its expansion first, 
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will be 5.25 per cent. Moreover, this additional crore of borrowing 
will not permit the bank to increase its advances by one crore, for 
reserves and liquidity must be held against the additional call money 
debt. So, Rs. 100 lakhs of call money only facilitate Rs. 80 lakhs of ad-
vances (the other Rs. 20 lakhs going into cash assets)5. Thus, if the 
additional crore of call borrowing is to be profitable, the bank must 
have customers for its advances willing to pay 6.56 per cent. This 
rate is well above average advance rates (over one percentage point 
above) and, as we have seen (Section V), individual banks have little 
ability, or at least desire, to raise advance rates. It is very likely that 
this hypothetical bank will not increase its call market borrowing in 
these circumstances, even though the call money rate, at 3.75 per cent, 
is nearly 2 per cent below the rate at which new advances could be 
made. 
This example is not unrealistic6. This is one way that the expan-
sion of advances in tight banks may come to an end. As long as the 
bank's demands on its advances continue strong, the bank has two 
possible ultimate constraints to its expansion. One, its supply of eligi-
ble State Bank collateral may become exhausted; and two, the margi-
nal call money rate may get too high to be profitable. When both 
become operative, the expansion must end. The bank cannot expand 
in the way that is profitable, and it is not profitable to expand in the 
way it can. 
The advance-expansion process has been described, at the micro-
economic level, for easy and tight banks. But each is not equally 
relevant. Those banks with fairly-to-very-conservative advance poli-
cies, relative to their deposits, seem always to be involved to a lesser 
extent in any advances expansion. Those banks with more liberal 
lending policies best attract potential advances customers when the 
demand for advances rises. Thus, the advances and bills to total de-
posits ratio of the conservative Habib Bank was 0.40, 0.40, and 0.46 
over 1959-61, while that of the National Bank was 0.66, 0.75, and 0.92 
over the same three years7. Those banks which make most of the 
advances also make most of the increments of advances. Thus, when 
5. Perhaps securities may be purchased. 
6. And can be generalized and made rigorous, see Appendix C. 
7. Source: Balance sheets of these banks. 
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expansion occurs, either seasonally or secularly, the tight banks lead. 
The result is that the tightness of the tight banks increases much more 
rapidly than that of the easy banks. This poverty (of reserves) in the 
midst of plenty explains, and is evidenced by, the curious behaviour of 
the call market (as we shall see in the next section). 
Thus, the easy banks can make large increments in their advances 
with relatively little difficulty. It would actually be quite hard to esti-
mate the limits to their expansion; fortunately, this is not necessary 
as any expansion of advances on their account is of lesser importance. 
For the tight banks, also the principals of any advance expansion, the 
problems of expansion are serious. Every new advance of a rupee 
requires the prior discovery of a rupee of reserves to meet the concomit-
ant withdrawal8. There are several sources of such new funds. The 
purpose of the next four sections is to examine the extent to which each 
can be tapped as the system becomes increasingly tight. In Section 
X, the determinants of the volume of inter-bank transfers are analysed; 
in Section XI, the possible economization of cash and excess reserves; 
in Section XII, the amount of indebtedness to the State Bank; and in 
Section XIII, the size of the liquidity ratio. To understand the limits 
to advance expansion in the system, we must look at each, for they are 
the means whereby the tight banks acquire funds. 
S E C T I O N X 
INTER-BANK REALLOCATIONS OF F U N D S 
Funds are reallocated among banks in two ways, by borrowing 
and lending call money and by clearing balances maintained in one 
bank by another. The economic implications of these two processes 
are quite similar although the motives of the participating banks are 
quite different. In the call market, the borrowing bank is paying a 
price in order to acquire funds; in the other case, the depositing bank 
8. Part of any withdrawal will probably return to or stay in the banking 
system as deposits, but no single bank is large enough to rely on this. For exam-
ple, the National Bank, with the largest deposits of any bank in Pakistan, holds 
about 30 per cent of the total non-bank deposits in the system. Such deposits 
comprise 45 per cent of the sum of deposits and currency (both figures are for 
December 1961). Thus, the National Bank can expect, on the average, a return 
of less than 14 per cent of any withdrawn new advances. Other banks must expect 
much less. In fact, it happens that currency drawings often occur simultaneously 
with advance expansion (sec Section XIII), which means that an even smaller flow-
back may be safely anticipated. 
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is foregoing earnings in order to possess useful cash assets. Because 
the motivations are so different, analysis of the amounts that are trans-
ferred in each of these categories should be conducted separately. Un-
fortunately, as was stated earlier, it is difficult to make a meaningful 
separation of these two types of inter-bank reallocations. We can 
at best approximate the distinction by treating all "inter-bank borrow-
ings" (time and demand) as call money and all "inter-bank deposits" 
(time and demand) as unsolicited balances. To what extent this bifur-
cation is useful will shortly become apparent. 
In the call money market, which consists only of banks, certain 
banks are traditionally lenders and certain others borrowers. Very 
few banks find themselves sometimes a borrower, sometimes a lender 
of call money. But to make this statement, correct in itself, runs the 
risk of overlooking a very important attribute of such a market: every 
participant is potentially a borrower or a lender, at some call rates. 
There is some rate, sufficiently high, that will convert all potential 
borrowers into lenders, and some rate, sufficiently low, that will convert 
all potential lenders into borrowers. One way to classify the Scheduled 
Banks might be by the call rate at which a bank wishes neither to lend 
nor to borrow call money. 
Such a classification is, of course, impossible but it is not pedagogi-
cally uninteresting. We can imagine the American banks, not wishing 
to tie up any more funds than necessary in government securities and 
unable for the present to make many advances, anxious to lend their 
surplus funds at call even at very low rates; for them, the only real 
alternative is increased cash assets of no earning power. At the other 
extreme are certain of the British banks, their eligible State Bank colla-
teral exhausted and liquidity ratio at a minimum, these banks would 
require quite a high call rate (and not a few months) to induce them to 
stop borrowing. Thus, for each bank, we can visualize a downward-
sloping supply-and-demand schedule for call loans. Such a schedule 
is pictured (CC) in Figure X- l . 
At a call rate above /„, this hypothetical bank becomes a lender of 
call money; at rates below /„, a borrower. There is, of course, no 
reason for assuming that this schedule is linear, as drawn in Figure X - l : 
we might expect several regions of distinct non-linearities. Around 
/„, there may be an inertia region of call rates where the bank would 
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FIGURE X - > 
neither borrow nor lend. The Bank Rate would surely provide a kink 
for these banks which are still borrowing at call rates in that neighbour-
hood. There may be a floor to lending rates or limits to borrowing 
quantities as ihe call rate approaches zero. And the amount of lending 
eventually reaches a technical and institutional maximum. 
The "neither-a-borrower-nor-a-lender-be" point, /„, will differ 
greatly between banks. But, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
j'o points of the traditional lenders are closely grouped (at a low level) 
and that the i0 points of the traditional borrowers are closely grouped 
(at a high level). The critical diversity of /„ points is between these 
two groups, not within each. If it is assumed that all the /„ points of 
the banks comprising each group are identical, we can easily draw a 
schedule for the low-/0 group and a schedule for the high-/0 group. 
These aggregated schedules are simply the horizontal sum of the indivi-
dual schedules of the members of the group and of course cross the 
call-rate axis at the /0 point, assumed the same, of the members. This 
simplification does make it impossible for us to consider one British 
bank borrowing from another (or one American bank borrowing f rom 
another); while these are indeed conceivable occurrences, neglect of 
them is not serious. 
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In Figure X-2, the supply demand schedules of the traditional 
lenders, LL, and of the traditional borrowers, BB, are drawn. Because 
of the aggregation within each group, we cannot see who is lending to 
whom, but the traditional lenders will, in equilibrium, lend OI, to the 
traditional borrowers at a rate of The rate, /,, is that rate which 
equates the supply of call money which lenders are willing to offer 
with the amount demanded by the borrowers. This equilibrium rate 
is somewhere between the /'„ point of the lenders and that of the 
borrowers—how far from each will depend upon the slopes of LL 
and BB (here drawn, for no reason, with identical slopes). 
/ C A L L RATE 
L B B 
FIGURE X - 2 
We must now consider what happens to the call rate and to the 
quantity of call money when there is an expansion of demand for ad-
vances. In the face of such an expansion, the typical call-lender bank 
will prefer to lend less into the call market, and the typical call-borrower 
will seek to borrow more. In terms of Figure X-l , an expansion of 
demand for advances will cause a rise in the i0 point, wherever it is 
(and perhaps also a change in the slope of the schedule, but this may 
be neglected). Thus, the call market supply-and-demand schedule 
will in these circumstances generally shift upwards and to the right, 
from LL toward L 'L ' for lender banks and from BB toward B'B' for 
borrower banks. 
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Exactly what happens in the call market in response to these shifts 
depends very critically upon the extent, absolutely and relatively, of 
the shifts. Three basic cases may be distinguished: 
1) Both schedules shift upward by the same amount ' , f rom LL to 
L ' L ' and from BB to B'B' . The equilibrium interest rate in the call 
market rises from to /3, but the volume of funds transferred remains 
unchanged at 01 | . 
2) Only the schedule of the lenders rises, from LL to L 'L ' , the borro-
wers' schedule remaining at BB. The call rate rises to i2 and the volume 
of funds declines to OI3. 
3) Only the schedule of the borrowers rises, f rom BB to B'B' , the 
lenders' schedule remaining at LL. The rate rises to i2 and the volume 
of funds increases to OI2. 
The only sure conclusion of this is that the call rate will rise in response 
to an increased demand for advances, regardless of how this increased 
demand is distributed among the banks. If the traditional borrowers 
receive the greater part of the new advances demand, then the volume 
of call funds will increase; if the traditional lenders receive it, the volume 
will decline. Theory can tell us no more. 
The historical evidence is, however, much more voluble. In Figure 
X-3, the volume of inter-bank borrowing (time and demand) as a frac-
tion of total "o ther" (i.e., non-bank) deposits is plotted against the call 
rate as a ratio to the Bank Rate over the past decade2. There is a dis-
tinct upward slope, indicating that in booms, seasonal or secular, the 
traditional borrowers in the call market receive the larger share of the 
1. Always assuming identical and unchanging slopes. If this is not 
assumed, the conclusions are much more complex but not fundamentally altered. 
2. The series covers exactly 40 quarters, starting in June 1952 because it is 
not possible to separate bank from non-bank deposits before that date. The volume 
of inter-bank borrowing is "deflated" by the volume of "other" deposits in the 
banking system in an effort to remove the effect of the strong upward trend in each 
of these absolute figures. The call rate is divided by the Bank Rate in an effort 
to make allowance for the rise of the latter in 1959; the conclusions of Appendix C 
suggest that this ratio is particularly relevant to the bank's calculations. All data 
are found in RC&.F 57-58, RC & F 60-61, Irarii's Market Weekly (op. c/7.),and 
SBP. B, April 1962. 
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new demand for advances. The call market is again seen as the means 
whereby the British banks are able to retain their advance customers 
despite declining (relative) deposits. Needless to say, the correlation 
m m 
1.2 
• A 
> a x x 
* « 
« XX « 
X x 
X x 
x x 
• 02 • OA 08 08 -10 
INTER-BANK BORROWING 
OTHER'DEPOSITS 
FIGURE X - 3 
in Figure X-3 is not perfect—spurts in advances demand are not always 
proport ioned in exactly the same way—but the positive slope is clear. 
Two other aspects of Figure X-3 should be noticed. One, the 
pat tern suggests that some inter-bank borrowing will occur even if 
the call rate is zero3. This indicates that some por t ion of this so-called 
borrowing probably consists more correctly of deposits held for the 
convenience of the lender. A correct dichotomy between these two 
types of loans is unattainable but might be better estimated if the entire 
pattern of crosses was shifted about one percentage point to the left. 
Two, the relationship appears to flatten out in the region where the 
call rate equals the Bank Rate. It is difficult to discover a good reason 
why this should be so; while it is easy to believe that the borrowers' 
schedule changes shape at the Bank Rate, it is not easy to find a reason 
why the lenders' should be (for these latter are not in debt to the State 
3. About one per cent of "other" (i.e., non-bank) deposits. 
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Bank). And, since the borrowers' schedule shifts much more than the 
lenders', the pattern in Figure X-3, approximately traces the mirror 
image of the traditional lenders' schedule4. Thus, it is perhaps wisest 
to blink at appearances5. If the two extreme right-hand crosses 
(September and December 1960) are considered aberrations, the rela-
tionship in Figure X-3 seems unaffected by the proximity of the call 
rate to the Bank Rate6. 
Call money is but one of the two ways that banks reallocate funds 
between themselves. We must also consider inter-bank deposits. 
Most banks both borrow and lend inter-bank deposit balances—unlike 
call money where a bank almost always either borrows or lends. Pre-
sumably, the amount of funds the bank borrows in this way is not a 
variable at its discretion; banks accept balances from other banks 
whenever they are offered. But the amount a bank maintains as 
balances in other banks is subject to its decision. 
When the demand for advances rises, how will a bank react with 
respect to its balances in other banks? There is surely a tendency 
to lower such deposits as those banks whose advances expand use 
these balances as reserves and those banks whose advances do not 
expand seek to profit f rom the higher call rates. Offsetting this, how-
ever, is the need for larger clearing balances when economic activity 
is more rapid. Especially those banks which increase advances must 
expect greater variability and even losses in their clearings. We can-
not know a priori which of these forces will predominate. 
In fact, it seems that the former has been the more important over 
the last decade as Figure X-4 shows7. There is a slight, but distinct, 
4. By mirror image is meant this: if Figure X-3 were relabelled "inter-bank 
lendings" instead of borrowing, the pattern of crosses would approximate the 
traditional lenders' schedule. 
5. See Appendix D. 
6. Some of the apparent curvature may result from hidden "deposits" in 
"borrowings". At low call rates, some 1—2 per cent of "other" deposits are inter-
bank "borrowings" when we should expect almost none. Probably the extent of 
these misnomered borrowings declines as the call rate rises. If the lower crosses 
were moved 1—2 per cent to the left and the higher ones left unmoved, the slope 
of the relationship would seem even less affected by the nearness of the call to 
the Bank Rate. 
7. In Figure X-4, the variables are the call rate "deflated" by the Bank Rate 
and the ratio of inter-bank deposits to "other" (i.e., non-bank) deposits. The 
period and sources are the same as for Figure X-3. 
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negative slope to the pattern of crosses. But the scatter is sufficiently) 
random that it is clear there are many forces other than the call rate 
and behind it the demand for advances, determining the volume of 
inter-bank deposits. 
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Figure X-4 gives an indication of the gross amount of inter-bank 
transfers by way of deposits, but it is not necessarily an indication of the 
net amount. This latter figure could be calculated only if we know 
the position of the individual banks and could add up the net position 
of the net lenders (or the net borrowers)8. If, at one extreme, those 
banks which received deposits from other banks never made such 
deposits themselves, the gross position would indeed be the net. If, 
at the other extreme, every bank held just as large balances in other 
banks as it receives from other banks, the net position is zero regardless 
of the gross. In fact, all we can say is that the net inter-bank transfer 
of funds through deposit balances is between zero and the gross 
transfer. 
If the net transfer through deposits is zero, then the overall net 
transfer (through deposits and borrowings) is, as shown in Figure X-3, 
greatly responsive to the call rate. If, however, the net transfer through 
8. See Section VIII for the meaning and definition of "ne t" in this context. 
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deposits is equal to the gross transfer, then the overall net transfer is 
much less correlated to the call rate, as is shown in Figure X-5. But 
the positive slope is still quite clear. 
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Note: The same period and sources as Figures X-3 and X-4. "Inter-bank funds" 
are the sum of inter-bank deposits and borrowings. 
This gross-versus-net problem is one that appeared to a lesser extent 
even in the call borrowing analysis. Occasionally, a bank will tem-
porarily lend on call what it has earlier borrowed "on call". But the 
situation was rare enough there to be neglected. In deposits also, 
probably few of the banks which receive large amounts of such balances 
also place large amounts with other banks. The National Bank is 
undoubtedly the biggest receiver of such deposits and its balances 
with other banks are probably very small9. So the net transfers implicit 
in Figure X-4 may be fairly near the gross. But even this does not 
solve the problem, for the sum of the net transfers through call money 
and the net transfers through deposits is not equal to the overall net 
9. The National Bank may receive as much as half of the inter-bank deposits, 
which were Rs. 10.68 crores at the end of December 1961 (Weekly Statement). 
But its balances with other banks in current account were only Rs. 1.17 crores on 
that date ( See Section VIII). 
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transfer. Many banks may be net borrowers of call and net lenders 
of deposits, and these positions should, in the overall, be netted out10. 
Thus, the conclusion must be very nebulous. Probably something 
like Figure X-3 or Figure X-5 represents the " t rue" relationship bet-
ween the net inter-bank transfer of funds and the call rate. We can 
only be reasonably sure that this is an upward-sloping relation. If 
we are not too pessimistic, we may draw the following conclusions. 
One, there is probably some shift of inter-bank funds f rom "deposits" 
to "borrowings" as the call rate rises. Two, there is probably some 
decline in the net volume of lending by means of inter-bank deposits 
as the call rate rises. Three, there is probably a large rise in call lending 
as the call rate rises. Four, there is probably a greater amount of net 
inter-bank reallocation of funds at high call rates than at lower. And 
five, the big call-market lenders do not share proportionately in increases 
in advances demand and hence are able, and willing, to transfer a greater 
volume of funds to other banks. 
SECTION XI 
DETERMINANTS OF CASH ASSETS 
For reasons of liquidity in the very short run, banks must always 
hold some balances in the various cash assets—assets which earn noth-
ing (except in unusual circumstances) but are acceptable to all for 
meeting obligations. In Pakistan, there are basically three such assets: 
1) actual notes and coins in the vault; 2) current account balances 
with other banks; and 3) balances with the State Bank in excess of 
what is legally required. Since we have examined the second of these 
in the previous section, we will here consider only the first and third. 
It should not be thought that the second differs f rom the other two with 
respect to its use by the bank as pure liquidity; it is just that it also has 
the attribute, unlike the other two, of being an inter-bank transfer of 
funds, and hence was conveniently considered there. Moreover, in 
Pakistan (as was mentioned earlier), it is difficult to be certain to what 
extent the labels on inter-bank accounts, deposit or borrowing, time or 
10. The State Bank, and only it, can clear all this up by publishing the net 
positions of the Pakistani,British, American and other foreign banks in inter-bank 
deposits and borrowings. This data, over the 1950s, would add greatly to our 
knowledge of inter-bank relationships. The "netting-out" procedure would, of 
course, need to be carefully planned. 
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demand, convey the true nature of the account. Thus, what are called 
demand accounts between banks may in fact be fairly illiquid balances. 
For these reasons, here we will treat as cash assets only vault cash and 
excess reserves with the State Bank. 
Cash assets place the bank in somewhat of a dilemma, as mentioned 
in the last section, in that they are most needed at the very time when 
they are most expensive. When a bank's potential for converting cash 
assets into earning assets is great, then uncertainty about the retention 
of deposits is also great. Thus, the way in which the quantity of cash 
assets reacts to changes in the demand for advances, or the call money 
rate, cannot be predicted. 
In the case of inter-bank deposits, it was found (Section X) that the 
profitability consideration slightly outweighed the liquidity need; higher 
call rates induced the banks to hold smallei inter-bank balances. Figure 
XI-1 shows that this is true also of the other non-earning cash assets. 
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As before, the sum of cash and excess reserves is deflated by "o ther" 
(i.e., non-bank) deposits in order to remove the secular trend. The 
state of tightness in the system is measured by the call rate, as a ratio 
to the Bank Rate to allow for the upward shift in call rates after the 
Bank Rate rise. The data are f rom Weekly Statements, end of each 
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quarter (June 1952 through March 1962)—as before, with the excep-
tion that crosses are used for the data up through December 1956 and 
circles thereafter. 
The pattern of crosses and circles, taken as a whole, is significantly 
negatively sloped. But this is misleading, as separate examination of 
the two periods indicates. There are several differences between the 
two: the pattern of the later period 1) is less erratic; 2) is more clearly 
of negative slope; and 3) is centred more to the left. This suggests 
that the banks, in their earlier years, determined the size of their cash 
assets more or less independently of opportunity cost considerations, 
and that these cash asset balances were generally large. In recent 
years, on the other hand, such balances have been reduced and have 
become more subject to change when foregone profits dictate. 
There are several possible explanations of this relative decline in 
cash assets. The one that offers itself most readily concerns various 
ways by which banks might reduce their relative needs for cash itself. 
In fact, however, the use of cash per se (i.e., notes, coins and silver in 
vaults) in the banking system has exhibited no clear trend in the last 
decade (relative to deposits), although there have been slight differences 
in the changes of the Pakistani banks and the foreign banks (see, 
Table XI. 1, on the following page). The average end-of-December 
cash in vault ratio fell by only 0.001 between 1953-56 and 1957-61, 
and was actually slightly above its nine-year average in 1961. While 
erratic, the ratios display no trend. 
The reason for this secular constancy can be discovered in the ratios 
for the Pakistani and foreign banks separately. The foreign banks, 
with almost no increase in branches over these years', were able to 
reduce, almost steadily, the cash ratio by half (from 0.028 to 0.014). 
This follows from elementary large-number theory: if deposits (per 
branch) double, a bank need not as much as double its vault cash to 
cover the same degree of risk of temporary shortage. The branch 
expansion of the Pakistani banks has precluded them from sharing 
1. Between June 1953 and June 1961, the number of branches of foreign 
banks in Pakistan fell by ten; the Indian branches declined by thirteen and the 
other foreign branches rose by three (BS 60-61, p. 110). 
Table XIII.l 
Ratio of cash to non-bank deposits of 
Period 
All Pakistani Foreign 
banks banks banks 
(1) (2) (3) 
1953 0.027 0.048 0.028 
1954 0.033 0.044 0.023 
1955 0.027 0.035 0.020 
1956 0.041 0.050 0.019 
1957 0.038 0.047 0.018 
1958 0.036 0.060 0.029 
1959 0.020 0.044 0.014 
1960 0.027 0.037 0.014 
1961 0.033 0.046 0.014 
Averages: 1953-56 0.032 0.044 0.023 
1957-61 0.031 0.047 0.018 
1953-61 0.031 0.046 0.020 
Source: BS 48-57 through BS 60-61. 
Notes: Col. (1): Weekly Statements for last Friday December; "cash in 
Pakistan" divided by "other" (i.e., non-bank) deposits. 
Cols. (2) and (3): Quarterly Statements, December; "notes, coins, 
and silver" divided by time and demand deposits "f rom 
others" (than banks). These columns are not strictly com-
parable with Col. (1). 
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these economies of scale. Not only is their cash ratio double that of 
the foreign banks, but it is rising2. Economies of scale, greater use 
of telegraphic transfers, and improved intra-bank (inter-brancli) com-
munication have failed to offset fully the increased vault cash require-
ments of the branch-expansion programme. 
If the ratio of cash plus excess reserves to deposits has declined, but 
that of just cash has not, the decline must have occurred in the excess 
reserve ratio. It did as is shown in Table XI.2 below: 
Table XI.2 
Date Ratio of excess reserves 
to non-bank deposits 
1953 0.019 
1954 0.026 
1955 0.028 
1956 0.023 
1957 0.015 
1958 0.015 
1959 0.011 
1960 0.011 
1961 0.011 
Source: Weekly Statements, for last Friday December. 
Note: Excess reserves are "balances with State Bank" less "statutory reserves". 
2. Of course, some of the Pakistani banks may prefer to cover a greater part 
of the cash-shortage risk than do the foreign banks. But, this almost certainly 
will not account for the entire difference. 
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The ratios begin to decline in 1956 and the average over 1957-61 is 
almost half that of 1953-56. It is no coincidence that the Scheduled 
Banks' holdings of the government securities began to increase rapidly 
about the same time as this excess reserve ratio began its decline. By 
1957, the State Bank was pushing out large quantities of these securi-
ties; with their irreproachable ability to serve as collateral for State 
Bank borrowing, these securities began to replace excess reserves as 
the bank's emergency reserves. With potential liquidity abundant, 
most of the busy season excess reserves with the State Bank are no 
more than slight miscalculations of probable required reserves. 
Cash in vaults and excess reserves are but a small fraction of deposits 
even for banks with many branches. The fraction is probably as low 
now, at 2-4 per cent, as banks dare press it and is not very responsive 
to changes in the call rate. Only once have suitable earning assets 
been so scarce as to push the fraction over 10 per cent; as long as the 
banking system remains even fairly tight, the cash ratio will not be 
subject to much variation. 
SECTION x n 
DETERMINANTS OF STATE B A N K INDEBTEDNESS 
Critical to an understanding of the determinants of the volume of 
credit in any banking system are the answers to when and how much 
do the banks borrow from the central bank. In Pakistan too, 
these questions must be asked. But first there is the important, though 
lesser, problem of defining the term "indebtedness". At its simplest, 
of course, the word means the sum of Scheduled Bank borrowings 
f rom the State Bank in all the various guises discussed in Section VII. 
However, this neglects the fact that some banks also " lend" to the 
State Bank in that they maintain balances above those required 
{i.e., excess reserves). We wish to get a figure which represents not just 
indebtedness but the larger concept, net reserves borrowed by the 
Scheduled Banks from the State Bank; for, if one bank keeps excess 
reserves of a rupee and another borrows a rupee, this is much more an 
inter-bank transfer than a creation of new reserves by the State Bank. 
Thus, in this section, we shall use this latter concept, the difference 
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between excess reserves and State Bank indebtedness'. This is usually 
called "net free reserves"2, a particularly well-chosen label. The only 
problem with this concept is that it is not thoroughly symmetrical 
in all ways. It does give the net amount that the Scheduled Banks 
together lend to (if positive) or borrow from (if negative) the State 
Bank. But borrowings cost the Bank Rate, while lendings earn nothing; 
this gap in the profitability means that there are many configurations 
of bank circumstances that will induce the bank neither to borrow from 
nor to lend to the State Bank. 
For a particular bank seeking funds the choice is often call money 
borrowing or State Bank borrowing; for a bank seeking an outlet for 
funds, the choice is often call money lending or excess reserves with 
the State Bank. Thus, for borrowers, the call rate is weighed against the 
4-per-cent Bank Rate, while for lenders, the call rate is weighed against 
zero-yield excess reserves. Net free reserves will clearly be greatly 
influenced by the relation of the call rate to the Bank Rate. Moreover, 
the regions around call rates of zero and of the Bank Rate will be es-
pecially significant. 
The expected relation between net free reserves and the ratio3 
of the call rate to the Bank Rate is shown in Figure XII-1. The path 
of net free reserves as the call rate rises, for a fixed Bank Rate, 
is ABCDE (or ABCDF). This tortuous hypothesis is best explained 
segment by segment. 
AB: Lending on call involves some expense and nuisance to 
the lending bank; there is, therefore, for each bank, some floor 
call rate below which the profits are not worth the bother. On Rs. 1 
crore of call money, for example, a bank earns each day about Rs. 278 
at 1 per cent, Rs. 139 at 0.50 per cent, and Rs. 70 at 0.25 per cent. 
Somewhere around \ — | per cent most lending banks withdraw their 
1. By tradition, the sign is positive if excess reserves exceed indebtedness, 
negative if the reverse. 
2. This term is also calculated, though slightly differently, in RC&F 60-61 
(for the first time). The figure, as used there, comprises excess reserves plus cash-
in-tills minus borrowing from the State Bank. Since cash ratios are fairly stable 
(Section XI), the two calculations are very similar. 
3. See Appendix C for the relevance of this ratio. 
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funds from the call market4. These funds are almost always transferr-
ed to the State Bank balances, though of course there are other possible 
placings for them5. At call rates of B and below, potential call 
lenders prefer to hold excess reserves. Potential call borrowers are of 
course out of debt to the State Bank at these low call rates, so net free 
reserves become increasingly large at call rates below B. B is presum-
ably somewhere below 1 per cent. 
BC: At call rates above B, it is still profitable for the seekers of 
funds to borrow call, not State Bank; and the rates are now sufficiently 
attractive to induce the lenders to run down their excess reserves. Thus, 
4. Call rates of "1/4 per cent" have not been quoted since 1954 and rates of 
"1/4—1/2 per cent" only twice (in May and June 1959). The floor seems to have 
risen since rates of "1/4 percent" were quoted six times over 1949-53. See RC &F 
53-54 through RC &F 60-61. 
5. Principally, cash-in-vaults and government securities. Banks see no need 
to burden themselves with unnecessary supplies of cash, and the purchase of securi-
ties they are not forced to buy and may never be able to sell is unthinkable (Section 
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the positive part of net free reserves declines to zero (or nearly so), 
while the negative part has not yet begun to increase. 
C D : At some call rate , probably in the neighbourhood of 0.80 
to 0.95 of the Bank Rate6, it becomes less expensive for at least some 
seekers of funds to begin to borrow from the State Bank. Since there 
are already negligible excess reserves in the system at these high call 
rates, net free reserves move below zero. 
D E : Once the call rate has reached 0.95 of the Bank Rate (about 
3 | per cent at present), the State Bank borrowing becomes less costly 
than call money (because reserves are required against call money). 
Then, the banking system will take all further new reserves f rom the 
State Bank; D E is a flat line at a call-to-Bank-Rate ratio of about 0.95. 
D F : It is not impossible that the call rate will rise above the Bank 
Rate , and the net free reserves schedule follow D F instead of DE. 
This might occur under two quite different sets of circumstances: 
1) The Scheduled Banks exhaust their supplies of eligible collateral 
and the State Bank refuses to lend further amounts to them in the 
absence of such collateral. If the demand for advances is great, some 
banks may then bid up the call rate in a frantic effort to get new funds 
somewhere. 
2) Despite plentiful supplies of eligible collateral, some banks may 
feel (or be induced by the State Bank to feel) that indebtedness to State 
Bank should be kept within limits. If they then require funds, they 
would feel the necessity for taking call money despite its expense 
(relative to the Bank Rate). This possibility is unlikely, for it is not clear 
why, a bank should decide that State Bank debt is bad, and then plunge 
more deeply into call money debt7 . 
Thus, if there is a D F segment to the schedule, it probably means 
6. See Appendix C. 
7. This criticism does not apply to the argument that the schedule is ABCD— 
and stops at D (i.e., banks cease at that point to do further borrowing of either 
kind). 
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simply that some banks have run out of State Bank collateral, and are 
willing to pay above the Bank Rate for funds. 
The following Table XII. 1, summarizes the schedule of net free 
reserves and its two components as the call ra te rises: 
Table XII. 1 
Excess State Bank Net free 
Call rate reserves debt reserves 
(1) (2) (3) 
A to B 
B to C 
C to D 
D to E (or F) 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
Very + 
+ 
0 
Very 
If the reader prefers to see only the State Bank indebtedness, he needs 
look only at the negative net free reserves quadrant at call rates above 
C. Some such debt does begin to take place at call rates below C, but 
(as we shall soon see) mostly for special reasons. 
In Figure XII-2 are presented the configurations of the call-to-
Bank Rate ratio and the ratio of net free reserves to "other" deposits8 
over the last 33 quarters (March 1954 through March 1962)9. The 
8. "Other" deposits are non-bank deposits. The ratio is taken to deflate 
the secular trends in net free reserves and deposits. 
9. Data on Scheduled Bank borrowings from the State Bank are not avail-
able before March 1954. Source: Weekly Statements. 
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crosses range from positive net free reserves of nearly 8 per cent of non-
bank deposits (in June 1956) to negative net free reserves of nearly 
20 per cent (in March 1962). While the pattern is roughly that hypo-
thesized in Figure XII-1, there is little more than the generally nega-
tive slope to recommend it. There appears to be neither a flattened 
AB segment nor a vertical BC segment. 
We need not look far to find the reason for this poor fit. The hypo-
theses of Figure XII-1 are derived on the assumptions that each bank 
is rational (in the sense that, having decided to borrow, it borrows 
where it is cheapest if it has a choice), and that all State Bank borrowing 
is done at the Bank Rate. The first assumption does not usually apply 
to the National Bank, and its peculiarities significantly affect the posi-
tion of the entire Scheduled Banks. The National Bank seems to 
prefer under most circumstances to get its new funds at the State Bank. 
And the National Bank, with its outpouring of nation-serving ad-
vances, frequently needs funds. Although exact figures are impossible 
to acquire, it is very probable that the National Bank has borrowed 
from the State Bank, at the Bank Rate or one per cent below it at times 
when it could have gotten call money at one per cent(September 1957), 
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1-1/2—1-3/4 per cent (June 1957), and 2-1/4—2-1/2 per cent (March 
1959, when the Bank Rate was 4 per cent)10. The second assumption 
does not apply to counter-finance where the borrower is charged one 
percentage point below the Bank Rate. 
Clearly, it would be more sensible to test the hypotheses on all 
Scheduled Banks except the National Bank, whose size peculiarities 
and especially great access to counter-finance distort the picture. Un-
fortunately, this is not statistically possible since no quarterly figures 
for the National Bank are available (and the annual ones are largely 
incomparable with the Weekly Statements). But a close approxima-
tion can be made to this ideal. Most of the counter-financing is done 
by the Nationaf Bank" . And most of the National Bank's indebted-
ness to the State Bank is through counter-financing12. Thus, we can 
come close to eliminating the National Bank's borrowing from the net 
free reserves figures if we omit all counter-finance from the calculations. 
This is done in Figure XII-3, which is constructed in the same way as 
Figure XII-2 except that net free reserves are now calculated from 
excess reserves minus all Scheduled Bank borrowing from the State 
Bank other than counter-finance. As before, the net free reserves 
figures are divided by "o ther" deposits as a secular deflater, and the 
data now cover the 25 quarters, December 1955 through December 
1961 '3. The circle represents an estimate of the March 1962 observa-
tion, probably an accurate one14. 
10. Estimated on the weak assumption that if there is counter-financing, at 
least some of it is done by the National Bank. See next paragraph. 
11. Rs. 28.88 crores of National Bank counter-finance out of Rs. 28.88 crores 
total counter-finance in December 1961 the only date for which the National Bank 
counter-financing figures are available (see its published balance sheet for Decem-
ber 1961 and Appendix B). The fraction is probably somewhat less than 100 
per cent in other quarters. 
12. Rs. 28.88 crores of the National Bank counter-finance out of Rs. 37.96 
crores of the total National Bank borrowing from the State Bank in December 
1961 (see its published balance sheet). The fraction is probably between 50 per 
cent and 75 per cent in most years. 
13. All data again from Weekly Statements except for the counter-financing 
(See Appendix B). Only those 25 quarters are included for which counter-finance 
data is available. 
14. The assumption is that counter-finance was Rs. 40 crores at the end of 
March 1962. Based on hearsay, the estimate is nevertheless surely within Rs. 5 
crores of the true figure. Since net free reserves (including counter-finance) are 
Rs. —68 crores, those excluding counter-finance are Rs. —28 ( + 5 ) crores. The 
ratio is therefore —.080 ( + .015). 
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Figure XII-3 fully supports the hypotheses of Figure XII-1. There 
is a relatively flat AB segment over the range of call rates 0.1 to 0.3 of 
the Bank Rate. There is the vertical BC segment up to call rates about 
0.8 of the Bank Rate15. Finally, there is a CD, DE, and/or D F range 
in the region where call rates are close to the Bank Rate. 
It is not easy to point out where and when the potential State Bank 
borrowers run out of collateral. Twice (up through December 1961) 
net free reserves (excluding counter-finance) reached minus seven per 
cent of non-bank deposits and twice (up through December 1961) the 
call rate passed the Bank Rate. The times were the same, December 
1956 and December 1960. This suggests that 7 per cent is the approxi-
mate point of collateral exhaustion, but if the estimate for March 1962 
is correct, the point is now out past 8 per cent. 
There must always be a D F segment somewhere (as long as "clean" 
advances from the State Bank are limited), in the short run fairly fixed, 
15. This vertical segment has random deviations which tend slightly to the 
positive net free reserve side. It is reasonable that errors should tend toward ex-
cess reserves in view of the penalties and embarrassment attendant to failure to 
satisfy the legal reserve requirements. 
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in the long run capable of being shifted leftward. Since the State Bank 
must now accept securities as collateral (and counter-finance), the start 
of the D F segment depends upon the willingness of the State Bank to 
accept bills as collateral and the extent to which bills are eligible. These 
put limits, both long-run and short-run, on the D F segment's position. 
The State Bank cannot accept less than no, nor more than all, eligible 
bills as collateral. Actually, the range to the State Bank's willingness 
to accept bills is, of course, much more narrow. Given the policy of 
encouragement to the Bill Discounting Scheme, some bills must always 
be accepted. And not all the banks wish to go into debt to the State 
Bank so that, even if those banks which borrowed from the State Bank 
were permitted to use all their bills as collateral, only a fraction (perhaps 
50—80 per cent) of the total bills in the system would in fact be used as 
collateral. Since bills collateral now represents only a small part of 
the State Bank borrowing and bills are declining in importance15, the 
collateral-exhaustion limit clearly cannot be much varied17. Of course, 
if the State Bank were to become willing to lend "clean" to banks, this 
limit could be greatly varied, at least in the direction of expansion. For 
the State Bank to accept private guarantees as readily as a government 
guarantee (i.e., to give "clean" advances to non-government banks) 
would be a very serious step which State Bank officials maintain will 
not be taken. But, as we shall see in Section XV, it is very possible 
that the State Bank will soon be forced to consider such an action, no 
matter how thoroughly it objects. Until the final section, however, we 
shall assume that the present policy of lending "clean" only to govern-
ment banks is continued. 
Banks can, therefore, borrow as much as necessary up to this limit 
but experience real difficulty edging much beyond it. This case of 
expansion up to a point and near impossibility of expansion beyond it, 
together with the relative immobility of this limiting point, are critical 
to our understanding of the volume of credit the Pakistan banking 
system creates. 
1.6. See Section V. 
17. See Appendix E for a more rigorous version of this statement. 
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S E C T I O N x i n 
DETERMINANTS OF LIQUIDITY RATIOS 
All Scheduled Banks are required by law to maintain certain liquid 
assets to the amount of at least 20 per cent of certain liabilities (see 
Section III). The assets which qualify under this legislation as "l iquid" 
cash, State Bank balances, and unencumbered approved securi-
ties comprise, in fact, neither the most liquid of a banks assets nor 
all the assets which most banks consider fully liquid. Government 
securities are, as we have seen (Section IV), far f rom easily marketable, 
being liquid only in the different sense that they are undeniable colla-
teral for State Bank borrowing. There is another sense in which the 
legally defined liquid assets are illiquid: by the very law that 20 per 
cent of liabilities must be kept in these assets, they become only 20 per 
cent liquid, i.e., a deposit withdrawal of a rupee releases only 20 paisas 
(Rs. 0.20) of liquid assets to help cover the withdrawal, the other 80 
paisas of the withdrawal must be found elsewhere. Balances with 
banks (other than the State Bank) and call lendings to banks are univer-
sally considered liquid by bankers (even though some so-called call 
money is not quite that liquid; see Section VIII). 
Thus, what each banker would consider his liquidity ratio may 
differ f rom the concept used not only by the State Bank but also by 
other bankers. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the relev-
ance of the liquidity ratio, as defined by the State Bank. For some 
banks, at least at some times, this requirement becomes a real cons-
traint on their operations; if a bank is in danger of failing to fulfil this 
requirement, it is quite immaterial whether the officers of the bank 
believe in the intrinsic worth of the formula. For many other banks, 
their conservative tendencies would never permit them, in the foresee-
able future, to approach even distantly so illiquid a portfolio as the 20-
per-cent ratio implies; in such cases, the degree of their conservatism 
may be measured as well by one formula as by another. 
The fact that the 20-per-cent figure is so far below the ratio in fact 
maintained by most banks at most times makes it less useful as a predic-
tive device. It is always more convenient to the central bank planner 
if no bank has any reserves or liquidity in excess of what is required 
and if all banks are trying to expand; under these circumstances, it is 
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amazingly easy to predict the effect upon credit and money supply of 
various central bank actions. This is not the situation in Pakistan 
for many reasons, not the least of which is the vast amounts of excess 
liquidity kept by some Scheduled Banks. 
Exactly how large is the liquidity ratio of particular banks, or even 
of particular groups of banks, is impossible to say. Even the liquidity 
ratio of all Scheduled Banks as a whole is not officially released and 
must be estimated, albeit rather closely. Nevertheless, estimates give 
a good indication of the extent to which these ratios exceed 20 per cent. 
For the Scheduled Banks as a whole, the liquidity ratio at the end of 
March 1962 was 38 per cent1. Not only is this ratio nearly twice the 
legal requirement, but it is also the lowest that the ratio has been since 
March 1954 (it has been as high as 53 per cent in September 1959). 
The liquidity ratio of the Pakistani banks as a whole has ranged, over 
March 1954 through December 1961, f rom a low of 47 per cent in June 
1957 to a high of 57 per cent in December 19542. The ratio of all foreign 
banks (other than Indian) as a whole has ranged, over almost the same 
period, f rom a low of 35 per cent in September 1961 to a high of 53 
per cent in June 19563. 
The ratio of the Pakistani banks is high, relative to the foreign banks, 
chiefly because the ratios of the two largest Pakistani banks, the Na-
tional Bank and the Habib Bank, are kept high. The reasons are, of 
course, not the same. The Habib Bank's conservative lending policies 
leave it with sizeable quantities of unencumbered securities and often 
excess reserves as well. The National Bank, though a liberal maker 
of advances, aids the State Bank by taking large amounts of govern-
ment securities issues and then has no need to encumber them exten-
sively, preferring counter-finance as a source of lendable funds. The 
lesser Pakistani banks also seem to maintain fairly high liquidity ra-
tios. 
1. See "Sources: Col. (1)" of Table XIII.l in this section. 
2. These figures are necessarily calculated somewhat differently and are over-
estimates. See "Sources: Co). (2)" of Table XIII. 1 in this section. 
3. Also an overestimate. See "Sources: Col. (3)" of Table XIII.1. The 
period covered here is March 1954 through September 1961; the December 1961 
figures fail to separate Indian from other foreign banks, and hence are not 
comparable. 
95. 
The low level of the ratio for "other foreign" (i.e., other than 
Indian4) banks is noteworthy when we recall that this includes the 
American banks whose liquidity ratios are probably quite high. In 
September 1961, for example, all "other foreign" banks had Rs. 35.12 
crores of liquid assets and Rs. 98.93 crores of liabilities, as defined by 
the liquidity ratio requirement5. The overall liquidity ratio was, 
therefore, 35 per cent. But something like Rs. 20 crores of these liabili-
ties were in the American banks and probably something like Rs. 10 
crores of the liquid assets (assuming the American banks kept about 
a 50-per-cent liquidity ratio). Moreover, it is not implausible that 
almost all of the securities collateral put up for State Bank borrowing 
(Rs. 4.63 crores; see Appendix B) belonged to the British banks. This 
means that the British banks as a whole held something like Rs. 21 
crores (35—10—4=21) of liquid assets and Rs. 79 crores (99—20=79) 
of liabilities, a liquidity ratio of under 27 per cent. Thus, iby the 
autumn of 1961, the British banks, individually and together, had 
liquidity ratios very near the legal [minimum6. 
For some banks, therefore, the liquidity ratio is a legal constraint; 
for most, however, it is a matter of taste and policy. Where the liqui-
dity ratio is the latter, it is subject to change. In the remainder of this 
section, we shall examine two kinds of change. One, secular move-
ments in the ratio, for different banks and different groups of banks. 
And two, changes in the ratio in response to short-run changes in the 
situation of banks (especially in the demand for advances). 
Table XIII . 1 presents estimates of the liquidity ratios, since 1951, 
of all Scheduled Banks, Pakistani Scheduled Banks, non-Indian foreign 
Scheduled Banks, the National Bank, the Habib Bank, and the Muslim 
Commercial Bank. These figures must be viewed with extreme caution, 
for they are not at all comparable across rows, and less than perfectly 
comparable down columns (see "Note" at bottom of table): 
4. The ratios of the Indian banks are usually high, in the 50—60 per cent 
region. 
5. The liquid assets are overstated as there is no data on the extent to which 
the "other foreign" banks had encumbered securities. For sources and methods, 
See "Sources: Col. (3)" of Table XIII. 1. 
6. There cannot have been much diversity between particular British banks 
since each must have kept the ratio at or above 20 per cent and the average for all 
was less than 27 per cent. 
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Table XIII.l 
Liquidity ratio of 
Year* All Pakistani Foreign National Habib Muslim Commercia 
banks banks banks Bank Bank Bank-I Bank-I I 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1951 n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.62 0.59 0.45 0.79 
1952 n. a. n. a. n. a. 0.46 0.65 0.30 0.48 
1953 n. a. 0.58 0.43 0.51 0.74 n. a. 0.56 
1954 0.50 0.57 0.44 0.54 0.59 n. a. 0.45 
1955 0.46 0.57 0.42 0.51 0.58 n. a. 0.45 
1956 0.44 0.55 0.37 0.54 0.61 n. a. 0.53 
1957 0.44 0.54 0.39 0.46 0.64 0.36 0.53 
1958 0.47 0.54 0.42 0.48 0.63 0.34 0.48 
1959 0.48 0.55 0.43 0.44 0.71 0.31 0.48 
1960 0.44 0.52 0.39 0.56 0.61 0.30 0.46 
1961 0.40 0.48 n. a. 0.52 0.55 0.31 0.45 
*A11 figures are for end of December, except where otherwise noted below. 
Sources: 
Col. (1): Weekly Statements, the sum of "cash in Pakistan", "balances 
with State Bank", and "investments" (Central 
and Provincial Government and "other") less 
encumbered securities (Col. (1) of Appendix B); all 
this divided by the sum of "inter-bank deposits", 
"inter-bank borrowings", and "other deposits", both 
time and demand. 
Cols. (2) and (3): Quarterly Statements, the sum of "gold", "notes, silver, 
and coins", "balances with the State Bank", and "total 
investments in shares and securities"; all this divided 
by "total demand and time deposits" (including inter-
bank) and "borrowings from other banks". 
Cols. (4), (5), and (6): published balance sheets of the banks, December 31 
for Habib and National Banks and September 30 for 
Muslim Commercial Bank. The sum of "cash in 
hand" and "investments" (in government securities 
and "others") divided by "deposits". Four percentage 
points are then added to compensate roughly for the 
balances with the State Bank. In 1957, the National 
Bank included its State Bank balances in "cash in 
hand", so the four per cent is not added to that figure. 
(footnote continued) 
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If we neglect the declines in liquidity ratios of the three Pakistani 
banks between 1951 and 1952, there is little indication of any secular 
fall in the liquidity ratios of any bank or group of banks up through 
1960. And it is still too soon to know whether the generally sharp 
declines in 1961 are permanent or temporary. Of course, the strongest 
evidence that plentifully liquid banks were not reducing their liquidity 
ratios in the past would be no justification for assuming that they would 
not reduce them in the future. Managers, directors, and the bank's 
environment change and so, at least eventually, may its policies and 
attitudes. But the lack of any strong evidence of secular change permits 
us to neglect it when we study the present short-run problems. 
There are many influences upon the liquidity ratio of a bank which 
can affect its level in the short run. Surely, the most important of the 
systematic influences is the state of demand for the bank's non-liquid 
assets, i.e., advances and bills. As the demand for advances expands, 
and the call rate rises in reflection of this increasing tightness, the liqui-
dity ratio of the banking system should decline. Holdings of excess 
reserves and cash assets are reduced and securities are increasingly 
encumbered by the " t ight" banks. In the denominator of the liquidity 
ratio, the changes will also tend to lower that ratio. Inter-bank borrowing 
(Footnote to Table XIII. I continued) 
Col. (7): same source as Col. (6). Since the Muslim Commercial Bank 
did not segregate "cash in hand" and "cash at banks" 
in the years, 1953-56, the latter was for all years counted 
in liquid assets in the computation of the ratio in this 
column. Since Col. (7) is 0.14 to 0.18 higher than 
Col. (6) in every year (for which both figures are avail-
able) except 1951, we are probably justified in assum-
ing that the "n .a ." figures in Col. (6) are about 0.40, 
0.29, 0.29, and 0.37 over 1953-56 respectively. 
Note: The figures of Col. (1) are probably quite close to accurate, erring 
only to the extent of the errors in the data for State Bank borrowing 
on securities collateral (see Appendix B). The ratios of Cols. (2) 
and (3) make no allowance for encumbered securities, and hence are 
overestimates to that extent. In Cols. (4) through (6), inaccuracy 
appears because of the uncertain labels on the banks' balance sheets; 
the chief errors are the exclusion of all "due to other banks" from 
the denominator, necessary because State Bank debt is not separated 
from debt to other Scheduled Banks, and the dubious method by 
which we include State Bank balances. Col. (7) is obviously a large 
overestimate as it includes all call lending and balances with other 
banks as liquid assets. 
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will rise7, and so also will an advances expansion usually increase 
non-bank deposits8. Thus, the tendency is clearly for the liquidity 
ratio to react inversely to the call rate. 
That this expectation is generally fulfilled can be seen in Figure 
XIII-1 where the liquidity ratio is plotted against the call-to-Bank Rate 
ratio for each of the 33 quarters, March 1954 through March 19629. 
CALL RATE 
BANK RAT^2 
0 37 
* * 
x x 
•41 • 4 5 
LIQUIDITY 
•49 -53 RATIO 
F I G U R F TTTT-I 
The well-behaved pattern of crosses presents only one disquieting fea-
ture, shown by the replacement of the cross with a circle for December 
1961 (at a liquidity ratio of about 0.403) and for March 1962 (at one of 
about 0.375). These circles are unexpectedly far to the left of the 
pattern. Two observations are of course inadequate to reject the 
hypothesis of mere temporary aberration, but they may well indicate 
7. It is not net butgrass inter-bank accounts that are relevant to the liquidity 
ratio. That these rise with the call rate is certain from Figure X-5 (Section X). 
8. Ceteris paribus. In fact, expansion of advances usually is accompanied 
(in the winter busy season) by a drain into currency of bank deposits. So, in 
Pakistan, it is not uncommon to find non-bank deposits declining when advances 
expand. This makes the system even more "t ight" when it occurs. The histori-
cal evidence shows an absence of a large seasonal pattern in non-bank deposits 
(See M. U. Chapra and A.N.M. Azizur Rahman, "Seasonal Variations in Sche-
duled Banks' Activity," Pakistan Development Review, Autumn 1962) which 
suggests that the deposit-creating ability ofbusy season advances and the deposit-
reducing ability of the concurrent currency drain approximately offset each other. 
9. The sources and methods are those cited in Table XIII.1 for Col. (1). 
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a leftward shift of this relationship. This would not be surprising; 
it is often claimed that prolonged tightness in bank positions induces 
bankers to economize their lower-yield assets. Perhaps the banks in 
Pakistan enter the next decade with an altered attitude about desirable 
liquidity ratios. If the two circles are taken at face value, they suggest 
that, at any particular call rate, the banks will on the average now main-
tain a liquidity ratio of at least five percentage points less than before. 
Indeed, the day may not be too distant when the 20-per-cent require-
ment becomes relevant to a majority of the banks. 
S E C T I O N X I V 
T H E LIMITS TO CREDIT EXPANSION 
There are several ways in which the credit-expansion process of a 
banking system may be limited. While we might categorize these roughly 
as technological, legal, institutional, and economic constraints, the 
division would be artificial in that these various limitations often merge 
with each other. It is difficult, though not impossible, to conceive of a 
purely technological constraint to bank expansion, but a combined 
"legal-technological" limitation is readily visualized. Such a limit 
would occur, in Pakistan, if every bank were at minimum required 
reserves and liquidity and the system were unable to uncover new re-
serves'. Certain banks in Pakistan are occasionally at or very near 
this "legal-technological" limit, but as a constraint to credit expansion 
in the banking system as a whole, it is not now or soon likely to be at 
all relevant. 
The "economic" constraint is usually the operative limit to credit 
expansion. Given the banks' very careful delineation of the credit-
worthiness of potential borrowers and reluctance with which in-
terest rates on advances are altered (Section V), the demand for ad-
vances at this relatively fixed set of rates is quite inflexible at any mo-
ment of time. It sometimes happens that every bank would like to 
make further advances at existing rates but that demand is inadequate 
to permit it. There is of course no competitive bidding down of ad-
vance rates (partly because it is seen by each to be of little advantage 
to the group as a whole and partly because such slack is expected to 
1. i.e., could neither borrow further from the State Bank nor induce people 
to hold less currency (relative to deposits). 
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be temporary), no lowering of credit standards, no bidding-up of security 
prices. The rates and the volume in the call market dwindle toward 
zero, the banks clean up their State Bank debt, and then all sit back 
to await better times. Although seemingly fatalistic, this short-run 
policy of the banks in the face of inadequate demand for advances is 
probably a thoroughly wise one—active efforts on their part to increase 
advances would achieve little, and the purchase of low-yield securities 
would be foolish if banks ever anticipate a revival of advances 
demand. 
As the demand for advances increases, however, the Pakistan bank-
ing system cannot expand as far as its "technological-legal" limit, 
given its present structure and institutions. Eventually, what may be 
labelled the "institutional" constraint becomes operative. Most simply 
stated, this occurs when those banks which wish to expand cannot and 
those banks which can expand do not wish to. To see how this con-
straint works, we must examine the banking system by segments: 
1) The National Bank (and other government banks) is able to get 
all the funds it desires f rom the State Bank, even receiving "clean" 
advances if it cannot find customary collateral. Thus, the only con-
straint on the National Bank's lending is its own inclination. 
2) The "easy" banks satisfy those potential borrowers they wish to 
and then lend the remainder of their funds at call. 
3) The "t ight" banks borrow all they can from the call market and 
the State Bank and then begin to turn down potential borrowers2. 
Thus, the limit to credit expansion is reached. It is easy to see 
qualitatively, but nearly impossible to predict quantitatively. The 
amount of credit outstanding when this limit is reached depends very 
critically upon the distribution of the demand for advances between 
banks, upon the advances policies of the National Bank and the "easy" 
banks, and upon the willingness of the borrowers to take bills as opposed 
to advances (since the former often may be used by the " t ight" banks 
to get new reserves). 
The relevant limits to credit expansion are then two: the extent 
2. There may be "neutral" banks which are no longer lending on call but 
have not yet begun to borrow funds. That the dichotomy between "easy" and 
"tight" is not perfect makes it no less useful. 
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of the demand for creditworthy advances up to a point and the institu-
tional inflexibilities of the system thereafter. Neither of these cons-
traints, the "economic" or the "institutional", are really constraints 
in the strictest sense of the word. Each is capable of being relaxed by 
the banks themselves. And in the long run, the banking system would 
surely manage to achieve this relaxation if the constraint continued to 
operate. A continually inadequate demand for advances would 
eventually induce banks to lower rates or relax credit standards; a 
continually unsatisfied demand would induce reverse reactions. Also, 
continued unsatisfied demands would induce an eventual shift of 
borrowers from "tight to "easy" banks, and higher advance rates 
might induce the "easy" banks to reformulate their advance policies. 
But these are long-run effects. In the short run, both of these cons-
traints do function as real limitations to bank-credit expansion. 
From the viewpoint of State Bank credit control policy, the problem 
is straightforward—though the solution is not. One of these two 
limits is, at any moment, determining the volume of credit in the system. 
What can the State Bank do to affect the levels at which each of these 
limits operates ? The table below shows, in deceptively simple fashion, 
what the State Bank must do in each of the four possible cases, where 
it wishes to expand or contract credit and where the existing deter-
minant is "economic" or "institutional": 
Determinant of the Volume of Credit 
Co 
& 
as 
a 
Expand credit 
"Economic" "Institutional" 
SBP must cause an in-
crease in the demand 
for advances. 
SBP must relax the 
institutional constraints 
to expansion. 
Contract credit 
SBP must cause a de-
crease in the demand 
for advances or tighten 
the institutional cons-
traints below the pre-
sent advances demand. 
SBP must tighten the 
institutional constraints 
to credit or cause 
a decline in advances 
demand below the 
present institutional 
limits. 
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To analyse the power of the State Bank to achieve its desires concern-
ing the volume of credit requires the analysis of four more elementary 
powers: the ability of the State Bank 1) to cause an increase in the 
demand for advances; 2) to cause a decrease in the demand for ad-
vances; 3) to contract the "institutional" limit to credit; and 4) to 
expand the "institutional" limit to credit. 
There is a consensus among economists and bankers that there is 
little a central bank can do to expand the demand for advances or to 
induce banks to make advances they prefer not to make. To the tradi-
tional discussion of this we may add two factors specific to the Pakistani 
bank environment. The State Bank is even more powerless to induce 
advance expansion here because it cannot now affect the relative yields 
of the competing asset, government securities. Of course, even 
increases in securities prices and central bank purchases of them are 
no guarantee of advance expansion—they may result merely in excess 
reserves—but they do represent an effort in the right direction. On 
the other hand, the existence of government-operated commercial 
banks, principally the National Bank, does make it possible for 
Scheduled Bank advances to be increased by government policy. The 
National Bank need only lower its rates and relax its credit standards 
sufficiently and at least some new advances can always be made. The 
net result is at best very little more promising in Pakistan than else-
where. When the demand for advances, acceptable to the banks, is 
inadequate from the government view, there is little the State Bank 
can do to affect this demand, either directly or by inducing the banks 
to lower their standards of acceptability. 
The contraction of the demand for advances is far easier to achieve 
by State Bank action, by the imposition of selective controls which 
forbid completely or limit greatly certain kinds of advances. Such 
controls have been frequently applied by the State Bank, usually on the 
justification of social undesirability of certain advances. While such 
action may have great effect upon the allocation among economic 
purposes of bank credit, it may have equally important effect upon the 
total demand for credit and hence, where demand is the determinant, 
upon the total volume of credit. Quite large chunks of potential de-
mand may be removed in this manner3 . 
3. Examples abound in Pakistan's brief career. See SBP:GFO, pp. 63-69, 
for a summary of the more important of the State Bank's selective credit controls. 
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The ability of the State Bank to affect the volume of credit when 
it is determined by the "institutional" constraint is quite limited. It 
cannot influence the amount of credit created by the "easy" banks since 
it has no policy tools it is willing to use that can reach these banks. 
It can affect the credit of the National Bank only insofar as it can coax 
it into lending more or less (and accordingly, borrowing more or less 
f rom the State Bank). The State Bank has only some slight power 
over the " t ight" banks, namely the limits on the extent to which bills 
will be accepted as collateral for State Bank borrowing. As we have 
seen, bills comprise a small and declining portion of banks' advances 
and bills portfolios, so that even this power is waning. 
This great inability to influence significantly the "institutional" 
limits of credit expansion have led the State Bank to the frequent use 
of two alternatives, selective controls and persuasion. These credit 
control techniques have their place in any banking system, and perhaps 
especially in an underdeveloped economy, but they should be chosen 
for their own merits and not because other techniques have been un-
wisely abandoned. 
In summary, the banking system may at any time create credit up 
to the limits of the "institutional" constraint, if demand warrants. This 
amount may be much larger or much smaller than the State Bank, or 
more generally the government, may feel is appropriate. But, there 
is very little the State Bank can presently do to alter this limit. If it 
wishes the limit raised, it can presently do no more, without a drastic 
change of policy, than offer to accept all bills as collateral and exhort 
the National Bank to liberality4. If it wishes the limit lowered, it can 
only reduce the amount of bills it accepts as collateral and attempt to 
inhibit the National Bank's liberality. When these prove inadequate, 
as they almost certainly will if the desired reduction of credit is of any 
significant size, persuasion and selective measures must be introduced. 
The State Bank assumes very little responsibility for the volume of 
bank credit in Pakistan. Occasionally, this is admitted and justifica-
4. It could lend 'clean' to all banks or, more radically, request the United 
States Government to move some of its deposits from the State Bank to the Ame-
rican banks, thus providing new lendable funds through the call market. It may 
have been no coincidence that, in the winter of 1961/62 when the State Bank felt 
most helpless, some Rs. 10 crores were so shifted. But, a policy of requesting a 
foreign government to conduct Pakistan's monetary policy surely should not 
warrant consideration. 
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tion is attempted along two lines. One, that the volume of credit is 
unimportant anyway: "In an economy like Pakistan's, where bank 
credit forms roughly 6 per cent of the total national income, credit 
control policies can, at best, produce only a limited effect on the total 
elfective demand"5 . And two, that credit contraction will not lower 
prices (and may actually raise them), but will reduce real output, hence 
credit should never be restricted, and it, therefore, matters not that 
such restriction is not possible anyway6. 
More usually, however, it is not admitted, and it is one of the pur-
poses of this monograph to display this fact. But it is not enough to 
prove that the State Bank now exercises inadequate powers of credit 
control; it is important that it also be shown that the State Bank is 
capable of greater control. It is the purpose of the final section to 
indicate the kinds of changes necessary if the State Bank is to fulfil its 
avowed responsibility for the volume of bank credit. 
SECTION XV 
T O W A R D THE POSSIBILITY OF CREDIT CONTROL 
"Whereas it is necessary to provide for the constitution of a State 
Bank to regulate the monetary and credit system of Pakistan " ' . 
So opens the preamble to the State Bank of Pakistan Act. And yet, 
the State Bank, by the end of its first fourteen years, has come to a 
position where it has almost no control over the volume of credit ex-
cept by su: h direct interventions as exhortation of the banks or pros-
cription of certain types of loans. Of the indirect approaches to credit 
control, the State Bank is not now willing and able to follow any. 
It is not necessary, though it is not uninteresting, to reconstruct 
the sequence of steps, sometimes bold, sometimes hesitant, by which 
the State Bank has arrived at this position2 . But it is necessary to ask 
5. SBP:GFO, p. 62. 
6. A beautiful example of such a series of dubious assertions is the speech 
of Mr. Abdul Qadir, the then Governor of the State Bank. State Bank, Speech 
Delivered by Mr. A. Qadir, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan. (Karachi: State 
Bank of Pakistan, September 7, 1955), pp. 7-8. 
1. State Bank of Pakistan Act, op. cit., p. 1. 
2. The interested reader is directed to two sets of documents, the Annual 
Reports of the State Bank and the Speeches of its governors at the annual general 
meetings. 
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Whether the repudiation of the indirect means of credit control is not 
inevitable in an underdeveloped economy. All the literature on this 
subject agrees that traditional indirect central bank influences upon 
the volume of credit and money are at least difficult to apply effec-
tively, if not impossible or dangerous3. Because the State Bank's 
rejection of indirect control is so frequently defended in the generali-
ties of this literature—that such control is too difficult or even impossi-
ble in an economy such as Pakistan's—it is essential that we examine 
specific arguments in order to discover whether they do really apply to 
the Pakistan banking system. 
1) That banks in underdeveloped economies usually carry a suffi-
ciently large volume of excess reserves to be immune to changes in their 
reserves. Where the liquidity and/or shiftability of assets is uncertain 
and the development of the banking habit tenuous, there is good reason 
for large holdings of cash assets. Monetary policy by indirect means 
will indeed be frustrated if the banks' lending policy is insulated from 
the state of their reserves in this way. There are countries where this 
situation exists4; but Pakistan is not one of them. Government 
securities are so amply liquid (Section IV) that cash assets may be kept 
small, and are (Section XI). 
2) That banks may operate quite independently of the central 
bank, and hence need not react to its policies. Where the banking 
system is composed of branches of foreign-owned banks and where 
these branches freely borrow from and lend to their parent offices, 
almost complete independence of the central bank may be achieved. 
Reserve shortages require no more than a transfer of funds f rom the 
home office; policy changes of the central bank induce neither alarm 
nor reaction5. While the Pakistan banking system does consist of 
3. See, for example, S. G. Davies (Ed.), Central Banking in South and East 
Asia, op. cit.; R. S. Sayers (Ed.), Banking in the British Commonwealth, op. cit.; 
E. Nevin, Capital Funds in Underdeveloped Countries, op. cit.; R.S. Sayers, "Cen-
tral Banking in Underdeveloped Countries" in Central Banking After Bagehot 
(Oxford: 1957), pp. 108-133; J.O.W. Olakanpo, "Monetary Management in 
Dependent Economies", Economica, November 1961, pp. 395-408; R . B . S t e -
venson, "By What Measures Can a Central Bank Exercise Credit Control in a 
Young Economy?", Journal of the Institute of Bankers, October 1961,pp. 362-379. 
4. Examples may be found in Central Banking in South and East Asia, 
op. cit. 
5. Sayers refers aptly to "a remote figure in a financial institution in the 
capital" ("Central Banking in Underdeveloped Countries", op. cit., p. 127). 
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foreign banks to the extent of about one-third of its deposits, these 
banks rarely borrow from or lend to their home offices more than mini-
mal amounts (Section III). Adequate evidence in itself of the depend-
ence of the Pakistan banking system upon the State Bank are the two 
facts that i) at one point during the past winter season, Scheduled 
Bank borrowing from the State Bank exceeded 20 per cent of their 
non-bank deposits (Section VII), and ii) about one-fourth of Scheduled 
Bank assets (Section IV) are in securities, whose price, yield, and liqui-
dity are potentially so subject to State Bank, influence. The dependence 
of the Scheduled Banks upon the State Bank is more than adequate 
for credit control purposes. 
3) That money markets are too underdeveloped to transmit interest 
rate changes, with the result that changes in such rates as the central 
bank can directly affect, the Bank Rate and/or government securities 
rates, will not induce changes in the yields (or other market conditions) 
of advances, deposits, call money, or "indigenous bank" loans. Follow-
ing Pakistan's only rise in the Bank Rate, however, rates on advances 
and call money readily responded (Section sV and VIII); if securities rates 
and deposit rates were more sluggish, it was largely the fault of the 
State Bank itself for failing to encourage an active securities market 
(Section IV) and for permitting extensive oligopsonistic collusion in 
the determination of time deposit rates (Section VI). And the non-
Scheduled Banks and other "indigenous bankers" are of sufficiently 
little importance that their rates and terms may be neglected. Thus, in 
Pakistan, interest rates are more than adequately responsive, or are 
potentially so, to movements in either or both of securities yields and 
the Bank Rate. 
4) That an underdeveloped economy is particularly insensitive 
to changes in interest rates. If, as is commonly believed, rates of return 
on the investments made possible by bank advances are higher in under-
developed than advanced countries this greater insensitivity to rates 
of potential bank borrowers is probably correct. But this misses the 
point. The purpose of change in the interest rate structure is to influence 
the banks as lenders, not their customers as borrowers. If the determi-
nant of the volume of credit is the "institutional" constraint and not 
the "economic" (as defined in the previous section), it is the impact 
of interest rate changes upon the bank lending potential that is rele-
vant. And, as be will seen shortly, the "institutional" limit is not insen-
sitive to fairly small changes in interest rates, 
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5) That too small a portion of the economy is influenced by the 
volume of bank credit for changes in credit to have any impact on the 
economy6. That bank credit is six per cent of national income7 not 
only fails to prove its insignificance but may actually prove the opposite. 
Because there are so many users of credit and money who get it not 
directly from banks but indirectly through buyers and sellers who do 
qualify for bank credit, any change in the volume of credit may have 
a greater multiplied effect in Pakistan than in more developed economies. 
Certainly, it is pertinent that currency and demand deposits, the two 
important means of payment, have kept in remarkably constant rela-
tionship to each other (Section VI) despite the erratic expansions and 
contractions of bank credit over the 1950s. The wholesaler's bank credit 
becomes, to some extent, the farmer's cash holding. Perhaps even the 
very reluctance of the monetary authorities to attempt credit restric-
tion is testimony to its effectiveness—for what is effective may be mis-
taken and may be avoided on the principle of minimization of mistakes8. 
We must not fall into the equally foolish trap of thinking that 
control of bank credit would be as powerful a tool of economic policy 
in Pakistan as in more developed economies. Ten per cent, the probable 
ratio of bank credit to national income in Pakistan, is not zero; neither 
is it 28 per cent9. But, in Pakistan, where the large agricultural sector 
shambles along, impervious to almost all government economic policies, 
we must choose our economic weapons less hopefully than in the more 
developed countries. 
6. In Pakistan, the same people who offer this argument often stress the 
dangers to the economy of credit restriction. Even the Research Department 
of the State Bank flirts with this contradiction in Chapter 9 of SBP.GFO: "credit 
control policies can, at best produce only a limited effect . . . . " (p. 62); "expanded 
credit supply would exercise a salutary effect on prices " (p. 63); "it was feared 
that any [credit] restrictions at that stage would impede " (p. 65); "it was con-
sidered desirable to raise the Bank Rate to supplement the anti-inflationary fiscal 
policy " ( p . 67). 
7. SBP.GFO, p. 62. Actually, the figure is probably about 10 per cent; 
the 6-per-cent figure implies a price inflation of over 100per cent in the past decade, 
surely an overestimate. 
8. This reluctance may also derive from fears about the desirability of exercis-
ing credit control; but our discussion of this will logically await proof that such 
control is possible. 
9. The ratio in the U.S.A. Source: Federal Reserve Board Bulletin, April 
1962, p. 427 ("loans" of "all commercial banks" on December 27, 1961) and p. 470 
("national income" of the fourth quarter of 1961). 
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With respect to its banking and credit structure, Pakistan seems 
rather favoured among underdeveloped economies. None of the tradi-
tional arguments against the possibility of credit control apply, at least 
with any real strength, to Pakistan. The State Bank, if it wishes, is cap-
able of great influence upon the quantity of bills and advances made by 
the Scheduled Banks, upon, at but one remove, the size of the nation's 
money supply, and upon, a few removes further, the rate of economic 
activity in the nation. There are many ways in which this influence can 
be exerted, only one of which will be discussed in detail in the ensuing 
paragraphs: the choice of techniques is not unimportant but is also not 
nearly so important as the recognition that control is possible. The 
method outlined below has, I think, certain special virtues but, in any 
case, suffices to prove this possibility of indirect credit control, rendered 
effective by making the "institutional" constraint much more flexible. 
The indirectness of the technique and the fact that it does not function 
through the effective demand for advances but through the ability of 
the banks to satisfy this demand—given the institutional structure of 
the banking system—are the two respects in which it differs from 
what presently passes for State Bank credit control. It will be convenient 
first to outline the basic changes suggested and then to examine their 
effectiveness in expanding and contracting credit. 
The changes are few and simple. The State Bank must be prepared 
to buy and sell unlimited quantities of government securities at the prices 
it declares10, and it must be willing to change these prices as the credit 
situation requires. Furthermore, the State Bank must be ready to alter 
the Bank Rate as a short-run control measure. 
Making a market for government securities would not be a new 
policy for the State Bank, but the precise method surely would be. 
The State Bank must abandon all its efforts to induce (or "bludgeon") 
the Scheduled Banks to hold unwanted securities. Entirely by means 
of price (and hence yield) variations, the State Bank can achieve almost 
any reasonable goal concerning the amount of government securities 
the Scheduled Banks (and insurance companies) hold. If it is to use the 
yield on securities as an inducement mechanism, as 1 am suggesting, 
then no element of State Bank pressure on Scheduled Banks' buying, 
selling, and holding government issues may be preserved. This is the 
10. The buying price and the selling price need not be identical. The latter 
may exceed the former by a small margin if the State Bank wishes. 
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first step: all those who hold government securities must be doing so 
because they wish to. 
There is not just one set of prices that will achieve this first step. 
Since the State Bank will fix the prices of all government securities, 
it will be able to determine not only the "average" yield on these securi-
ties but also the extent of the yield differential on more distant maturi-
ties. Thus, it may be possible to induce the banks and insurance com-
panies to hold a given volume of government securities in several ways. 
For example, a low yield on securities near maturity and a high yield 
on those far from redemption may induce a certain total holding of 
securities, primarily consisting of long-dated issues; some yield between 
these two yields, set for all securities regardless of redemption dates, 
may achieve the same total placement of securities, though more of it 
will consist of short-dated issues. Thus, the State Bank will have some 
freedom in its yield-setting. Given that it wishes to determine the total 
volume of government securities not held by itself, the State Bank may 
also choose, within limits, one other variable as a matter of policy: 1) 
the yield on very short securities; 2) the yield on very long securities; 
3) the shape (but not the position) of the yield-maturity relationship; 
or 4) the composition by maturity of the government securities not held 
by itself. Which of these four the State Bank will prefer to determine is 
a question we need not ask; what is now important to notice is that the 
State Bank will no longer be able to set all of these variables as it pleases 
—only one. This loss is trivial when compared to the gains elsewhere. 
The question of cost to the government arises. Will this policy 
require, over a period of time, a higher interest rate on government 
securities and/or a greater debt-servicing cost to the governments? 
This, of course, depends upon the level at which yields are in fact set. 
In order to make the question manageable, we will assume that, under 
this new policy, exactly the same volume of securities is placed with the 
banks as would have been under the old policy and that the composition 
of these holdings is also the same. 
Inasmuch as the present yields are almost certainly kept below 
equilibrium, which will not be possible under this new policy, the in-
terest rates will rise on all government securities. This rise will probably 
be neither negligible nor terribly large (as the State Bank perhaps fears)11, 
11. See Appendix A for estimates of the differences between actual and 
equilibrium yields, 
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If the yield of every issue of the government permanent debt rose by 
one percentage point, this would increase the interest cost of govern-
ments by Rs. 2.83 crores per annum (see Section IV). If we recall that 
much of this (almost two-thirds l2) is held by the State Bank and the 
National Bank, we must reduce this estimate, to get a true net cost 
to government, to not more than Rs. 2.00 crores. This is about one-half 
of one per cent of the total annual revenue receipts of governments. 
Surely, this is not a forbidding magnitude. 
The question of cost is, however, more than just this gap between 
present actual yields and present equilibrium yields; we must also exa-
mine the more nebulous gap between present equilibrium yields and 
equilibrium yields under the new policy. The direction and size of this 
latter gap will be chiefly determined by whether the banks consider 
securities more or less liquid under the new policy. At present, the 
liquidity of securities derives not from their marketability, which is 
almost nil, but from their eligibility as collateral for four-per-cent 
loans f rom the State Bank. Under the new policy, these securities will 
have greater liquidity iiv one sense, in that the banks will have a choice 
whether to sell securities or to use them as collateral for borrowing. 
In another sense, their liquidity will be lower because neither the selling 
price nor the borrowing rate can be known for certain. In sum, an un-
certain selling price is better, from a liquidity viewpoint, than complete 
inability to sell; an uncertain borrowing rate is worse than a certain one, 
given that the average rate is the same in each case. The loss of certainty 
about the borrowing cost will surely be the more serious, with the result 
that equilibrium yields will also be raised by the new policy. But the 
additional cost on this account will probably be very small compared 
to that resulting from the actual-equilibrium yield gap. So, the total 
additional cost to governments will still be of the order of less than one 
per cent of government revenues. 
Let us now consider the State Bank actions when it wishes to limit 
the volume of bank credit. If the "institutional" potential for expan-
sion vastly exceeds the actual credit volume, probably little can be done 
12. Assume the National Bank held about Rs. 40 crores of government 
securities in June 1961 (this is about half-way between their December figures for 
1960 and 1961; see its balance sheets). The total permanent debt held outside 
the State Bank was Rs. 150 crores and the total permanent debt was Rs. 283 crores 
(Section IV). Thus, 39 per cent (150 — 40 - 283) was held by neither the State 
Bank nor the National Bank. 
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even under the new policy except by direct intervention. But if the 
"institutional" constraint is somewhere close to being effective the 
new policy permits it to be tightened to a much greater extent than 
was before possible. The State Bank's buying-selling prices on govern-
ment securities may be reduced and the Bank Rate raised. Consider 
separately the effects upon "easy" and " t ight" banks: 
• 
1) "Easy" banks will be induced to purchase securities. (with 
their now more attractive yields) with their surplus funds. This will 
reduce the supply of funds entering the call money market. 
2) "Tight" banks will be doubly discouraged from selling govern-
ment securities in order to expand advances: their yields will be higher, 
and a capital loss must be incurred in order to make what may turn 
out to be short-lived, though higher yield, advances. Fewer funds will 
be available from the call market and borrowing at the State Bank is 
more expensive. With advances rates only slightly above the Bank Rate 
and not rapidly flexible (Section V), a small rise in the cost of bank 
borrowing may be very effective in reducing bank lending. 
There is no simple way to prevent the "easy" banks from expand-
ing their advances if they wish, but it is not their expansion that pre-
dominates. If they can be stimulated into placing their surplus reserves 
in government securities rather than the call market, a significant con-
traction of the lending powers of the system will occur. For, even if the 
"t ight" banks are willing to accept capital loss f rom selling securities, 
they can do this only as long as they have excess liquidity—something 
which, by definition, a "t ight" bank does not have in abundance. A 
reduction in the bill-discounting limits may still be used, as at present, 
but it will then only supplement the ability to contract the "institutional" 
constraint, while now it represents almost the entire ability13. 
Expansion of the "institutional" constraint requires precisely the 
opposite actions, a raising of securities prices and a lowered Bank Rate. 
The "easy" banks will be thereby encouraged to sell securities to the 
State Bank and lend additional funds on the call market. Borrowing, 
13. 1 would actually favour discontinuance of the policy of variation in bill-
discounting limits. Eligibility should be carefully defined, and all such bills always 
accepted. The present system of direct negotiation of limits violates the principles 
of indirection and inducement which are not unwisely preferred by central bankers. 
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both on call and from the State Bank, is made cheaper to the "t ight" 
banks14. 
The bill-borrowing limits can be increased as much as possible, 
and the other measures currently used by the State Bank can be conti-
nued. The difference again lies in the fast that these relatively inept 
movers of the "institutional" constraint are relegated to a more appro-
priate subordinate position. The principal mover under the new policy 
is the activation of the potential reserves of the conservative banks by 
prompting them to sell securities to the State Bank and augment the 
volume of call funds. 
For both contraction and expansion, the reason the new policy 
permits the "institutional" constraint to be so much more extensively 
and easily moved is basically its ability to affect the "easy" banks as 
well as the "t ight" banks. Under the present State Bank policies little 
can be done indirectly beyond the slight flexibility of the bill-discounting 
of the "t ight" banks. Undep the proposed policy are added the varia-
tion in the cost of borrowing to the "t ight" banks and the variation in 
the volume of funds supplied to the "t ight" banks by the "easy" banks. 
This greatly increased policy-flexibility in the "institutional" 
constraint is made possible by only three major changes, the lemoval 
of pressure on the holders of government securities, the creation of a 
market for these securities by the State Bank, and the willingness to use 
the Bank Rate. It should be noticed that even these are more than the 
minimum changes needed; the Bank Rate could be pegged, and much 
of the same contraction and expansion still be attained. Probably, the 
raising of the Bank Rate when contraction is desired will have a much 
greater impact than its reduction when expansion is to be facilitated. 
To get contraction, State Bank borrowing must be actively discourag-
ed; to get expansion15, such borrowing must merely be facilitated and 
not necessarily actively encouraged. 
14. Of course, this assumes that at least the "tight" banks are trying to ex-
pand advances but cannot because of the "institutional" constraint; monetary 
policy for expansion when there is an inadequate effective demand for bank credit 
is another problem, perhaps insoluble and certainly not now being considered. 
15. Remember, we are assuming that banks wish to expand but are prevented 
by the "institutional" constraint. 
113. 
That it is more important to raise the Bank Rate than to lowef 
it is a welcome discovery from another point of view: that of the struc-
ture and level of interest rates in Pakistan. As I have argued elsewhere16, 
the interest structure is presently too low from the viewpoint of credit 
allocation (not discussed here) and should be prompted upward by 
government policy. Certainly, one convenient way to accomplish 
this is, over the next few years, to raise the Bank Rate when restrictive 
pressure is desired but not to lower it when expansion is being facili-
tated. 
Having seen that it is possible to control the volume of bank credit 
in Pakistan, we must now consider whether such control is desirable. 
It is convenient first to consider an alternative to control, roughly the 
present State Bank monetary policy. This policy, or more accurately 
this series of actions over recent years, is not the complete absence of 
control—in some ways it has been a partially successful policy of con-
trol and in other ways much worse than no control at all. By no control 
is meant here that the banking system is always able to make all the 
advances it wishes to make1 7; in other words, the "economic" cons-
traint, discussed in the previous section, is always the determinant of 
the volume of credit. In Pakistan's recent history, this has not always 
been the determinant for two reasons: 1) the State Bank has frequently 
attempted to shift this effective demand for advances by means of 
selective credit measures; and 2) the banks have, especially recently, 
been constrained from making all desirable advances by the "institu-
t ional" limitation—neither have the "t ight" banks been able to find 
reserves nor has the State Bank been able to provide them. In the first 
case there is control in that a limitation of credit occurs (relative to what 
would have occurred) which the State Bank desires (and causes); in 
the second case also a limitation occurs which, however, the State Bank 
does not desire but feels nearly helpless to prevent. 
The policy suggested here is different in two ways, 1) that it permits 
greater contraction or makes possible contraction when it is so desired, 
and 2) that it permits greater expansion or makes possible expansion 
when it is so desired. The essential point is that the policy does not 
imply that greater contractions or expansions are desirable—it merely 
16. "Monetary Policy in the Economic Development of Pakistan", op. cit., 
Part III. 
17. Other definitions are possible. 
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makes them possible. The State Bank may be wise in its fear that, at a 
time of inflation, credit contraction might reduce real output and 
fail to retard the price rises; if so, under any policy, credit should not 
be drastically reduced at such a time . But this same argument has a 
corollary that the failure of credit to increase at an appropriate rate 
might cause a retardation of the rate of growth of real output. One 
cannot have it both ways. If one believes that the volume of credit has 
no effect upon the important variables of the economy, then credit 
policy is neither desirable nor undesirable—it is immaterial. If, on the 
other hand, one believes that credit does have some effect upon the 
economy, then an active credit policy will be at least sometimes desir-
able, and the State Bank would be unwise not to prepare itself for the 
execution of a credit policy. 
It may be that credit restriction at a time of inflation is some-
times undesirable and ineffective, especially if the price rises are basi-
cally caused by over-large government deficits, as in the mid-1950s. 
But now, when more conservative (probably too conservative) budget 
policies are being conducted, the resurrection of at least the possibility 
of credit control is essential. Restrictive measures, if called for, can now 
be used effectively. But this is not the primary reason why State Bank 
credit control is now required. In the absence of government deficits'9, 
there is currently no automatic means of expansion of the Scheduled 
Banks' reserve base. A stagnation of reserves, in a banking system al-
ready at the limit of its expansion20, means a stagnation of credit 
expansion, something a growing economy cannot afford. The State 
Bank is not now capable of preventing this stagnation; if it was forced 
to the limits of its abilities during the 1961/62 busy season, what will 
it do in 1962/63, or if that is survived, in 1963/64? Under present State 
Bank policies, the continued absence of new government deficits will 
soon force a complete stagnation of credit unless the State Bank begins 
to make "c lean" advances to non-government banks21. But this is a 
18. It is not the purpose of this already-long monograph to examine the 
exact effects of the volume of bank credit upon prices and output. We may here 
accept the State Bank's judgement as to the direction and extent of the desirable 
credit movements. 
19. And it goes without saying in the absence also of balance-of-payments 
surpluses. 
20. The "institutional" limit, not the "technological-legal" limit. 
21. Or, perhaps more euphemistically, begins to accept new forms of assets 
(e.g., buildings, advances, etc.) as collateral, 
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drastic step and introduces further elements of arbitrariness and poten-
tial favouritism into the dealings between the State Bank and the 
Scheduled Banks22. 
Thus, credit control now requires, or will soon require, measures 
which are too arbitrary and too direct to influence the banking system 
in the way a central bank ideally should and in Pakistan can, A system 
of indirect inducements, such as is described here, should be consider-
ed; the Pakistan financial system is no longer so rudimentary as to 
require being bumped from emergency to emergency in such crude 
fashion. 
Appendix A 
(SECTION IV) 
Statistical investigation of securities yields gives a great deal of 
support to many of the statements of Section IV, especially to those 
about the sluggishness of the price reactions in the government security 
market. Also, some insight into the shape of the equilibrium yield struc-
ture is gained despite the fact that the market moves too slowly to reach 
that equilibrium before it becomes obsolete. 
In this appendix, we shall be concerned only with the market for 
securities of the Pakistan Central Government over the period June 
1958 through May 1962. The following symbols will be used: 
C t is the number of years the security has been in circulation 
at time t (this is sometimes written without the subscript): 
Ct_i = C t - j = C - j . 
M t is the number of years, as of time t, until the security is 
redeemed: Mt.j = M t -f- j. 
Y t is the actual yield-to-redemption of the security at t (in per 
cent). 
Y° is the equilibrium yield-to-redemption at t (in per cent). 
Y' is the yield at the time of issue (in per cent): 
Y' = Y,.c 
22, Just as the variable bill-discounting limits already do. 
116. 
It is hypothesized that securities yields move, in this year, some 
fraction of the distance f rom their level of last year to their equilibrium 
level of this year: 
(A-l) Y t — Y t . | = k (Y® — Y t. |) 
Thus, if (k) is one, securities prices reach their current equilibrium level 
within a year; if (k) is zero, securities prices never change despite 
any alterations in their equilibrium level. Generally, O < k < 1. 
The equilibrium yield is assumed to be a simple function of the 
time-to-maturity of the security, although that function may shift as 
time passes: 
(A-2) Y « = A t + b M t 
Traditional economic thinking suggests that b > 0 and A t 0; 
though the values of A, may vary from year to year, we will assume 
that the slope (the maturity effect) does not. 
Substituting (A-2) into (A-l) in order to eliminate the unobserv-
able Y ° , we get: 
(A-3) Y t = k A t + k b M t - | - ( l — k) Yt., 
The parameters, k, b, and A t , of this equation may be estimated 
using data for Y t , M t , and Yt., over 1959-62'. This regression is: 
.719 in 1959 
(A-4) Y t = { .891 In 1961 > + - 0 0 6 M . + . 7 6 0 Y t , 
.883 in 1962 
(.005) (.022) 
where the standard errors of the coefficients are placed in parentheses 
1. Because of the lagged Yt, the 1958 data cannot be used here. The years 
before 1958 were excluded by a fear that the structure of the market may have been 
quite different; the provincial government securities were excluded by the possible 
complications of the (perhaps different between provinces) risk premiums in their 
yields; securities maturing in less than two years were omitted since their prices 
often remained quite different from redemption values right up to redemption, and 
thus their yields-to-redemption often begin to get very large (in absolute value) 
even two years before redemption. The data are published in RC+F, "Yield on 
Central and Provincial Governments'Securities" (Table No. 48 in RC+F60-6I). 
The permanent debt of the Central Government consisted of seven issues in 1958 
and 1959, of eight in 1960 and 1961, and of nine in 1962. The data are all as of the 
last Friday of June, except for 1962 which is as of May 4. 
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beneath them2. Implicit in equation (A-4) are the following estimates 
of the parameters of (A-3): 
k = 0 . 2 4 0 
b = 0 . 0 2 5 
A|9 5 9 = 2.996 
A | 9 6 O = 3 . 9 5 0 
A,9 6 , = 3.713 
A1962 = 3.679 
The coefficient of determination is 0.909. 
Despite this apparently good explanation, equation (A-4) is not 
a very happy result. The coefficient of M t is quite insignificant which 
means that the slope of the equilibrium yield curve (the maturity effect) 
is not significantly different f rom zero. Furthermore, the pattern of 
the values of A t , over 1959-62, is disturbing; while it is plausible that 
the equilibrium yield curve shifted upwards by about one percentage 
point in the year-and-a-half after the one percentage point rise of the 
Bank Rate, it is extremely unlikely that this structure shifted down-
wards in the succeeding two years of increasingly tight money. 
The problem is a basic one. In the short run, the " b e s t " explana-
tion (in the sense of the highest coefficient of determination) of an 
economic variable is often achieved by means of the value last period 
of that variable. Even in an active securities market where yields adjust-
ed rapidly to changed conditions, we should not expect very great 
movements in yields. Where shifts in the yield curve and the maturity 
effect upon yields are not great, this year's yield will be very close to 
last year's; where the market is not quickly responsive, this similarity 
will be greatly increased. Equation (A-4) tells us little more than this: 
yields change slowly in Pakistan Government securities. There are ways 
around this problem, but all require the removal of Yt., from the list 
of independent variables, for it loo completely swamps the influences 
we seek to measure. 
One such way is to assume that (k) equals one in equation (A-3); 
2. Standard errors for each of the constant terms cannot be computed be-
cause of the method of calculation. All variables were, in effect, measured in terms 
of deviations from annual means because it greatly simplified the computations. 
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the coefficient of Y t. | thus becomes zero, a priori, and the variable 
can be omitted. This regression is3: 
f 2.741 in 19581 
j 2.864 in 1959 \ 
(A-5) Y t = i 3.164 in 1960 )- + . 0 4 2 M t 
| 3.301 in 1961 i (.007) 
[3 .398 in 1962 j 
The coefficient of determination is 0.524, the maturity effect significantly 
different from zero, and the constant terms behave more plausibly 
(rising by 0.30, 0.14, and 0.10 percentage points in the three years after 
the one percentage point Bank Rate rise). Nevertheless, the equation 
is still not very satisfactory for two reasons. One, the assumption that 
actual yields are equilibrium yields is very dubious in the context of 
Pakistan securities markets, even if the results of such an assumption 
seem reasonable. But, two, the results are not reasonable if we look 
carefully at the constant terms in equation (A-5). The intercept of the 
"equilibrium" yield curve is 2.741 per cent in 1958, when the Bank 
Rate was 3 per cent; by 1962, over three years after the Bank Rate had 
been increased to 4 per cent, this intercept had risen only to 3.398 per 
cent. In a period of increasing tightness, it is not reasonable that the 
equilibrium yield structure would have declined relative to the Bank 
Rate. Because of this, we must view the "equil ibrium" yield equation 
(A-5) with skepticism. 
There is a second way to avoid the problems that the lagged yield, 
Yt.|, causes in estimation of the coefficients of equation (A-3). We 
may apply equation (A-3), lagged one year, to itself in order to elimi-
nate Yt_|. This introduces the variable, Yt„2, which in turn is removed 
by substituting equation (A-3), lagged two years. This process is 
continued until the only remaining yield variable on the right-side of 
(A-3) is Y t . c = Y ' , the yield at issue. By these repeated substitutions, 
equation (A-3) becomes4: 
3. To be strictly comparable to equation (A-4), equation (A-5) should also 
omit observations from 1958. However, because the 1958 data do not seriously 
alter the estimated coefficients, they were included. Were 1958 excluded, the 
constant terms would be about 0.01 higher, the maturity effect(b) 0.001 lower, and 
the coefficient of determination 0.04 lower. 
4. To derive (A-6) from (A-3), all M t.j terms must be replaced by ( M t + j ) . 
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Recalling from equation (A-2) that ( A t . c - f -b M,„c ) was the 
equilibrium yield of the security at the time it was issued, we see that 
dY t /dC t will be positive or negative according to whether the actual 
yield at issue was below or above the equilibrium yield. 
A linear regression of Y t upon M t , Y ' , and C t (with different 
intercepts for each year) can then be estimated; the derivatives of the 
complicated equations (A-7) and (A-9) giving an indication of the 
meaning of the coefficients estimated. This regression is: 
f 0.836 in 1958] 
j 0.932 in 1959 j 
(A- l l ) Y t = i 1.144 in 1960 + .025 M t + .611 Y1 + .025 C t 
| 1.208 in 1961 | (.007) (.171) (.012) 
[1 .224 in 1962J 
The coefficient of determination is 0.710 (as compared to 0.524 when 
only M t was used in equation (A-5)5. The coefficients of M t and Y' 
are significantly different f rom zero at the one-per-cent confidence 
level, and the coefficient of C t is significantly different from zero at the 
five-per-cent confidence level. 
If we assume these coefficients to be approximately equal to the 
first derivatives of (A-7) and (A-9) we have: 
(A-12) 0.611 = (l-k) c 
0.025 = b [ ( l — ( l -k) c ] 
If the first of these is evaluated at C = 5 . 7 (the mean value of C over 
the entire sample), it yields an estimate of 0.083 for (k). This estimate 
of (k) is much lower than that derived from equation (A-4) (0.240); 
both estimates, however, give testimony to the argument that (k) is 
small and certainly not of the order of 0.6 to 1.06. The second and first 
5. The simple coefficient of determination between Y t and Y ! is 0.413 and 
between Y, and Ct is 0.115. The effect of C t upon Y, when C t is the only in-
dependent variable is negative. 
6. As will be seen in the next paragraph, a value for (k) as high as 0.375 is 
estimated if only 1958 and 1959 data are used. If (k) is less than 0.4, the securities 
market requires at least five years to alter actual yields by 90 per cent of any change 
in equilibrium yields. 
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together place (b) at 0.064. The coefficient of C t being positive (0.025) 
indicates that securities usually enter the economy with yields below 
their equilibrium yields. 
With so few observations, to fit the same regression to portions of 
this data approaches folly. Thus, it is offered with a warning that it be 
treated with skepticism. The table below summarizes the results for 
1958 and 1959 together and for 1961 and 1962 together : 
1958 and 1959 1961 and 1962 
Coefficient of determination 0.793 0.800 
„ M t 0.041 0.000 * 
„ Y' 0.057 1.145 
„ C t —0.020 0.072 
Estimate of k j 0.375 —0.025 
„ b 0.044 —0.002 
*Positive, but less than 0.0005. 
•[Evaluated, as earlier, at the mean values of C; C = 6.1 in 1958, 1959 and 
C = 5.4 in 1961, 1962 
This subdivision of the sample suggests (but no more!) three possible 
conclusions: 1) that the rate of adjustment of securities yields toward 
their equilibrium values (k) has declined in recent years; 2) that secu-
rities of greater maturity have not recently commanded as large a pre-
mium as earlier (b); and 3) that new securities have been issued recent-
ly at yields below equilibrium yields while earlier the reverse was true 
(the coefficient of C t ) . These suggestions gain greater value in that they 
corroborate the conclusions of Section IV. 
Returning to the estimates of equation (A- l l ) , we can deduce the 
equilibrium yield functions over 1958-62. This is done by assuming that 
the government issues each year its securities at the equilibrium yield, 
i.e., Y t = Y ' since this equality indicates that there is no tendency for 
the market to change the issue-yield. This also implies that the C t 
coefficient would be zero and hence we must put the average value of 
that term (as in equation (A- l l ) ) into the constant term of our new 
equilibrium yield function7 . 
7. Thus (0.025) times (5.7) is added to each constant (5.7 is the mean value 
of C in the sample). 
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These steps give us: 
(A-13) Yt 
i 
= Y t = Y1 = J 
f 2.514 in 1958 
2.761 in 1959 
3.306 in 1960 
3.470 in 1961 
3.512 in 1962 j 
• + .064 M t 
It is particularly worthnoting that the constant terms conform to a 
priori expectations—the yield curve intercept bears almost exactly 
the same relationship to the Bank Rate after the Bank Rate rise (3.512 
by 1962) as before it (2.514 in 1958). Moreover, four-fifths of this 
rise in the equilibrium yield curve intercept occurred within 18 months 
(by June 1960) of the Bank Rate change (from 2.514 to 3.306). It is also 
interesting that this equilibrium yield curve is much more affected by 
the maturity of the security than any of the actual yield relations. This 
is also reasonable; when actual yields differ considerably from equili-
brium yields, they will not be so greatly affected by factors that signifi-
cantly affect those equilibrium yields. Equation (A-13) is plotted in 
Figure A-l , for each of the years 1958-1962 and with the maturity time 
noted for which the equilibrium yield equals the Bank Rate. 
As an illustration of the difference between the actual yield (as 
estimated in equation (A-l l ) ) and the equilibrium yield (as computed 
in (A-13)), let us consider the yield history of a hypothetical central 
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government security issued in 1957 at 3 per cent and to be redeemed 
in 1967. For each year, its actual and equilibrium yields may be com-
puted (from equations (A-1.1) and (A-13) respectively): 
Year Actual yield 
(1) 
Equilibrium 
yield 
(2) 
1957 3.00 * 
1958 2.92 3.09 
1959 3.02 3.27 
1960 3.23 3.75 
1961 3.29 3.85 
1962 3.31 3.83 
* not calculable. 
These two series are plotted in Figure A-2. It should be noted that the 
equilibrium yield declines over 1961/62, but by then the actual yield is 
so far below this equilibrium yield that it continues its climbing. 
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Appendix B 
(SECTION VII) 
SCHEDULED BANKS' BORROWINGS FROM THE STATE BANK 
(by type of collateral offered) 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
Counter-
Date Securities Bills finance Total 
0 ) (2) (3) (4) 
f March 26 1.85 n.a. n.a. 4.92 
J June 25 0.71 99 99 1.41 
| Sept. 24 0.72 99 99 0.97 
I^Dec. 30 1.05 99 99 12.77 
f March 25 2.12 99 99 12.92 
J June 24 0.99 99 99 0.98 
j Sept. 30 1.02 99 99 2.82 
I^Dec. 30 5.58 6.09 6.17 17.84 
'March 29 8.10 1.14 3.70 12.94 
. June 29 4.11 — — 2.83 
^ Sept. 28 4.03 . — 0.52 4.19 
Dec. 28 8.13 13.31 — 21.44 
f March 29 8.11 8.47 16.58 
J June 28 5.65 — 4.42 9.30 
j Sept. 27 4.93 — 1.03 5.72 
l^Dec. 27 5.06 3.37 6.28 14.71 
fMarch 28 2.35 3.72 6.43 12.50 
! June 27 2.62 1.25 — 3.87 
"j Sept. 26 1.59 0.63 — 2.22 
^Dec. 26 3.27 1.22 13.65 18.14 
'March 27 1.22 1.46 5.63 8.31 
June 26 0.35 0.64 — 0.99 
I Sept. 25 0.70 0.55 — 1.25 
Dec. 24 3.36 2.57 3.82 9.75 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
(Contd. on next page) 
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(Conld. from previous page) 
^ . • Counter- _ . , 
Year Date Securities Bills . Total finance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
' M a r c h 24 5.48 3.22 6.60 15.30 
June 30 0.55 0.06 — 0.61 
* Sept. 30 0.57 0.53 4.71 5.81 
Dec. 30 11.04 15.51 14.62 41.17 
f March 31 12.71 4.92 17.78 35.41 
J June 30 3.39 3.95 26.42 33.76 
Sept. 29 4.63 11.22 20.79 36.64 
Dec. 29 5.85 15.05 28.88 49.78 
March 30 8.10 n.a. n.a. 72.39 
Sources and Methods: 
Col. (1): Through March 1958, the encumbered securities of the 
Scheduled Banks (courtesy: State Bank). From June 1958 
on, the figure is from the Weekly Statement (as reported to 
the press; it is not given in any State Bank publication), 
"borrowings from State Bank: others"; this figure includes 
not only borrowings on security collateral but also any "clean" 
borrowing by the Scheduled Banks. 
Col. (2): Derived residually by subtracting Columns (1) and (3) from 
Column (4). Thus, the figure is not available before Decem-
ber 1955. From December 1955 through March 1958, the 
figure includes any "clean" advances by the State Bank to 
the Scheduled Banks; the figures derived for June and 
September of 1956 and 1957 are negative and hence are 
assumed zero in the table (this is perhaps a result of the under-
estimation of Column (4) in the Weekly Statement). From 
June 1958 on, the figure no longer includes any "clean" 
borrowing. 
Col. (3): Borrowing from the State Bank on collateral of government 
advances (courtesy: State Bank). 
Col. (4): Weekly Statement. 
Note: The figures in Column (1) up to March 1958 were intended as rough 
estimates, not accurate statistics, and should be treated as such. 
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Appendix C 
(SECTION IX) 
The purpose of this appendix is to show rigorously that, if a bank 
has a choice between various sources of funds with which to make 
new advances, it will not usually be indifferent between them. Profit-
ability considerations will dictate the sequence in which the various 
sources should be tapped. Also, in this process, we shall see more clear-
ly the nature of the ultimate limits to the profitable expansion of a 
single bank. 
Since we are interested in advance expansion in the face of inade-
quate funds, it will be convenient to begin with a bank that 1) has no 
excess cash assets, and 2) is doing no lending in the call money market, 
but 3) is not yet in debt either to the State Bank or to the other banks 
(through call borrowing). We shall assume that this bank has more 
securities than are required to maintain its liquidity ratio initially (see 
Section IV). Finally, since the scale of operations of the bank is irrele-
vant, we may divide all assets and liabilities figures by the amount 
of initial deposits in the bank. The bank's initial balance sheet may then 
be written: 
where (e) is the initial excess of the actual liquidity ratio over the re-
quired1. Since (e) plays an important role in what follows, it will be 
wise to specify more carefully what "initially" means. The "initial" 
position occurs when a bank must turn to either the State Bank or the 
call market if it is to further increase its advances2. 
1. "SBP" means State Bank of Pakistan and "advances" includes bills 
throughout. The assumption, that no excess cash assets means these are 5 per 
cent of deposits plus call debt (on which reserves must be held), will be arbitrarily 
maintained throughout this appendix. A more basic set of assumptions, leading 
to the same 5-per-cent ratio, might be that 1) half of deposits are always demand, 
half time (requiring 3-1/2 per cent of deposits to be kept as State Bank balances), 
and2) 1-1/2 per cent of deposits must be kept in vault cash (without any economies 
of scale). 
2. If it is possible for the bank to expand its deposits or sell some of its securi-
ties, it is not yet to the "initial" position. We assume that, at the "initial" posi-
tion, neither of these is possible. 
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves = 0.05 
Securities = 0.15 + e 
Advances = 0.80 — e 
Deposits 
Call debt 
SBP debt 
1.00 
0 .00 
0 .00 
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We must consider three possible ways for the bank to acquire 
funds : 1) borrow call money; 2) borrow from the State Bank on the 
collateral of securities; and 3) borrow from the State Bank on the 
collateral of eligible bills. It is easy to compare the relative merits of 
the second and third ways; borrowing on securities collateral can never 
be preferable to borrowing on bills, for the two cost the same (the Bank 
Rate) and "encumbering" bills does not affect the liquidity ratio3. Thus, 
between posting bills or securities collateral, the bank either will be 
indifferent or will prefer to post bills. We must take our task in two 
parts: 1) the bank has eligible bills and may either use them for State 
Bank borrowing or borrow call money; and then 2) the bank has no 
eligible bills and may either post securities collateral for State Bank 
borrowing or borrow call money. In the interests of simplicity and 
brevity, we may neglect the intermediate case of some eligible bills 
after the use of which securities collateral is posted. 
First, the case where eligible bills are owned. The bank makes new 
advances of an amount (a), simultaneously increasing its deposits by 
that amount. The deposits are withdrawn4, which reduces the initially 
just adequate cash reserves by an equivalent amount (a). In order to 
replenish its cash reserves, the bank borrows (i) of call money and 
(b) f rom the State Bank on its bills collateral. Its balance sheet, at the 
end of this expansion, is: 
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves = 0.05 + i + b — a Deposits = 1.00 
Securities = 0 .15+e Call debt = i 
Advances = 0 .80—e+a SB P debt = b 
The bank must choose the most profitable combination of (i) 
and (b). But, its choice is constrained in two ways: 1) the ratio of its 
cash reserves to its deposits plus call debt must be at least 5 per cent; 
and the ratio of its reserves plus securities5 to its deposits plus call debt 
3. In fact, bill borrowing has not always cost exactly the Bank Rate; be-
cause the differential has been neither constant nor large, we may simplify by 
assuming it zero. 
4. We assume that the bank expects, correctly, these new deposits to be fully 
withdrawn. For simplicity, we neglect any later flows of deposits back to the 
bank. 
5. Technically, its unencumbered securities; but we are not yet considering 
borrowing on securities collateral. 
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must be at least 20 per cent. Mathematically, we may write that the bank 
is to maximize its marginal profits on the advances expansion (P), 
where 
(C-l) P = a r A — brB— ir, 
(where rA, rB, and r, are, respectively, the rate of interest (marginal) 
on advances, State Bank borrowing {i.e., the Bank Rate), and call mo-
ney) subject to the reserve-ratio constraint, 
(C-2) ( 0 . 0 5 + i + b — a ) > 0.05 (1 .00+i) 
and the liquidity-ratio constraint, 
(C-3) (0.05 + i + b — a ) + (0.15 + e ) > 0.20 (1.00 + i ) 
Inequalities (C-2) and (C-3) can be reduced to the following: 
(C-4) 0 .95 i+b ^ a 
(C-5) 0 .80 i+b ^ a—e 
If constraints (C-4) and (C-5) are graphed, it is seen, that the 
situation differs according to whether a ^ 6.33e, In Figure C-l , 
FIGURE C • 1 
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FIGURE C ~2 
a < 6.33e, and in Figure C-2, a > 6.33e; in each figure, the region 
of feasible choice of (i) and (b) is above and to the right of the shading. 
When (a) is small relative to (e), as in Figure C-l , the liquidity ratio 
is never a constraint; if the reserve ratio is restored, the liquidity ratio 
is at least 20 per cent. Thus, in Figure C-l, one "constraint" (liquidity) 
always lies inside the other (reserves) and is never relevant to the bank's 
choice between (i) and (b). In Figure C-2, on the other hand, both 
constraints are potentially effective. For high values of (i) and low 
values of (b), liquidity is a constraint; for low values of (i) and high 
values of (b), reserves are; at one point, Q, both constraints are opera-
tive. Thus, when (a) is large relative to (e), either the liquidity ratio or 
the reserve ratio or both may constrain the bank's choice between (i) 
and (b). 
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The bank must choose the least costly combination of (i) and (b) 
from among those above and to the right of the shading. Clearly, the 
optimum combination will be along the shading since borrowing of 
any kind that is not required to fulfil the constraints is unnecessarily 
costly. The problem, as seen in Figures C-l and C-2, is to find the 
point along the shading which is touched by the most profitable iso-
profit line. The slope of the iso-profit lines (di/db for constant values 
of P, a, rA, rB, and r, in equation (C-l) ) is: 
di 
(C-6) — rB—r, = 0 
or 
di rR 
< & 7 > db = - rf 
In Figure C-l , where a < 6.33e, there are two possibilities: 
1) if r, < ,95rB, i = 1 . 0 5 a , a n d b = 0 ; 
2) if r, > .95rB, i = 0 , and b = a . 
When the liquidity ratio provides no constraint on the bank's choice, 
the bank will finance its advances expansion either entirely by State 
Bank borrowing (on bills collateral) or entirely by call money borrow-
ing. The choice depends only on the relative rates of interest of the two 
sources of funds. It should be noted that, if the bank chooses to borrow 
call money, it must borrow an amount greater than (a) since it is required 
to hold reserves (of 5 per cent) against such borrowing6. Thus, the 
question the bank asks is whether one rupee of (b) costs more or less 
than 1.05 rupees of (i); hence the result depends upon whether r, is 
greater or less than 0.95rB. 
In Figure C-2, where a > 6.33e, the problem is more compli-
cated; there is now a range of values of r, and rB which will induce 
the bank to finance its expansion by some call borrowing and some 
State Bank borrowing (i.e., the point Q is a possible touching point of 
the highest feasible iso-profit line). There are then three possibilities: 
1) if r, < 0.80rB, i = 1 . 2 5 (a—e), and b = 0 ; 
2) if 0.80rB < r, < 0.95 rB , i = 6 . 6 7 e , and b = a — 6 . 3 3 e ; 
3) if r, > 0.95rB, i = 0 and b = a . 
6. Liquidity must also be held against such borrowing, but liquidity is no 
constraint in this case. 
131. 
The r, {§ 0.95rB criterion is familiar f rom the preceding case; the 
r, ^ 0.80rB criterion results f rom the fact that the liquidity ratio is 
now a constraint (except in the third possibility). Since liquid assets 
must be held against call money debt, this means that to reduce (b) 
by one rupee requires increasing (i) by 1.25 rupees; thus a second crite-
rion is introduced, whether r, 0.80rB. 
To summarize, we must distinguish three ranges of r„ less than 
0.80rB, between 0.80rB and 0.95rB, and greater than 0.95rB. 
When r, is less than 0.80rB, as in Figure C-3, the bank borrows 
only call money; once advances expand beyond 6.33e, the bank's 
excess liquidity is used up, and it must maintain ever larger excess 
reserves in order to meet its liquidity requirements7. 
FIGURE C - 3 
7. The bank might be willing to purchase additional securities, rather than 
keep excess reserves, if it were sure that the higher demand for advances would 
continue. But that need not concern us here. 
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FIGURE C - 4 
When r, is between 0.80rB and 0.95rB, as in Figure C-4, the bank 
expands by borrowing call money until its excess liquidity is used up 
(at a = 6 . 3 3 e ) and thereafter by borrowing from the State Bank (on its 
bills). When r, is greater than 0.95rB (not pictured), the bank expands 
its advances by borrowing, on a one-to-one basis, from the State Bank; 
its initial excess liquidity never changes. 
It can easily be shown, by substituting the optimum values of (i)and 
(b) into the marginal profit equation (C-l), that expanton is always 
profitable to the bank as long as the marginal earning rate on advances 
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(rA) is greater than the Bank Rate (rB). Does this mean that there is 
no limit to the expansion potential of a bank? Yes, if the marginal 
call money rate to it stays below four-fifths of the Bank Rate (i.e., 
below 3.2 per cent in Pakistan today). But this would require that the 
bank be both very small in the call market and that other potential call 
money borrowers happen to be inactive. Once r, rises out of this low 
region, the bank prefers, soon or late, to use State Bank borrowing. 
This it can only do as long as it has eligible bills to post as collateral, 
and these must run out eventually. 
Suppose, to consider the simple extreme case, the bank's eligible 
bills are immediately exhausted (i.e., b = 0 throughout). Would it be 
profitable to expand by means of call money alone? A look at the verti-
cal axes of Figures C-l and C-2 shows that eventually liquidity be-
comes the relevant constraint. Then the bank must borrow 1.25 rupees 
on call for each one rupee of new advances. Obviously, it is profitable 
only if r , < 0.80rA. This condition is much more strict than it at first ap-
pears, for we are talking of marginal rates. Individual banks, as we have 
seen (Section V), have not enough power (or audacity) to raise advance 
rates; thus, the marginal rA is not much above the average rA. But 
the call market, as we have seen (Section VIII), is sufficiently sticky that 
it might require significantly higher rates to increase borrowings; 
thus, the marginal r, is probably well above the average r,. For 
example, if the marginal advance rate were 7 per cent and the average 
call rate 3-1/2 per cent, the elasticity of supply of call money to the 
bank need only be 1.67 to make it unprofitable to borrow. 
We may now turn to the other basic situation, where the bank can 
borrow on securities collateral (as well as on call) but not on bills colla-
teral, to see if the conclusions are altered. We start with the same initial 
position and again assume that the bank makes new advances of (a) 
and borrows call money (i) and f rom the State Bank on securities 
collateral (b). The only difference is that this last action encumbers 
securities and hence directly affects the liquidity ratio. The balance 
sheet, after (a) of new advances are made, is: 
Assets 
Reserves 
Unencumbered 
securities 
Encumbered 
Liabilities 
0 . 0 5 + i + b — a Deposits 1.00 
0 .15+e—b Call debt 
securities 
Advances 
b 
0.80 — e + a 
SBP debt b 
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The profit equation and the reserve ratio constraint are the same as 
equations (C-l) and (C-2), respectively; but the liquidity ratio 
constraint becomes: 
(C-8) ( 0 . 0 5 + i + b — a ) + ( 0 . 1 5 + e — b ) > 0.20(1.00+i) 
or, simplifying, 
(C-9) i > 1,25(a - e) 
It is left to the interested reader to show that inequalities (C-4) 
and (C-9) provide three possible problems to the bank: 
1) if a < e, inequality (C-9) is inoperative. Thus, only the reserve 
constraint is relevant. 
2) if e < a < 6.33e, both constraints are potentially relevant. 
3) if a > 6.33e, inequality (C-4) is inoperative (since the value 
of (i) demanded by liquidity considerations always exceeds the value 
required by reserve considerations). Thus, only the liquidity constraint 
is relevant. 
The critical values of r, and rB for the bank are again whether 
r, ^ 0.95rB. There is now no r, ^ 0.80rB criterion since the choice 
between call money and State Bank borrowing on securities does not 
involve differential liquidity effects: call money requires extra liquidity 
to be held and borrowing now reduces liquidity (unlike bills-collateral 
borrowing which did not). This problem may be solved in the same 
way as before, with the results: 
1) when a < e, 
i) if r, > 0.95rB, i = 0 , and b = a ; 
ii) if r, < 0.95rB, i = 1 . 0 5 a , and b = 0 . 
2) when e < a < 6.33e, 
i) if r, > 0 .95r B , i=1 .25(a—e) , and b = 1.19e—0.19a; 
ii) if r, < 0.95rB, i = 1.05a, and b = 0 . 
3) when a > 6.33e, i = 1.25(a—e), and b = 0 , 
regardless of whether r, ^ 0.95rB. 
When r, < 0.95rB, the results are as pictured in Figure C-3; 
only call money is used to finance expansion. It should be noted that 
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call money competes more successfully with State Bank borrowing on 
securities than on bills, because of the different liquidity effects of the 
two kinds of State Bank borrowing. Whereas the call rate needed to be 
less than 0.80 of the Bank Rate to replace, always and entirely, bills-
collateral borrowing, it need only be less than 0.95 of the Bank Rate 
to replace securities-collateral borrowing. 
When r, > 0.95rB, the problem is more complicated, as seen in 
Figure C-5. While there is excess liquidity (a <; e), State Bank borrow-
F I G U R E C r 5 
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ing is used; once the excess liquidity disappears, the liquidity and 
reserve ratios are both just maintained by borrowing call money and 
repaying State Bank debt; and once all securities have become unen-
cumbered, excess reserves are accumulated in order to meet the liqui-
dity requirement8. 
It is even more obvious in this situation that expansion eventually 
requires the borrowing of call money at a rate sufficient to make the 
new advances and to provide the liquidity which must be held against 
call debt. Thus, as before (when the eligible bills were exhausted), 
expansion eventually requires the borrowing of 1.25 rupees of call 
money for each one rupee of new advances. Expansion is profitable 
as long as r, <c 0.80rA, the same criterion we discovered earlier. 
Two important conclusions emerge from this appendix. One is 
that a bank which has a choice between two or more sources for new 
funds will prefer one particular combination of borrowings, if it con-
siders only its profits. All feasible debt combinations are not equally 
profitable; in fact just the opposite, it is rare that profit maximization 
does not dictate one precise combination of borrowings. Other consi-
derations may lead to the rejection of the profit-maximizing combina-
tion of debt, but it is still relevant to the bank's calculations. 
The second conclusion concerns the nature of the limit to the 
expansion of a single bank. The limit is not technological or institu-
tional; provided that call money can be found at some price, the indi-
vidual bank can always expand. But sooner or later, the marginal 
price of call money to the bank will exceed 80 per cent of its marginal 
earning rate on advances. When this happens, it is no longer profitable 
to expand' . 
8. The possibility of purchasing new securities with these excess reserves is 
again neglected. 
9. Of course, many banks would prefer to stop expanding long before this 
limit is reached, for other reasons.' 
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Appendix D 
( SECTION X ) 
The exact relationship between the rate on call money and the 
amount of inter-bank call borrowing follows from, though not very 
simply, the shapes and positions of the schedules of the borrower and 
the lender banks. Let us assume that, for each group of banks, the 
amount which is borrowed (or, if negative, lent) is a decreasing function 
of the ratio of the call rate to the Bank Rate. To the borrower banks' 
schedule is added a shift parameter which increases when the demand 
for advances rises; to the lender banks' schedule is also added such a 
shift parameter, usually less than that of the borrower banks. Mathe-
matically, we may write: 
(D-l) IB = f ( i ) + a 
(D-2) IL = g ( i ) + k a 
(D-3) IB = _ I U = I 
where: IB = the borrowings of the borrower banks; 
IL = the borrowings (always negative, and hence 
lendings) of the lender banks; 
i = the ratio of the call rate to the Bank Rate; 
a = the shift parameter for borrower banks; 
ka == the shift parameter for lender banks; 
I => the volume of inter-bank borrowing. 
By substitution, we may reduce equations (D-l) through (D-3) 
to one equation relating (i) and (I): 
(D-4) I = k f ( i ) ~ k ^ 
Two extremes of this function may be easily seen. If k = 0 so that the 
lenders* schedule never moves, equation (D-4) reduces to 
(D-5) I = - g(i) 
The amount transferred is simply the "mirror image" of the lenders' 
supply schedule, regardless of the shape or shifts of the borrowers' 
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schedule. If, on the other hand, the borrowers' schedule never moves 
(i.e., a = 0 but ka 0, which requires finding the limit of (D-4) as k 
approaches infinity), equation (D-4) reduces to 
(D-6) I = f(i) 
The amount transferred is simply the borrowers' schedule. For inter-
mediate values of (k), the relationship (D-4) involves both schedules, 
the borrowers' and the lenders'. 
The shape of (D-4) may be seen by taking the first and second 
derivatives of I with respect to (i): 
(D-7) dl/di = k f ' ( i ) - g ' ( i ) 
1 + k 
(D-8) d > I / d i 2 = ^ " W - g M i ) 
1 + k 
Where the primes and double primes refer to the first and second 
derivatives of f(i) and g(i) with respect to (i). Equation (D-7) is not 
necessarily positive or negative even if we stipulate that any realistic 
values of f ' (i) and g ' (i) are negative. The positive relationship of (i) 
and (I) which is in fact discovered implies that 
g ' (i) 
(D-9) > k 
f ' ( 0 
If (k) is small (i.e., very much less than one), condition (D-9) merely 
requires that the lenders' schedule be not too insensitive to changes in 
(i)d relative to the borrowers' schedule. 
In the text, Figure X - 3 suggests that there may be some curvature 
in the relationship between (i) and (I). Specifically, it appears that an 
ever-larger volume of (I) is transferred as (i) increases toward the unity 
region. Thus, the second derivative, d2 I/di2 appears to be positive. 
This requires, in terms of equation (D-8), that 
(D-10) g ' (i) < k f ' (i) 
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Since (k) is small, this means either that g" (i) is negative or that f" (i) 
is a large positive. Neither of these seems very plausible. The former 
implies that the lenders supply ever-larger increments of (I) as (i) 
approaches the Bank Rate; the latter implies that the borrowers demand 
ever smaller decrements of (I) as (i) approaches the Bank Rate. This 
latter is surely not true, the reverse being far more likely: borrowers 
will probably demand ever-larger decrements of (I) as (i) approaches 
the Bank Rate (see Appendix C). Even the former seems less than 
equally likely as its reverse: as the call rate nears the Bank Rate, we 
would expect the lenders to draw ever closer to the limits of their lend-
ing, and further increases in (i) to evoke ever-smaller responses. Thus, 
if forced to a choice, we should expect a priori exactly the opposite 
curvature to the relationship between (i) and (I) as that exhibited in 
Figure X-3. 
There are two further possible explanations of this curious curva-
ture. One is that there has been a secular shift, or a series of shifts, un-
related to the demand for advances, in the supply schedule of lenders 
over recent years; and that, since in the last few years high call rates 
have occurred, this shift has given the appearance of curvature. It is 
true that the American banks, sizable lenders in this market, have 
recently received great increments of the United States government 
deposits. But most of this has occurred since June 1961, while the two 
extreme right-hand crosses in Figure X-3 arc those of September and 
December 1960. 
The other possible explanation is that we are mistaken in assuming 
the lenders' schedule to be a function of the ratio of the call rate to the 
Bank Rate' . If the alternative assets of the lenders are not government 
securities or advances, whose rates are at least somewhat tied to the 
Bank Rate, but cash and excess State Bank balances, whose yield is 
zero, then their lendings may be a function of the call rate alone. If 
this is so, the model of equations (D-l ) through (D-3) is incorrect, 
and (D-2) should be replaced by: 
( D - l l ) 1L = g(bi) + ka 
where (b) is the Bank Rate, and hence (bi) the call rate. The relation of 
(I) to (i) and (b) is then not equation (D-4) but : 
1. Though it is clear from Appendix C that the borrowers' schedule is almost 
certainly a function of this ratio. 
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(D-12) I = k f ( i ) 1 7 k g ( b ° 
The effect of the rise in the Bank Rate in 1959 can then be calculated 
by taking the partial derivative of (I) with respect to (b): 
(D-13) d l /db = 
This will be positive for all values of (i). Thus, the volume of funds 
transferred would be greater, at all (i) values, after the Bank Rate rise. 
And, since call rates have been generally high over the last few years, 
this shift would appear as a curvature. But this explanation also fails 
to make sense of the two extreme crosses in Figure X 3, those of 
September and December 1960. 
The conclusion of the text may be wise: half to remain mystified, 
and half to deny that a mystery exists. 
Appendix E 
( S E C T I O N X I I ) 
The statement in the text, that the collateral-exhaustion limit of 
the Scheduled Banks is relatively invariant to State Bank policy, will 
be made more rigorously here. The State Bank cannot reject borrowing 
applications based on government securities collateral or counter-finance 
(Sections IV and VII); as far as State Bank policy is concerned, we 
may accept these borrowings as given'. Here, then, we shall examine 
the effects upon the limit to Scheduled Bank borrowing of a change in 
the State Bank's willingness to accept bills as collateral. 
The following symbols will be used in this appendix: 
B is the amount of borrowing done on the collateral of bills; 
D is the total amount of State Bank borrowing; 
T is the total amount of eligible bills held by those Scheduled 
Banks which are in debt to the State Bank2 . 
1. Also assumed given throughout this appendix is any "clean" lending. 
2. Assumed fixed here. To the argument that an increased willingness on 
the part of the State Bank to accept bills collateral will evoke greater bill-lending 
jq th e banking system, we need only note that this has not in fact occurred. 
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At any moment of time, we can define (a) and (b) as the following 
fract ions: 
(E- l ) B = a T 
(E-2) B = b D 
Now consider two extreme changes in State Bank policy: 
1) If the State Bank were now to refuse to accept bills as collateral 
at all, the amount of borrowing would decline by (b D) to : 
(E-3) D, = ( I—b)D 
The per-cent fall in borrowing would be: 
, c .. D — D , , (E-4) = b 
2) If, on the other hand, the State Bank were to accept all bills 
as collateral, the amount of borrowing would rise by (1—a)T to : 
(E-5) D 2 = D + ( 1 - a ) T = ( l - b + ^ ) D 
The per-cent rise in borrowing would be: 
(E-6) 
Before analysis of these results, however, two provisos should be 
made. One, the State Bank can never force banks to borrow more than 
they wish, so (E-6) is the per-cent rise in but a restricted sense; (E-4) 
is not so restricted. And two, a change in the eligibility of bills may 
affect the amount of borrowing under securities or counter-finance; 
since any such changes would probably be compensatory, their neglect 
may lead us to overestimate the State Bank's effect. 
Numerical content may now be given formulas (E-4) and (E-6) 
by the example of December 1961. The total borrowing was Rs. 49.78 
crores, of which Rs. 15.05 crores was on the collateral of bills (see 
Appendix B). Thus, (b) was equal to 0.30. The total of all bills in the 
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Scheduled Banks was Rs. 26.56 crores, of which at most 80 per cent 
(i.e., Rs. 21.25 crores) were held by banks which had done State Bank 
borrowing. Thus, (a) was at least 0.71. Using (E-4) and (E-6), we may 
say that State Bank policy could have caused a decline in borrowing 
of 30 per cent and could have permitted an increase in borrowing of 
no more than 12 per cent. In fact, the limits to the possible change the 
State Bank could effect were somewhat less, especially in the upward 
direction; it is not impossible that every bill in every bank that was in 
debt to the State Bank was in fact used as collateral during the busy 
season of 1961/62. Of course, that bills are now 100 per cent eligible 
collateral does not mean that they will always be so. 
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